RK-23F
PC-1

AK1
10-7-69

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/2 (Rev 3/69)

9 OCT 1969

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: [signature] REVIEWED: [signature] LOGGED: 10/6/69 PUNCHED: B VERIFIED: [initials]

Card 1

RECORD IDENTIFICATION: Date (Cal. Yr. 01–02, Mo. 03–04, Day 05–06), Type Report 07, Log Line Number 08–09, Aircraft Number 10–11; Source 12; Don't Count 13; Enemy Action 14; Aircraft Model: Mission Modif 15–16, Basic Mission 17, Design Number 18–20, Series Symbol 21; Model Code 22–23; AIRCRAFT BUREAU NUMBER 24–29; Reporting Custodian 30–32; Squadron Class 33–34; Major Command 35–36; Time of Mishap: Condition 37, LOCAL TIME 38–41

01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41
6	9	0	8	2	6	1	0	3	0	1	1					A	0	0	6	A	0	3	1	5	1	5	7	4	D	1	0	9	2	1	3	2	0	8	1	5

Accident Damage 42; Aircraft Damage 43; Accident Injury 44; Aircraft Injury 45; Hull Number 46–48; Kind of Flight 49–51; Clearance 52; Location: NAME CODE 53–59, Bearing From 60–61 (N/A), Dist. From 62; Fac Runway Descrip: Distance 63, Area 64, Runway Heading 65–66, Length 67, Was Duty Runway Used? 68; Fac Ship Descrip: Ship Type 69, Ship Course 70–71, Ship Speed 72–73, Loc'n Initial Contact 74, Final Rest 75; MOR Coded 76; Trans. Code 77; Card Number 78–80

42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
A	A	A	A				1	A	1	2	A	6	C	H	R	P	T	2	2	0														Y	A	0	1	0

CLOSED
1 MAY 1970

Card 2

Relative Wind: Direction 12–13, Velocity 14–15; Density Altitude 16–18; Alt. of Emergency: Above Terrain 19–21, Pressure Altitude 22–24 (N/A); Aircraft Gross Weight 25–28; 29–30; Fiscal Year 31–32; Fleets and MAWS 33–34; Property Damage Cost: Gov't 35–37, Non Gov't 38–40; "A" Injuries: NAVY DNA 41–42, OTHER 43–44; MARINE DNA 45–46, OTHER 47–48; OTHER 49–50

12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50
										1	6	0	0	0	3	8	0		7	0	0	9	0	0	0								0	1				

"U" Injuries: NAVY DNA 51–52, OTHER 53–54; MARINE DNA 55–56, OTHER 57–58; OTHER 59–60; "L" Injuries: NAVY DNA 61–62, OTHER 63–64; MARINE DNA 65–66, OTHER 67–68; OTHER 69–70; 71–76; Trans. Code 77; Card Number 78–80

51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																										A	0	2	0

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 1 OF 6

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/3 (Rev 3/69)

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: 4 REVIEWED: ___ LOGGED: ___ PUNCHED: ___ VERIFIED: ___

Card 3

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											"B" Injuries										"F" Injuries										"G" Injuries									
Date				Type Report	Log Line Number	Aircraft Number	NAVY		MARINE		OTHER	NAVY		MARINE		OTHER	NAVY		MARINE		OTHER	NAVY		MARINE		OTHER												
Cal. Yr.	Mo.	Day					DNA	OTHER	DNA	OTHER		DNA	OTHER	DNA	OTHER		DNA	OTHER	DNA	OTHER		DNA	OTHER	DNA	OTHER												
01 02	03 04	05 06		07	08 09	10 11	12 13	14 15	16 17	18 19	20 21	22 23	24 25	26 27	28 29	30 31	32 33	34 35	36 37	38 39	40 41																
6 9	0 8	2 6		1	0 3	0 1			0 1																												

Number Individuals Involved A/I Acft	ESCAPE SYS. DATA				Component Separated From Aircraft	Pri Acdt. Type	Pri Phase of Operation	1st Acdt. Type	1st Phase of Operation	2nd Acdt. Type	2nd Phase of Operation	Trans. Code	Card No.
	System	Component	Spec. Data										
42 43 44	45	46 47	48	49 50 51 52 53	54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61	62	63 64 65 66	67 68	69 70 71	72	73 74 75 76	77	78 79 80
0 0 2	B	0 0	A			G	6 4 2	G	6 4 2	B	1 A 2	A	8 3 8

Card 4

	3rd Acdt. Type	3rd Phase of Operation	Type Operations	Contributing Cause	Pilot Error Causal Fac. First	Pilot Error Causal Fac. Second	Pilot Error Causal Fac. Third	Pilot Factor After Fact	Other Personnel Causal Factor First	Other Personnel Causal Factor Second	Other Personnel Causal Factor Third	Other Pers. Factor After Fact	Inv. Mat. Comp 1st Causal Factor Cross Ref.	Component	Ass'y	Sub Ass'y
12 13	14 15	16 17 18	19 20	21 22 23 24 25 26 27	28 29	30 31	32 33	34 35	36 37	38 39	40 41	42	43 44	45 46	47	48 49
			3	1	2 6	0 1	S B									

Involved Mat. Comp. (cont'd.)											Material Fact. After Fact				Acft. Design Comp. Causal Factor											
2nd Causal Factor				3rd Causal Factor																						
Cross Ref.	Component	Ass'y	Sub Ass'y	Cross Ref.	Component	Ass'y	Sub Ass'y				Cross Ref.	Component	Ass'y	Sub Ass'y	Cross Ref.	Component	Ass'y	Sub Ass'y	Special Equipment	Pilot's Equipment		Trans. Code	Card No.			
50 51	52 53	54 55		56 57	58 59	60 61					62 63	64 65	66 67	68 69	70 71	72 73	74	75	76	77	78 79 80					
																				A	8 4 8					

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET ___ OF ___

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/4 (Rev 6-69)

NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: *bp* REVIEWED: ______ LOGGED: ______ PUNCHED: ______ VERIFIED: ______

CARD 6

RECORD IDENTIFICATION: Date – Cal Yr.		Mo.		Day		Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number	
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11
6	9	0	8	2	6	1	0	3	0	1

Weather Causal Factor						Facility Causal Factor	Facility Factor After Fact	Environ. Factor								
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28

Cause + Factor Primary (Misc / Wx / Fact / Pers / Factor) – Mat	X Ref	Comp	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.		Cause + Factor 1st Possible (Misc / Wx / Fact / Pers / Factor) – Mat	X Ref	Comp	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.	
29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42
/					~~S~~ 05	B							

NØ BM

Cause + Factor 2nd Possible (Misc / Wx / Fact / Pers / Factor) – Mat	X Ref	Comp	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.		Cause + Factor 3rd Possible (Misc / Wx / Fact / Pers / Factor) – Mat	X Ref	Comp	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.	
43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56

Cause + Factur 4th Possible (Misc / Wx / Fact / Pers / Factor) – Mat	X Ref	Comp	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.		Special Attention	Special Data and Conditions													Trans. Code	Card Number		
57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
								8	A	D	J	G								A	0	6	0

M DAT

CARD 8

								Material Special Data – First – Code				Second – Code				Third – Code				Fourth – Code				Fifth – Code				Maneuver Prior To Occurrence	Operator Incapacitation Cause Factor									
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49

				1st Ground Support Equipment – Equipment				Component					2nd Ground Support Equipment – Equipment				Component					Multi Occurrences			Multi-Maintenance Problems	Trans. Code	Card Number		
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																												0	8	0

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 3 OF 6

R&DP-20-4(1/68)

NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: [illegible] REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 9

Record Identification: Date – Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day		Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number		1st Flight After Maint.	D. I. R.	Aircraft Data: Tour	Hours Since Acceptance				Since Last Insp.: Type	Hours			Days		Since Last Par/O'Haul: Activity	Hours				Months		Power Plant Model Number							
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39
6	9	Ø	8	2	6	1	Ø	3	Ø	1			3	1	5	5	2	C		8	1	4	Ø	3		4	4	7	1	3								

Power Plant Serial Number										Primary Involved Material Component: Manufacturers Part Number																Total Hours				Since Last Par/O'Haul: Activity	Number	Hours					Trans. Code	Card Number		
40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																																					A	Ø	9	Ø

CARD 10

Pri. Inv. Mat. Comp. (cont'd) Since Last Check Perf.: Type	Hours			Days		Possible or Secondary Involved Material Component: Manufacturers Part Number																Total Hours				Since Last Par/O'Haul: Activity	Number	Hours				Since Last Check Perf.: Type	Hours			Days	
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49

																											Trans. Code	Card Number		
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																												1	Ø	Ø

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 4 OF 6

NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

NAVSAFECEN 3750 - 1/7 (Rev 3/69)

CODED: *bjn* REVIEWED: ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ______

Card 12

RECORD IDENTIFICATION

Date: Cal. Yr.		Date: Mo.		Date: Day		Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number	
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11
6	9	Ø	8	2	6	1	Ø	3	Ø	1

12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42

Pilot's Name										Pilot's Social Security Number								
43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61
C	A	S	E	Y		R		B										

File or Serial Number (Pilot)	Rank/Rate	Br. of Service	Age		Yrs. D.N.A.	Status	Position	Inj. to Indiv.	Abandon A/C	Trans. Code	Card Number		
62–68	69	70	71		72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
(b) (6) [redacted]	5	5	6		Ø	E	1	A	2	A	1	2	Ø

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 5 OF 6

NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

NAVSAFECEN 3750 - 1/8 (Rev 3/69)

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: *[initials]* REVIEWED: ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

Card 13

Record Identification – Date – Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day		Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number		Pilot Factor Inv.	Service Tour	Instrument Card	Emerg. Syst. Train – Last 6 Months		Emerg. Syst. Train – Last 12 Months		Instrument Trainer – Last 6 Months		Instrument Trainer – Last 12 Months		Time All Models – Total		Time All Models – Last 3 Months		Time This Model – Total		Time This Model – Last 3 Months		Inst. Hours Last 3 Months		Nite Hours Last 3 Months		Total Jet or Helo Time		Number of – Total	Number of – Day	Number of – Nite	Total Day This Model	
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41
6	9	0	8	2	6	1	0	3	0	1	1		2			0	3					0	3	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	2	3	1	1		0	0

Carrier Landings – Total Nite This Month		Carrier Landings – This Model Day Last 30 Days		Carrier Landings – This Model Night Last 30 Days			Copilot's Social Security Number									File or Serial Number (Copilot) *INSTR A.F.*							Rank/Rate	Br. of Service	Age	Yrs. D.N.A.	Status	Position	Inj. to Indiv.	Abandon A/C	Pilot Factor Involved	Service Tour	Inst. Card		Trans. Code	Card Number		
42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
0	0	0	0	0	0											(b) (6) [redacted]							5	6	6	2	A	2	B	2	4		2		A	1	3	Ø

Card 14

Emerg. Syst. Train – Last 6 Months		Emerg. Syst. Train – Last 12 Months		Instrument Trainer – Last 6 Months		Instrument Trainer – Last 12 Months		Time All Models – Total		Time All Models – Last 3 Months		Time This Model – Total		Time This Model – Last 3 Months		Inst. Hours Last 3 Months		Night Hours Last 3 Months		Total Jet or Helo Time		Number of Carrier Landings – Total	Day	Night	Total Day This Model		Total Night This Model		This Model Day Last 30 Days		This Model Night Last 30 Days		Copilot's Name									
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54
		0	0			0	0	1	0	1	3	0	0	1	3	2	4	1	4	9	9	1	1		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(b) (6) [redacted]									

File or Serial Number (Inst. Plt. in Other Acft)							Rank/Rate	Br. of Service	Age	Yrs. D.N.A.	Status	Position	Inj. to Indiv.	Abandon A/C	Pilot Factor Involved	Service Tour	Instr. Card					Trans Code	Card Number		
55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																						A	1	4	Ø

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 6 OF ____

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/22 (REV. 5/69)

GENERAL DATA SECTION NARRATIVE BRIEF

I.D. Number	1 2 Yr.	3 4 Mo.	5 6 Day	7 Typ	8 9 Log	10 Typ Brief	13 14 15 Narr File I.D.	69 CL	70 71 72 73 Orig. Use	75 76 Sch Cde	77 78 Trans. Code
	69	08	26	1	03	1	N N N	1		20	A

Common Fields to All Cards

CLASS CODE
1 – Non-Class
2 – Conf

CARD NO. CODED [signature] 10/3 REVIEWED [initials] KEY PUNCHED ____ VERIFIED ____

Card No. (11 12)	Columns 16–68
01	REPL PLT FAILED PULL OUT OF DIVE/EJT. REPL PLT ON 2ND
02	FAM FLT WITH INSTR PLT STBD SEAT. AFTER T/O, SLATS F
03	AILED TO RETRACT NORM WITH REPL PLT ROUGH IN ALT & SP
04	D CONT DURING RECYCLE OF FLAP HANDLE. FLT PROCEEDED T
05	HRU BASIC INSTS, SLOW FLT & APPR TO STALLS. NEXT PHAS
06	E WAS WING OVERS & ROLLS. REPL PLT PULLED NOSE UP @ 1
07	6M FT, 380 KTS & 11M LBS FUEL INT ONLY. ACFT THEN ROL
08	LED INVERTED. NOSE PULLED THRU HORIZON & DOWN TO VERT
09	, PWR 100%. NO RESPONSE TO INSTR'S COMMAND OF REDUCE
10	PWR, POP THE BOARDS & PULL-PULL. INSTR OBSR SPD OF .7
11	-.8 MACH & EJT @ 3500 FT/AMBULANCE PICK-UP. REPL PLT
12	EJT OUTSIDE ENVELOPE/A INJ/HELO PICK-UP. BOTH EJT THR
13	U CPY. ACFT EXPLD AND IMPACT/PRIVATE PROPERTY DAM. PR
14	E-FLT BRIEF DID NOT PERMIT OVERHEAD MANEUVERS. INSTR
15	PLT REFUSED PERMISSION OF OVERHEAD MANEUVER WHEN REQ
16	BY REPL PLT IN FLT. NO MAT FAIL/MAL OF SYS/COMPONETS.
17	CAUSE REPL PLT LACK ANY RESPONSE ON CONTROLS UNDET.
18	~~PRI- REPL PLT- UNDET PHYSICAL INCAPACITATION. CONTRIB~~
19	~~- REPL PLT- LACK OF EXPER IN TYPE ACFT, JUDGMENT BY E~~
20	~~NTRY INTO UNBRIEFED MANEUVER.~~

CARD NO.

— SEE CORRECTED CARD —

R&DP-20-16(1/68)

I.D. Number	1 2 Yr.	3 4 Mo.	5 6 Day	7 Typ	8 9 Seq	10 Typ Brief	13 Narr	14 File	15 A.D.	69 Cls	70 71 72 73 Orig Use	74 75 Sel-Cds	77 78 Trans. Code
	69	Ø8	26	1	Ø3	1	N	N	N	1		2Ø	A

Common Fields to All Cards

CLASS CODE
1 - Non-Class
2 - Conf

TYPE BRIEFS
CODES
1 - GEN. MISHAP
2 - BIO-MED
3 - SAF-SURV
4 - PSYCHO

CARD NO. CODED ______ REVIEWED ______ KEY PUNCHED ______ VERIFIED ______

CARD NO. (11 12)	16–68
18 ~~01~~	PRI- REPL PLT- VIOLATION SOP BY ENTERING UNBRIEFED MA
19 ~~02~~	NEUVER. CONTRIB- REPL PLT- UNUSUAL SITUATION DEVELOPE
2Ø ~~03~~	D BEYOND EXPER LEVEL, UNDET PHYSICAL INCAPACITATION.
04	
05	
06	
07	
08	
09	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	

CARD NO.

R&DP-30(6/68)

REQUEST FOR DELETION OF RECORD OR CODING MODIFICATION FORM

FROM: RECORDS DEPT

DATE 22 DEC 1969

TO: (1) CODING SECT
(2) REC CONT BRANCH 12/22/69
(3) ADPE DIV
(4) REC CONT BRANCH

TRANSACTION CODES

D-Deletion of the entire MISHAP Master Record (use only cc 1-11 and code D in cc 77).

M-Modifying contents of any Master Record field. Use "ØØ" in Person Seq No. field, if field to be modified is in the Gen Data Sect of the Master Record. Otherwise use Person Seq No. for the individual for which the change is to be made. These changes must be in Person Seq No. order.

IDENTIFICATION NO.									AIRCRAFT NUMBER	
YEAR		MONTH		DAY		TYP-RPT	LOG NUMBER			
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11
6	9	Ø	8	2	6	1	Ø	3	Ø	1

CASEY

	FIELD NAME	CARD NUMBER	CARD COL OF FLD START ADD.	FIELD'S STARTING ADDRESS				PERSON SEQ NUMBER		FIELD LENGTH		DATA TO BE INSERTED (LEFT JUSTIFIED)										TAPE REC DIV NO.		TRANS CODE
				12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29			
1	SOURCE	1	12	Ø	Ø	1	2	Ø	Ø	Ø	1	1												
				30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47			
2	PLT CAUSAL FACTORS	4	28	Ø	2	2	5	Ø	Ø	Ø	4	Ø	5	Ø	5									
				48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	77
3	PRI CAUSE	6	34	Ø	2	8	9	Ø	Ø	Ø	2	Ø	5									Ø	1	M

NOTE: (1) For deletions of codes in a given field, leave the "DATA TO BE INSERTED" field blank and use "TRANS CODE" M in cc 77.

(2) Only corrections applying to personnel in one TAPE RECORD DIV may be shown on a single CHANGE REQUEST form.

(b)(6) [redacted]

ORIGINATOR'S SIGNATURE

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 2(LONG)

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/10 (REV 2/69) CODE SHEET_____ OF_____

AIRCRAFT_____ OF_____ PERSONNEL_____ OF_____

CODED: _____ REVIEWED_____ LOGGED_____ PUNCHED: 26 AUG 1970 VERIFIED_____

I.D. Number	69	08	26	1	03	01	2	D	01	01
	1 2 Yr.	3 4 Mo.	5 6 Day	7 Typ	8 9 Log	10 11 A/C NO.	12 Format No.	13 Transaction	14 15 Pers Sequence	16 21 Tot. No. Cards

COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN. TAPE POS	FLD SIZE	CODES
		13		FILE/SERVICE NO	0022	07	
		13		NAME	0029	07	
		09		NAME (CONT)	0036	03	
		07		RANK/RATE	0039	01	
		07		BRANCH OF SERVICE	0040	01	
		07		STATUS	0041	01	
		07		INJURY	0042	01	
		07		DISPOSITION	0043	01	
		08		DAYS HOSPITALIZED	0044	02	
		08		DAYS QUARTERS	0046	02	
		08		DAYS GROUNDED	0048	02	
		09		UNCONSCIOUS	0050	03	
		08		AMNESIA	0053	02	
		08		EXPOSURE/SHOCK	0055	02	
01		13		INJURY NO. 1 BODY PART	0057	07	46AAAA
		13		INJURY NO. 1 DIAGNOSIS	0064	07	5611 33A
		13		INJURY NO. 1 CAUSE	0071	07	
		13		INJURY NO. 2 BODY PART	0078	07	00AAAA
		13		INJURY NO. 2 DIAGNOSIS	0085	07	7762 4A
		13		INJURY NO. 2 CAUSE	0092	07	

CD NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		13		INJURY NO. 3 BODY PART	0099	07	
		13		INJURY NO. 3 DIAGNOSIS	0106	07	
		13		INJURY NO. 3 CAUSE	0113	07	
		13		INJURY NO. 4 BODY PART	0120	07	
		13		INJURY NO. 4 DIAGNOSIS	0127	07	
		13		INJURY NO. 4 CAUSE	0134	07	
		13		INJURY NO. 5 BODY PART	0141	07	
		13		INJURY NO. 5 DIAGNOSIS	0148	07	
		13		INJURY NO. 5 CAUSE	0155	07	
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 1	0162	06	
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 2	0168	06	
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 3	0174	06	
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 4	0180	06	
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 5	0186	06	
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 6	0192	06	
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 7	0198	06	
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 8	0204	06	
		08		X-RAY	0210	02	
		09		PRE-EXISTING DISEASE NO. 1	0212	03	
		09		PRE-EXISTING DISEASE NO. 2	0215	03	

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 2(LONG)

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/10 (REV 2/69) CODE SHEET _____ OF _____

AIRCRAFT _____ OF _____ PERSONNEL _____ OF _____

CODED: _____ REVIEWED _____ LOGGED _____ PUNCHED: _____ VERIFIED: _____

26 AUG 1970

I.D. Number	69	04	26	1	03	41	2	C	12	02
	1 2 Yr.	3 4 Mo.	5 6 Day	7 Typ	8 9 Log	10 11 A/C NO.	12 Format No.	13 Transaction	14 15 Pers Sequence	20 21 Tot. No. Cards

COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN. TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		13		FILE/SERVICE NO	0022	07	
		13		NAME	0029	07	
		09		NAME (CONT)	0036	03	
		07		RANK/RATE	0039	01	
		07		BRANCH OF SERVICE	0040	01	
		07		STATUS	0041	01	
		07		INJURY	0042	01	
		07		DISPOSITION	0043	01	
		08		DAYS HOSPITALIZED	0044	02	
		08		DAYS QUARTERS	0046	02	
		08		DAYS GROUNDED	0048	02	
		09		UNCONSCIOUS	0050	03	
		08		AMNESIA	0053	02	
		08		EXPOSURE/SHOCK	0055	02	
01		13		INJURY NO. 1 BODY PART	0057	07	LV 0AAAA
		13		INJURY NO. 1 DIAGNOSIS	0064	07	5210 09C
		13		INJURY NO. 1 CAUSE	0071	07	
		13		INJURY NO. 2 BODY PART	0078	07	R21AAAA
		13		INJURY NO. 2 DIAGNOSIS	0085	07	8360116C
02		13		INJURY NO. 2 CAUSE	0092	07	8020436E

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
	(	13		INJURY NO. 3 BODY PART	0099	07	R15AAAC
	)	13		INJURY NO. 3 DIAGNOSIS	0106	07	8814316C
		13		INJURY NO. 3 CAUSE	0113	07	
		13		INJURY NO. 4 BODY PART	0120	07	
		13		INJURY NO. 4 DIAGNOSIS	0127	07	
		13		INJURY NO. 4 CAUSE	0134	07	
		13		INJURY NO. 5 BODY PART	0141	07	
		13		INJURY NO. 5 DIAGNOSIS	0148	07	
		13		INJURY NO. 5 CAUSE	0155	07	
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 1	0162	06	
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 2	0168	06	
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 3	0174	06	
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 4	0180	06	
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 5	0186	06	
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 6	0192	06	
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 7	0198	06	
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 8	0204	06	
		08		X-RAY	0210	02	
		09		PRE-EXISTING DISEASE NO. 1	0212	03	
		09		PRE-EXISTING DISEASE NO. 2	0215	03	

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 2(LONG)

11 JUN 1971

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/10 (REV 2/69) CODE SHEET _____ OF _____

AIRCRAFT _____ OF _____ PERSONNEL _____ OF _____

CODED: _____ REVIEWED _____ LOGGED DA PUNCHED: B VERIFIED: D

I.D. Number	69	08	26	1	43	01	2	C	01	01
	1 2 Yr.	3 4 Mo.	5 6 Day	7 Typ	8 9 Log	10 11 A/C NO.	12 Format No.	13 Transaction	14 15 Pers Sequence	20 21 Tot. No. Cards

COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN. TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		13		FILE/SERVICE NO	0 0 2 2	0 7	
		13		NAME	0 0 2 9	0 7	
		09		NAME (CONT)	0 0 3 6	0 3	
		07		RANK/RATE	0 0 3 9	0 1	
		07		BRANCH OF SERVICE	0 0 4 0	0 1	
		07		STATUS	0 0 4 1	0 1	
		07		INJURY	0 0 4 2	0 1	
		07		DISPOSITION	0 0 4 3	0 1	
		08		DAYS HOSPITALIZED	0 0 4 4	0 2	
		08		DAYS QUARTERS	0 0 4 6	0 2	
		08		DAYS GROUNDED	0 0 4 8	0 2	
		09		UNCONSCIOUS	0 0 5 0	0 3	
		08		AMNESIA	0 0 5 3	0 2	
		08		EXPOSURE/SHOCK	0 0 5 5	0 2	
		13		INJURY NO. 1 BODY PART	0 0 5 7	0 7	
		13		INJURY NO. 1 DIAGNOSIS	0 0 6 4	0 7	
01		13		INJURY NO. 1 CAUSE	0 0 7 1	0 7	8 0 2 2 1 4 5
		13		INJURY NO. 2 BODY PART	0 0 7 8	0 7	
		13		INJURY NO. 2 DIAGNOSIS	0 0 8 5	0 7	
		13		INJURY NO. 2 CAUSE	0 0 9 2	0 7	8 0 2 2 1 4 5

CD NO 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		13		INJURY NO. 3 BODY PART	0 0 9 9	0 7	
		13		INJURY NO. 3 DIAGNOSIS	0 1 0 6	0 7	
		13		INJURY NO. 3 CAUSE	0 1 1 3	0 7	
		13		INJURY NO. 4 BODY PART	0 1 2 0	0 7	
		13		INJURY NO. 4 DIAGNOSIS	0 1 2 7	0 7	
		13		INJURY NO. 4 CAUSE	0 1 3 4	0 7	
		13		INJURY NO. 5 BODY PART	0 1 4 1	0 7	
		13		INJURY NO. 5 DIAGNOSIS	0 1 4 8	0 7	
		13		INJURY NO. 5 CAUSE	0 1 5 5	0 7	
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 1	0 1 6 2	0 6	
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 2	0 1 6 8	0 6	
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 3	0 1 7 4	0 6	
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 4	0 1 8 0	0 6	
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 5	0 1 8 6	0 6	
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 6	0 1 9 2	0 6	
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 7	0 1 9 8	0 6	
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 8	0 2 0 4	0 6	
		08		X-RAY	0 2 1 0	0 2	
		09		PRE-EXISTING DISEASE NO. 1	0 2 1 2	0 3	
		09		PRE-EXISTING DISEASE NO. 2	0 2 1 5	0 3	

HSEY

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION DIRECTOR CARD

NAVSAFECEN 3750 – 1/20 (NEW 3/69)

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: ___ REVIEWED: ___ LOGGED: ___ PUNCHED: ___ VERIFIED: 12 DEC 1969

RECORD IDENTIFICATION																												
Date						Type Report	Log Line Number	Aircraft Number			Trans Code	No. of Aircraft in Mishap							Corrected Mishap Identification Number								
Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day																								
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
6	9	0	5	2	6	1	0	3	0	0		A	0	1															

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 1 OF 16

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 1(ACFT)

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/21 (New 3/69)

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: Ø REVIEWED: ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

Card 1

RECORD IDENTIFICATION: Date: Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day		Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number		Format No.	Trans Code	Card Number			Reporting Custodian			Acft. Damage	Total Pers. This Acft		Model Acft: Mission Modif.		Basic Mission	Design No.			Series Symbol	Aircraft Bureau Number					
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35
6	9	Ø	8	2	6	1	Ø	3	Ø	1	1	A	Ø	1		D	1	Ø	A	Ø	2			A	Ø	Ø	6	A	1	5	1	5	7	4

Altitude of Emergency: Terrain Clearance					Cabin Altitude					Ambient Altitude					Time At Alt: At Cabin Altitude			At Ambient Altitude			Place in Formation	Cloud Condition	Time of Mishap: Horizon	Condition	DURATION OF FLIGHT		
36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63
1	6	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	8	Ø	Ø	Ø	1	6	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	5	Ø	Ø	5	A	Ø	1	2	Ø	Ø	5

Card 2

Format No.	Trans Code	Card Number			Kind of Flight			Narrative Identification: Safety and Survival						Bio-Med					Combat Environment	Primary Cause	Enemy Action
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34
1	A	Ø	2		1	A	1		8					Ø	C	B	A	Z	Z		1	

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 2 OF 16

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 2(LONG)

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/10 (REV 2/69) CODE SHEET 3 OF 16

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1 PERSONNEL 1 OF 2

CODED: _____ REVIEWED _____ LOGGED _____ PUNCHED: _____ VERIFIED: _____

I.D. Number	1 2 Yr.	3 4 Mo.	5 6 Day	7 Typ	8 9 Log	10 11 A/C NO.	12 Format No.	13 Transaction	14 15 Pers. Sequence	20 21 Tot. No. Cards
	67	08	26	1	03	01	2	A	01	25

COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN. TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
01		13		FILE/SERVICE NO.	0022	07	(b) (6)
		13		NAME	0029	07	CASEY R
		09		NAME (CONT)	0036	03	B
		07		RANK/RATE	0039	01	S
02		07		BRANCH OF SERVICE	0040	01	N
		07		STATUS	0041	01	E
		07		INJURY	0042	01	A
		07		DISPOSITION	0043	01	F
		08		DAYS HOSPITALIZED	0044	02	
		08		DAYS QUARTERS	0046	02	
		08		DAYS GROUNDED	0048	02	
		09		UNCONSCIOUS	0050	03	
		08		AMNESIA	0053	02	
		08		EXPOSURE/SHOCK	0055	02	
03		13		INJURY NO. 1 BODY PART	0057	07	54 04 47 A
		13		INJURY NO. 1 DIAGNOSIS	0064	07	86 1533 4
		13		INJURY NO. 1 CAUSE	0071	07	20 21 4E
		13		INJURY NO. 2 BODY PART	0078	07	04 44 A
04		13		INJURY NO. 2 DIAGNOSIS	0085	07	99 99 84
		13		INJURY NO. 2 CAUSE	0092	07	20 21 4E

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		13		INJURY NO. 3 BODY PART	0099	07	
		13		INJURY NO. 3 DIAGNOSIS	0106	07	
		13		INJURY NO. 3 CAUSE	0113	07	
		13		INJURY NO. 4 BODY PART	0120	07	
		13		INJURY NO. 4 DIAGNOSIS	0127	07	
		13		INJURY NO. 4 CAUSE	0134	07	
		13		INJURY NO. 5 BODY PART	0141	07	
		13		INJURY NO. 5 DIAGNOSIS	0148	07	
		13		INJURY NO. 5 CAUSE	0155	07	
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 1	0162	06	
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 2	0168	06	
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 3	0174	06	
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 4	0180	06	
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 5	0186	06	
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 6	0192	06	
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 7	0198	06	
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 8	0204	06	
		08		X-RAY	0210	02	
		09		PRE-EXISTING DISEASE NO. 1	0212	03	
		09		PRE-EXISTING DISEASE NO. 2	0215	03	

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 2(LONG)

2

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/11 (REV 2/69)

CODE SHEET 4 OF 16

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1 PERSONNEL 1 OF 2

CODED: ____ REVIEWED: ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

I.D. Number	Yr. (1-2)	Mo. (3-4)	Day (5-6)	Typ (7)	Log (8-9)	A/C NO. (10-11)	Format No. (12)	Transaction (13)	Pers Sequence (14-15)	Tot. No. Cards (20-21)
	69	Ø1	24	1	Ø3	Ø1	2	A	Ø1	

COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		09		PRE-EXISTING DISEASE NO. 3	0218	03	
Ø5		08		AUTOPSY	0221	02	N1
		10		MATERIAL TO AFIP	0223	04	2
		07		AFIP REPORT	0227	01	J
		11		ADDITONAL INJURY NO. 1	0228	05	
		11		ADDITIONAL INJURY NO. 2	0233	05	
		11		ADDITIONAL INJURY NO. 3	0238	05	
		11		ADDITIONAL INJURY NO. 4	0243	05	
		11		PSYCHOPHYISIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 1	0248	05	3Ø[illegible]AD
Ø6		11		PSYCHOPHYISIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 2	0253	05	3Ø2AD
		11		PSYCHOPHYISIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 3	0258	05	699AD
		11		PSYCHOPHYISIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 4	0263	05	4Ø1AD
		11		PSYCHOPHYISIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 5	0268	05	4Ø2AD
Ø7		11		PSYCHOPHYISIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 6	0273	05	7Ø2ED
		11		PSYCHOPHYISIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 7	0278	05	7Ø1AS
		11		PSYCHOPHYISIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 8	0283	05	622AS
		08		ROLE OF INDIVIDUAL	0288	02	A1
Ø8		12		LEAVE INFO - DATE LAST LEAVE	0290	06	Ø8Ø669
		09		LEAVE INFO - NO. OF DAYS/TYPE	0296	03	1ØA
		12		DATE LAST PREV. FLIGHT	0299	06	[illegible]

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		09		HOURS FLOWN LAST 24	0305	03	Ø27
Ø9		09		HOURS FLOWN LAST 48	0308	03	Ø27
		10		MISSIONS FLOWN LAST 24 (2)/48 (2)	0311	04	Ø1Ø1
		12		HOURS WORKED LAST 24 (3)/48 (3)	0315	06	[illegible]
		12		HOURS SLEPT LAST 24 (3)/48 (3)	0321	06	Ø4Ø15Ø
1Ø		09		HOURS DUTY PRIOR TO MISHAP	0327	03	Ø25
		09		HOURS AWAKE PRIOR TO MISHAP	0330	03	Ø33
		09		HOURS DURATION LAST SLEEP	0333	03	Ø8Ø
		08		TIME IN COCKPIT PRIOR TO MISHAP	0336	02	2Ø
11		12		PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING NO. 1	0338	06	1Ø1699
		12		PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING NO. 2	0344	06	2Ø1699
		12		PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING NO. 3	0350	06	3Ø1699
		12		PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING NO. 4	0356	06	
		12		PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING NO. 5	0362	06	
		12		PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING NO. 6	0368	06	
		08		AGE	0374	02	25
12		08		HEIGHT	0376	02	(b) (6) [redacted]
		09		WEIGHT	0378	03	[redacted]
		09		SITTING HEIGHT	0381	03	[redacted]
		09		TRUNK HEIGHT	0384	03	[redacted]

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 2(LONG)

3

I.D. Number	1 2 Yr.	3 4 Mo.	5 6 Day	7 Typ	8 9 Log	10 11 A/C NO.	12 Format No.	13 Transaction	14 15 Pers Sequence	20 21 Tot. No. Cards
	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	01	2	A	01	

COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/12 (REV 2/69) CODE SHEET 5 OF 16

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1 PERSONNEL 1 OF 2

CODED: _____ REVIEWED: _____ LOGGED: _____ PUNCHED: _____ VERIFIED: _____

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
13		09		FUNCTIONAL REACH	0 3 8 7	0 3	(b) (6)
		09		BUTTOCK-KNEE LENGTH	0 3 9 0	0 3	
		09		LEG LENGTH	0 3 9 3	0 3	
		09		SHOULDER WIDTH	0 3 9 6	0 3	
14		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 1	0 3 9 9	0 7	9 1 1 I
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 1 CONTINUED	0 4 0 6	0 6	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 1 CONTINUED	0 4 1 2	0 4	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 2	0 4 1 6	0 7	9 9 9 9 A
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 2 CONTINUED	0 4 2 3	0 6	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 2 CONTINUED	0 4 2 9	0 4	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 3	0 4 3 3	0 7	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 3 CONTINUED	0 4 4 0	0 6	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 3 CONTINUED	0 4 4 6	0 4	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 4	0 4 5 0	0 7	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 4 CONTINUED	0 4 5 7	0 6	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 4 CONTINUED	0 4 6 3	0 4	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 5	0 4 6 7	0 7	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 5 CONTINUED	0 4 7 4	0 6	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 5 CONTINUED	0 4 8 0	0 4	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 6	0 4 8 4	0 7	

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 6 CONTINUED	0 4 9 1	0 6	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 6 CONTINUED	0 4 9 7	0 4	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 7	0 5 0 1	0 7	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 7 CONTINUED	0 5 0 8	0 6	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 7 CONTINUED	0 5 1 4	0 4	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 8	0 5 1 8	0 7	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 8 CONTINUED	0 5 2 5	0 6	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 8 CONTINUED	0 5 3 1	0 4	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 9	0 5 3 5	0 7	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 9 CONTINUED	0 5 4 2	0 6	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 9 CONTINUED	0 5 4 8	0 4	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 10	0 5 5 2	0 7	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 10 CONTINUED	0 5 5 9	0 6	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 10 CONTINUED	0 5 6 5	0 4	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 11	0 5 6 9	0 7	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 11 CONTINUED	0 5 7 6	0 6	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 11 CONTINUED	0 5 8 2	0 4	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 12	0 5 8 6	0 7	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 12 CONTINUED	0 5 9 3	0 6	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 12 CONTINUED	0 5 9 9	0 4	

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 2(LONG)

I.D. Number	6 9	0 8	2 6	1	0 3	0 1	2	A	0 1		
	1 2 Yr.	3 4 Mo.	5 6 Day	7 Type	8 9 Log	10 11 A/C NO.	12 Format No.	13 Transaction	14 15 Pers Sequence	20 21 Tot. No. Cards	

COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/13 (REV 2/69) CODE SHEET 6 OF 16

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1 PERSONNEL 1 OF 2

CODED: ____ REVIEWED: ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 13	0 6 0 3	0 7	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 13 CONTINUED	0 6 1 0	0 6	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 13 CONTINUED	0 6 1 6	0 4	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 14	0 6 2 0	0 7	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 14 CONTINUED	0 6 2 7	0 6	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 14 CONTINUED	0 6 3 3	0 4	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 15	0 6 3 7	0 7	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 15 CONTINUED	0 6 4 4	0 6	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 15 CONTINUED	0 6 5 0	0 4	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 16	0 6 5 4	0 7	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 16 CONTINUED	0 6 6 1	0 6	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 16 CONTINUED	0 6 6 7	0 4	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 17	0 6 7 1	0 7	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 17 CONTINUED	0 6 7 8	0 6	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 17 CONTINUED	0 6 8 4	0 4	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 18	0 6 8 8	0 7	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 18 CONTINUED	0 6 9 5	0 6	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 18 CONTINUED	0 7 [illegible] 1	0 4	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 19	0 7 0 5	0 7	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 19 CONTINUED	0 7 1 2	0 6	

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 19 CONTINUED	0 7 1 8	0 4	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 20	0 7 2 2	0 7	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 20 CONTINUED	0 7 2 9	0 6	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 20 CONTINUED	0 7 3 5	0 4	
2		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 21	0 7 3 9	0 4	0 9 0 1
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 22	0 7 4 3	0 4	0 1 0 1
15		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 23	0 7 4 7	0 4	0 5 0 3
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 24	0 7 5 1	0 4	0 7 0 1
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 25	0 7 5 5	0 4	1 2 0 4
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 26	0 7 5 9	0 4	1 [illegible] [illegible] 3
16		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 27	0 7 6 3	0 4	1 7 0 3
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 28	0 7 6 7	0 4	1 8 1 4
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 29	0 7 7 1	0 4	1 9 0 4
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 30	0 7 7 5	0 4	1 [illegible] 1 4
17		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 31	0 7 7 9	0 4	1 9 0 1
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 32	0 7 8 3	0 4	2 0 1 2
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 33	0 7 8 7	0 4	2 0 0 3
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 34	0 7 9 1	0 4	2 2 0 4
18		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 35	0 7 9 5	0 4	1 9 2 9
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 36	0 7 9 9	0 4	2 3 0 4

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 2(LONG)

5

I.D. Number	1 2 Yr.	3 4 Mo.	5 6 Day	7 Typ	8 9 Log	10 11 A/C NO.	12 Format No.	13 Transaction	14 15 Pers Sequence	20 21 Tot. No. Cards
	6 9	0 8	2 6	1	0 3	0 1	2	A	0 1	

COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

NAVSAFECEN 3750 1/14 (REV 2/69) CODE SHEET 7 OF 16

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1 PERSONNEL 1 OF 2

CODED: _____ REVIEWED: _____ LOGGED: _____ PUNCHED: _____ VERIFIED: _____

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
	7	10		EQUIPMENT NO. 37	0 8 0 3	0 4	2 2 0 2
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 38	0 8 0 7	0 4	2 2 0 2
19		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 39	0 8 1 1	0 4	0 6 0 3
		0		EQUIPMENT NO. 40	0 8 1 5	0 4	2 5 9 9
		11		LOCATION IN AIRCRAFT	0 8 1 9	0 5	1 1 1 1 1
		09		METHOD OF ESCAPE	0 8 2 4	0 3	1
20		07		INTENT FOR ESCAPE	0 8 2 7	0 1	1
		07		EXIT USED	0 8 2 8	0 1	2
		07		COCKPIT CONDITION	0 8 2 9	0 1	
		08		ORDER OF ESCAPE	0 8 3 0	0 2	0 2
		09		REASON(S) FOR ESCAPE	0 8 3 2	0 3	6
21		08		COMMUNICATION PRIOR TO ESCAPE	0 8 3 5	0 2	0
		10		NUMBER OF PREVIOUS ESCAPES	0 8 3 7	0 4	
		09		TERRAIN OF LANDING OR CRASH SITE	0 8 4 1	0 3	5
		13		AIRCRAFT ATTITUDE	0 8 4 4	0 7	0 7 0
		08		AIRCRAFT ATTITUDE CONTINUED	0 8 5 1	0 2	
	-	14		EJT. TRAINING/LECTURES	0 8 5 3	0 7	0 1 0 1 0 1 9
		14		EJT. TRAINING/FILMS	0 8 6 0	0 7	
22		14		EJT. TRAINING/ UNARMED SEAT	0 8 6 7	0 7	9 1 9 9
		14		EJT. TRAINING/ ARMED SEAT	0 8 7 4	0 7	3 1 1 9 9

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		09		JUMP/PARASAIL/OTHER SCHOOL ROLE	0 8 8 1	0 3	
		12		EGRESS DIFF. BEFORE PROB. 1 & 2	0 8 8 4	0 6	
		12		EGRESS DIFF. BEFORE PROB. 3 & 4	0 8 9 0	0 6	
	7	12		EGRESS DIFF. DURING PROB. 1 & 2	0 8 9 6	0 6	3 1 A
		12		EGRESS DIFF. DURING PROB. 3 & 4	0 9 0 2	0 6	
		12		EGRESS DIFF. AFTER PROB. 1 & 2	0 9 0 8	0 6	
		12		EGRESS DIFF. AFTER PROB. 3 & 4	0 9 1 4	0 6	
		11		TIME FROM EMER. UNTIL ESCAPE ATTEM.	0 9 2 0	0 5	1 0
23		09		REASON FOR DELAY	0 9 2 5	0 3	9
		11		TERRAIN CLEAR AT ESCAPE	0 9 2 8	0 5	2 0 0 0
		11		TERRAIN CLEAR AT PRCHT. OPENING	0 9 3 3	0 5	
		09		AIR SPEED	0 9 3 8	0 3	5 5 0
		09		GROUND SPEED	0 9 4 1	0 3	
		07		PRCHT. DID NOT OPEN	0 9 4 4	0 1	1
		12		PROTECTIVE HELMET CHINSTRAP/VISOR	0 9 4 5	0 6	
24		08		CHIN STRAP NAPE STRAP	0 9 5 1	0 2	2
		08		ZERO LANYARD	0 9 5 3	0 2	
		07		AUTO LAP BELT RELEASE	0 9 5 5	0 1	
		10		ACFT. CANOPY REMOVAL	0 9 5 6	0 4	0
		09		EJECTION	0 9 6 0	0 3	1 2

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 2(LONG)

6

I.D. Number	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	20	21
	Yr.		Mo.		Day		Typ	Log		A/C NO.		Format No.	Transaction	Pers Sequence		Tot. No. Cards	
	6	9	ϕ	8	3	ϕ	1	ϕ	3	ϕ	1	2	A	ϕ	1		

COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/15 (REV 2/69)

CODE SHEET 8 OF 16

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1 PERSONNEL 1 OF 2

CODED: ____ REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		10		BODY POSITION	0963	04	9
25		09		SEAT POSITION/SEPAR TYPE SEPARATION	0967	03	9 ϕ
		12		Parachute Data Deploy/Open Shock/Oscillat	0970	06	
		10		PARACHUTE DAMAGE	0976	04	
		10		PARACHUTE DAMAGE CAUSE	0980	04	
		07		DIRECTION FACED AT CHUTE LANDING	0984	01	
		11		LANDING CONDITIONS (WEIGHT-WINDS)	0985	05	
		09		DRAGGED BY CHUTE DISTANCE DRAGGED	0990	03	
		10		LANDING POSITION	0993	04	
		09		DEPLOYED BEFORE LANDING	0997	03	
		07		CANOPY DEFLATION POCKETS	1000	01	
		11		SURVIVAL TRAINING SWIM	1001	05	ϕ 7 ϕ 9 ϕ
		11		SURVIAL TRAINING DILBERT DUNK	1006	05	
		11		PARACHUTE DRAG	1011	05	
		11		SURVIVAL TRAIN IMMERSED COCKPIT	1016	05	
		11		SURVIVAL TRAIN IMMERSED SEAT	1021	05	
		11		SURVIVAL TRAIN JUNGLE	1026	05	
		11		SURVIVAL TRAIN ARCTIC	1031	05	
		11		SURVIVAL TRAIN DESERT	1036	05	
		11		SURVIVAL TRAIN MOUNTAIN	1041	05	

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		11		SURVIVAL TRAINING GENERAL	1046	05	
		13		CONDITIONS AT SURVIVAL/ RESCUE SITE (TEMP WINDS)	1051	07	
		10		CONDITION AT SITE CONT. (WAVES)	1058	04	
		10		CONDITION AT SITE CONT. (TERRAIN WEATHER)	1062	04	
		11		TIME LAPSE MISHAP TO ALERT (RESCUE VEH)	1066	05	
		10		TIME LAPSE OTHER ASSIST NO. 1	1071	04	
		10		TIME LAPSE OTHER ASSIST NO. 2	1075	04	
		11		TIME LAPSE ALERT TO DEPART (RESC VEH)	1079	05	
		10		TIME LAPSE ALERT TO DEPART (ASSIST NO. 1)	1084	04	
		10		TIME LAPSE ALERT TO DEPART (ASSIST NO. 2)	1088	04	
		11		TIME LAPSE ALERT TO LOCATE (RESCUE VEH)	1092	05	
		10		TIME LAPSE ALERT TO LOCATE (ASSIST NO. 1)	1097	04	
		10		TIME LAPSE ALERT TO LOCATE (ASSIST NO. 2)	1101	04	
		11		TIME LOCATE TO REACH (RESCUE VEHICLE)	1105	05	
		10		LOCATE TO REACH (ASSIST NO. 1)	1110	04	
		10		LOCATE TO REACH (ASSIST NO. 2)	1114	04	
		11		TIME LAPSE MISHAP TO RESCUE/ABANDON	1118	05	
		10		TIME LAPSE MISHAP TO RESCUE COMPLETE	1123	04	
		10		TIME IN WATER	1127	04	
		10		TIME IN RAFT	1131	04	

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 2(LONG)

NAVSAFECEN 3750 1/10 (REV 2/69) CODE SHEET 9 OF 16

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1 PERSONNEL 2 OF 2

CODED ____ REVIEWED ____ LOGGED ____ PUNCHED ____ VERIFIED ____

I.D. Number	1 2 Yr.	3 4 Mo.	5 6 Day	7 8 Typ	9 Log	10 11 A/C NO.	12 Format No.	13 Transaction	14 15 Pers. Sequence	20 21 Tot. No. Cards
						01	2	A		36

COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

CD. NO. 16 17	CU FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN. TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
01		13		FILE/SERVICE NO.	002	07	(b) (6)
		13		NAME	029	07	(b) (6)
		09		NAME (CONT)	003	03	(b) (6)
		07		RANK/RATE	039	01	
02		07		BRANCH OF SERVICE	040	01	
		07		STATUS	041	01	
		07		INJURY	042	01	
		07		DISPOSITION	043	01	
03		08		DAYS HOSPITALIZED	044	02	(b) (6)
		08		DAYS QUARTERS	046	02	
		08		DAYS GROUNDED	048	02	
		09		UNCONSCIOUS	050	03	
		08		AMNESIA	053	02	
		08		EXPOSURE/SHOCK	055	02	
		13		INJURY NO. 1 BODY PART	057	07	(b) (6)
		13		INJURY NO. 1 DIAGNOSIS	064	07	
04		13		INJURY NO. 1 CAUSE	071	07	
		13		INJURY NO. 2 BODY PART	078	07	
		13		INJURY NO. 2 DIAGNOSIS	085	07	
		13		INJURY NO. 2 CAUSE	092	07	

CD. NO. 16 17	CU FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
05		13		INJURY NO. 3 BODY PART	099	07	(b) (6)
		13		INJURY NO. 3 DIAGNOSIS	106	07	
		13		INJURY NO. 3 CAUSE	113	07	
		13		INJURY NO. 4 BODY PART	120	07	
		13		INJURY NO. 4 DIAGNOSIS	127	07	
		13		INJURY NO. 4 CAUSE	134	07	
		13		INJURY NO. 5 BODY PART	141	07	
		13		INJURY NO. 5 DIAGNOSIS	148	07	
		13		INJURY NO. 5 CAUSE	155	07	
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 1	162	06	
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 2	168	06	
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 3	174	06	
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 4	180	06	
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 5	186	06	
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 6	192	06	
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 7	198	06	
		12		LABORATORY TEST NO. 8	204	06	
		08		X-RAY	210	02	(b) (6)
		09		PRE-EXISTING DISEASE NO. 1	212	03	
		09		PRE-EXISTING DISEASE NO. 2	215	03	

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 2(LONG)

2

I.D. Number	1 2 Yr.	3 4 Mo.	5 6 Day	7 Typ	8 9 Log	10 11 A/C NO.	12 Format No.	13 Transaction	14 15 Pers Sequence	20 21 Tot. Nu. Cards
	0 4	0 8	2 6	1	4 3	0 1	2	A	0 2	

COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/11 (REV 2/69) CODE SHEET 10 OF 16

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1 PERSONNEL 2 OF 2

CODED: ____ REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		0 9		PRE-EXISTING DISEASE NO. 3	0 2 1 8	0 3	
		0 8		AUTOPSY	0 2 2 1	0 2	
		1 0		MATERIAL TO AFIP	0 2 2 3	0 4	
		0 7		AFIP REPORT	0 2 2 7	0 1	
		1 1		ADDITONAL INJURY NO. 1	0 2 2 8	0 5	
		1 1		ADDITIONAL INJURY NO. 2	0 2 3 3	0 5	
		1 1		ADDITIONAL INJUR NO. 3	0 2 3 8	0 5	
		1 1		ADDITIONAL INJUR NO. 4	0 2 4 3	0 5	
06		1 1		PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 1	0 2 4 8	0 5	
		1 1		PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 2	0 2 5 3	0 5	
		1 1		PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 3	0 2 5 8	0 5	
		1 1		PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 4	0 2 6 3	0 5	
		1 1		PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 5	0 2 6 8	0 5	
		1 1		PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 6	0 2 7 3	0 5	
		1 1		PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 7	0 2 7 8	0 5	
		1 1		PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL FACTOR NO. 8	0 2 8 3	0 5	
07		0 8		ROLE OF INDIVIDUAL	0 2 8 8	0 2	
		1 2		LEAVE INFO DATE LAST LEAVE	0 2 9 0	0 6	
		0 9		LEAVE INFO NO. OF DAYS/TYPE	0 2 9 6	0 3	
		1 2		DATE LAST PREV FLIGHT	0 2 9 9	0 6	

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		0 9		HOURS FLOWN LAST 24	0 3 0 5	0 3	
08		0 9		HOURS FLOWN LAST 48	0 3 0 8	0 3	
		1 0		MISSIONS FLOWN LAST 24 (2)/48 (2)	0 3 1 1	0 4	
		1 2		HOURS WORKED LAST 24 (3)/48 (3)	0 3 1 5	0 6	
		1 2		HOURS SLEPT LAST 24 (3)/48 (3)	0 3 2 1	0 6	
09		0 9		HOURS DUTY PRIOR TO MISHAP	0 3 2 7	0 3	
		0 9		HOURS AWAKE PRIOR TO MISHAP	0 3 3 0	0 3	
		0 9		HOURS DURATION LAST SLEEP	0 3 3 3	0 3	
		0 8		TIME IN COCKPIT PRIOR TO MISHAP	0 3 3 6	0 2	
10		1 2		PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING NO. 1	0 3 3 8	0 6	
		1 2		PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING NO. 2	0 3 4 4	0 6	
		1 2		PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING NO. 3	0 3 5 0	0 6	
		1 2		PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING NO. 4	0 3 5 6	0 6	
		1 2		PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING NO. 5	0 3 6 2	0 6	
		1 2		PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING NO. 6	0 3 6 8	0 6	
		0 8		AGE	0 3 7 4	0 2	
11		0 8		HEIGHT	0 3 7 6	0 2	(b) (6)
		0 9		WEIGHT	0 3 7 8	0 3	
		0 9		SITTING HEIGHT	0 3 8 1	0 3	
		0 9		TRUNK HEIGHT	0 3 8 4	0 3	

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 2(LONG)

3

I.D. Number		1 2 Yr.	3 4 Mo.	5 6 Day	7 Typ	8 9 Log	10 11 A/C NO.	12 Format No.	13 Transaction	14 15 Pers Sequence	20 21 Tot. No. Cards
		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	01	2	A	02	

COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/12 (REV 2/89) CODE SHEET 11 OF 16

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1 PERSONNEL 2 OF 2

CODED: _____ REVIEWED _____ LOGGED: _____ PUNCHED: _____ VERIFIED: _____

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		09		FUNCTIONAL REACH	0387	03	(b) (6)
12		09		BUTTOCK-KNEE LENGTH	0390	03	
		09		LEG LENGTH	0393	03	
		09		SHOULDER WIDTH	0396	03	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 1	0399	07	[illegible]
13		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 1 CONTINUED	0406	06	[illegible]
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 1 CONTINUED	0412	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 2	0416	07	[illegible]
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 2 CONTINUED	0423	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 2 CONTINUED	0429	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 3	0433	07	06044 41
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 3 CONTINUED	0440	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 3 CONTINUED	0446	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 4	0450	07	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 4 CONTINUED	0457	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 4 CONTINUED	0463	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 5	0467	07	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 5 CONTINUED	0474	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 5 CONTINUED	0480	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 6	0484	07	

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 6 CONTINUED	0491	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 6 CONTINUED	0497	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 7	0501	07	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 7 CONTINUED	0508	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 7 CONTINUED	0514	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 8	0518	07	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 8 CONTINUED	0525	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 8 CONTINUED	0531	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 9	0535	07	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 9 CONTINUED	0542	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 9 CONTINUED	0548	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 10	0552	07	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 10 CONTINUED	0559	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 10 CONTINUED	0565	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 11	0569	07	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 11 CONTINUED	0576	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 11 CONTINUED	0582	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 12	0586	07	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 12 CONTINUED	0593	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 12 CONTINUED	0599	04	

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 2(LONG)

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/13 (REV 2/69) CODE SHEET 12 OF 16

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1 PERSONNEL 2 OF 2

CODED: ____ REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

I.D. Number	1 2 Yr.	3 4 Mo.	5 6 Day	7 8 9 Typ Log	10 11 A/C NO.	12 Format No.	13 Transaction	14 15 Pers Sequence	20 21 Tot. No. Cards
	69	08	26	1 8 3	21	2	A	02	

COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 13	0603	07	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 13 CONTINUED	0610	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 13 CONTINUED	0616	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 14	0620	07	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 14 CONTINUED	0627	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 14 CONTINUED	0633	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 15	0637	07	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 15 CONTINUED	0644	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 15 CONTINUED	0650	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 16	0654	07	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 16 CONTINUED	0661	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 16 CONTINUED	0667	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 17	0671	07	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 17 CONTINUED	0678	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 17 CONTINUED	0684	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 18	0688	07	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 18 CONTINUED	0695	06	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 18 CONTINUED	0701	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 19	0705	07	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 19 CONTINUED	0712	06	

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 19 CONTINUED	0718	04	
		13		EQUIPMENT NO. 20	0722	07	
		12		EQUIPMENT NO. 20 CONTINUED	0729	06	
7		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 20 CONTINUED	0735	04	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 21	0739	04	
14		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 22	0743	04	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 23	0747	04	2511
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 24	0751	04	2599
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 25	0755	04	
15		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 26	0759	04	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 27	0763	04	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 28	0767	04	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 29	0771	04	
16		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 30	0775	04	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 31	0779	04	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 32	0783	04	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 33	0787	04	
17		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 34	0791	04	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 35	0795	04	
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 36	0799	04	

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 2(LONG)

5

I.D. Number	1 2 Yr.	3 4 Mo.	5 6 Day	7 Typ	8 9 Log	10 11 A/C NO.	12 Format No.	13 Transaction	14 15 Pers Sequence	20 21 Tot. No Cards
	69	A2	24	6	A3	01	2	A	02	

COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

NAVSAFECEN 3750 1/14 (REV 2/69) CODE SHEET 13 OF 16

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1 PERSONNEL 2 OF 2

CODED: ____ REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 37	0803	04	0003
18		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 38	0807	04	0001
		10		EQUIPMENT NO. 39	0811	04	
		0		EQUIPMENT NO. 40	0815	04	
		11		LOCATION IN AIRCRAFT	0819	05	11111
		09		METHOD OF ESCAPE	0824	03	1
		07		INTENT FOR ESCAPE	0827	01	1
19		07		EXIT USED	0828	01	2
		07		COCKPIT CONDITION	0829	01	
		08		ORDER OF ESCAPE	0830	02	01
		09		REASON(S) FOR ESCAPE	0832	03	8
		08		COMMUNICATION PRIOR TO ESCAPE	0835	02	0
		10		NUMBER OF PREVIOUS ESCAPES	0837	04	
20		09		TERRAIN OF LANDING OR CRASH SITE	0841	03	1
		13		AIRCRAFT ATTITUDE	0844	07	01
		08		AIRCRAFT ATTITUDE CONTINUED	0851	02	
		14		EJT. TRAINING/LECTURES	0853	07	1111111
		14		EJT. TRAINING/FILMS	0860	07	
		14		EJT. TRAINING/ UNARMED SEAT	0867	07	1111111
21		14		EJT. TRAINING/ ARMED SEAT	0874	07	1111111

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		09		JUMP/PARASAIL/OTHER SCHOOL ROLE	0881	03	
		12		EGRESS DIFF. BEFORE PROB. 1 & 2	0884	06	
		12		EGRESS DIFF. BEFORE PROB. 3 & 4	0890	06	
		12		EGRESS DIFF. DURING PROB. 1 & 2	0896	06	3A
		12		EGRESS DIFF. DURING PROB. 3 & 4	0902	06	
		12		EGRESS DIFF. AFTER PROB. 1 & 2	0908	06	
		12		EGRESS DIFF. AFTER PROB. 3 & 4	0914	06	
		11		TIME FROM EMER. UNTIL ESCAPE ATTEM.	0920	05	11115
		09		REASON FOR DELAY	0925	03	1
22		11		TERRAIN CLEAR AT ESCAPE	0928	05	0250
		11		TERRAIN CLEAR AT PRCHT. OPENING	0933	05	
		09		AIR SPEED	0938	03	55
		09		GROUND SPEED	0941	03	
		07		PRCHT. DID NOT OPEN	0944	01	
		12		PROTECTIVE HELMET CHINSTRAP/VISOR	0945	06	111111
		08		CHIN STRAP NAPE STRAP	0951	02	11
		08		ZERO LANYARD	0953	02	
		07		AUTO LAP BELT RELEASE	0955	01	
23		10		ACFT. CANOPY REMOVAL	0956	04	0
		09		EJECTION	0960	03	12

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 2(LONG)

I.D. Number	1 2 Yr.	3 4 Mo.	5 6 Day	7 Typ	8 9 Log	10 11 A/C NO.	12 Format No.	13 Transaction	14 15 Pers Sequence	20 21 Tot. No. Cards
	79	02	26	1	03	01	2	A	02	

COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/15 (REV 2/69) CODE SHEET 14 OF 16

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1 PERSONNEL 2 OF 2

CODED: _____ REVIEWED _____ LOGGED: _____ PUNCHED: _____ VERIFIED: _____

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		10		BODY POSITION	0 9 6 3	0 4	1 1 1 V
		09		SEAT POSITION/SEPAR TYPE SEPARATION	0 9 6 7	0 3	3 4 3
24		12		Parachute Data Deploy/Open Shock/Oscillat	0 9 7 0	0 6	1 B A F
		10		PARACHUTE DAMAGE	0 9 7 6	0 4	3
		10		PARACHUTE DAMAGE CAUSE	0 9 8 0	0 4	1
		07		DIRECTION FACED AT CHUTE LANDING	0 9 8 4	0 1	1
		11		LANDING CONDITIONS (WEIGHT-WINDS)	0 9 8 5	0 5	
25		09		DRAGGED BY CHUTE DISTANCE DRAGGED	0 9 9 0	0 3	W
		10		LANDING POSITION	0 9 9 3	0 4	1 3 1 9
		09		DEPLOYED BEFORE LANDING	0 9 9 7	0 3	W W W
		07		CANOPY DEFLATION POCKETS	1 0 0 0	0 1	
		11		SURVIVAL TRAINING SWIM	1 0 0 1	0 5	2 3 6 6 1
		11		SURVIAL TRAINING DILBERT DUNK	1 0 0 6	0 5	
		11		PARACHUTE DRAG	1 0 1 1	0 5	
		11		SURVIVAL TRAIN IMMERSED COCKPIT	1 0 1 6	0 5	
		11		SURVIVAL TRAIN IMMERSED SEAT	1 0 2 1	0 5	
		11		SURVIVAL TRAIN JUNGLE	1 0 2 6	0 5	
		11		SURVIVAL TRAIN ARCTIC	1 0 3 1	0 5	
		11		SURVIVAL TRAIN DESERT	1 0 3 6	0 5	
		11		SURVIVAL TRAIN MOUNTAIN	1 0 4 1	0 5	

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		11		SURVIVAL TRAINING GENERAL	1 0 4 6	0 5	
26		13		CONDITIONS AT SURVIVAL/ RESCUE SITE (TEMP WINDS)	1 0 5 1	0 7	6 7 0 4
		10		CONDITION AT SITE CONT. (WAVES)	1 0 5 8	0 4	
		10		CONDITION AT SITE CONT. (TERRAIN WEATHER)	1 0 6 2	0 4	1 1
		11		TIME LAPSE MISHAP TO ALERT (RESCUE VEH)	1 0 6 6	0 5	4 2 5 3
		10		TIME LAPSE OTHER ASSIST NO. 1	1 0 7 1	0 4	
		10		TIME LAPSE OTHER ASSIST NO. 2	1 0 7 5	0 4	
		11		TIME LAPSE ALERT TO DEPART (RESC VEH)	1 0 7 9	0 5	3 3 1 3
		10		TIME LAPSE ALERT TO DEPART (ASSIST NO. 1)	1 0 8 4	0 4	
		10		TIME LAPSE ALERT TO DEPART (ASSIST NO. 2)	1 0 8 8	0 4	
27		11		TIME LAPSE ALERT TO LOCATE (RESCUE VEH)	1 0 9 2	0 5	2 1 1 1 2
		10		TIME LAPSE ALERT TO LOCATE (ASSIST NO. 1)	1 0 9 7	0 4	
		10		TIME LAPSE ALERT TO LOCATE (ASSIST NO. 2)	1 1 0 1	0 4	
		11		TIME LOCATE TO REACH (RESCUE VEHICLE)	1 1 0 5	0 5	4 4 3 3 3
		10		LOCATE TO REACH (ASSIST NO. 1)	1 1 1 0	0 4	
		10		LOCATE TO REACH (ASSIST NO. 2)	1 1 1 4	0 4	
		11		TIME LAPSE MISHAP TO RESCUE/ABANDON	1 1 1 8	0 5	4 4 4 5 2
		10		TIME LAPSE MISHAP TO RESCUE COMPLETE	1 1 2 3	0 4	1 1 0 0
		10		TIME IN WATER	1 1 2 7	0 4	
		10		TIME IN RAFT	1 1 3 1	0 4	

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 2(LONG)

7

I.D. Number	1 2 Yr.	3 4 Mo.	5 6 Day	7 Typ	8 9 Log	10 11 A/C NO.	12 Format No.	13 Transaction	14 15 Pers Sequence	20 21 Tot No Cards
	69	18	26	1	03	01	2	A	02	

COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/16 (REV 2/69) CODE SHEET 15 OF 16

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1 PERSONNEL 2 OF 2

CODED: ____ REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN. TAPE POS	FLD SIZE	CODES
28		12		RESCUE VEHICLES DISTANCE TO SCENE	135	06	002
		13		RESCUE VEHICLE/PERS.	1141	07	235
		12		RESCUE VEHICLE /PERSONNEL CONT.	1148	06	1115Y
		10		OTHER VEHICLES/PERSONNEL	1155	04	
		10		OTHER VEHICLES/PERSONNEL	1159	04	
		10		STAND-BY/BACK UP VEHICLES	1163	04	
		10		NO. SEARCH/RESCUE HRS. ACTUAL RESCUE VEH	1167	04	
29		10		TOTAL SEARCH/RESCUE HRS – ALL VEHICLES	1171	04	
		10		RESCUE EQUIPMENT USED	1175	04	19
		10		RESCUE EQUIPMENT USED	1179	04	
		10		RESCUE ALERT MEANS	1183	04	AF
		08		ALERTING/COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEMS	1187	02	
		08		DEPARTURE DELAYS	1189	02	
		08		PROBLEMS ENROUTE	1191	02	
		10		PROBLEMS LOCATING (OR KEEPING IN SIGHT)	1193	04	
		12		LOCATOR MEANS	1197	06	01
		10		LOCATOR MEANS CONT.	1203	04	
30		12		SURVIVORS PROBLEMS	1207	06	13
		10		SURVIVORS PROBLEMS CONT.	1213	04	
		10		RESCUE PROBLEMS (VEHICLE/PERSONNEL)	1217	04	

CD. NO. 16 17	CU. FWD.	ADD	CU.	FIELD NAME	BEGIN TAPE POS.	FLD SIZE	CODES
		12		RESCUE PROBLEMS	122106		
		10		RESCUE PROBLEMS CONT.	122704		
		10		RESCUE PROBLEMS (VEHICLE/PERSONNEL)	123104		
		12		RESCUE PROBLEMS	123506		
		10		RESCUE PROBLEMS CONT.	124104		
		10		RESCUE PROBLEMS (VEHICLE/PERSONNEL)	124504		
		12		RESCUE PROBLEMS	124906		
		10		RESCUE PROBLEMS CONT.	125504		
		10		RESCUE PROBLEMS (VEHICLE/PERSONNEL)	125904		
		12		RESCUE PROBLEMS	126306		
		10		RESCUE PROBLEMS CONT.	126904		
		08		SURVIVORS CONDITION	127302		2A
		12		FACTORS HELPFUL TO RESCUER	127506		9
		13		SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	128107		
		08		SOCIAL SECURITY NO. (CONT.)	128802		
		07		FORM	129001		L

AVN NAVSAFECEN MISHAP NARRATIVE CODE SHEET PERSONNEL SECTION FORMAT NO. 3

I.D. Number	1 2 Yr.	3 4 Mo.	5 6 Day	7	8 9 Log		12 Format No.	13 Trans Code	18 19 Tot. No. Cards	
	6	9	0	6	1	3	3	1	2 ϕ	

COMMON FIELDS TO ALL CARDS

NAVSAFECEN 3750-1/19 (REV 2/69) CARD 16 OF 16

CODED: _____ REVIEWED: _____

PUNCHED: _____ VERIFIED: _____

CARD NO. 14 15 16	22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71
0 1	FRP INSTRUCTOR HAD COMPLETED CIRCLED MANEUVERS
0 2	FRP WAS ATTEMPTING TO PERFORM A DISCRETIONARY
0 3	MANEUVER. HE RAISED THE NOSE + ROLLED INVERTED. TH
0 4	E NOSE FELL THROUGH + WHEN THERE WAS NO ATTEMPT TO
0 5	RECOVER THE INSTRUCTOR ORDERED PLT TO PULL OUT. TH
0 6	E WAS NO RESPONSE FROM PLT. THE ACFT WAS IN A
0 7	NOSE DOWN, INVERTED ATTITUDE + THE INSTRUCTOR EJT
0 8	HE SUSTAINED MAJOR INJ (b) (6)
0 9	(b) (6) THE FRP EJT JUST PRIOR TO
1 0	IMPACT BUT OUTSIDE ENVELOPE. HE SUSTAINED FATAL
	22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71
1 1	INJ. THE MOR DOES NOT INDICATE ANY FACTORS TO EXPL
1 2	AIN PLTS ACTIONS. THE M.O. RECOMDS MODIFICATION OF
1 3	THIS MODEL ACFT TO INCLUDE DUAL CONTROLS FOR TRAIN
1 4	ING PLTS (SEE NOR).
1 5	INSTRUCTOR EJT @ APPROX 4M FT 550 KTS 70 DEG
1 6	NOSE DOWN. HIS LEG INJ WAS ATTRIBUTED IN PART TO
1 7	HIM HITTING CKPT STRUCTURE DURING EJT. HE WAS HELP
1 8	ED BY CIV AT SCENE WHO CALLED AMBULANCE. FRP EJT
1 9	OCCURRED AT ESTIMATED 2M FT 550 KTS IN DIVE. PRCNT
2 0	HAD JUST BEGUN DEPLOYMENT AT GND IMPACT.
14 15 16	22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71

NAVAL SAFETY CENTER
NAVAL AIR STATION
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23511

111B1/kg
3750/3
Ser 43
7 Jan 1970

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IAW OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

From: Commander, Naval Safety Center
To: Commanding Officer, Marine All-Weather Attack Training Squadron TWO ZERO TWO

Subj: VMAT(AW)-202 AAR ser 1-70A concerning A-6A BuNo 151574 accident occurring 26 August 1969, pilot CASEY

1. The subject report and all endorsements have been reviewed. Concur with the conclusions and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board as modified by subsequent endorsers.

2. The cause factors contributing to this accident have been recorded as follows:

a. REPLACEMENT PILOT:

*(1) Violation of SOP by entering unbriefed maneuver.

(2) Unusual situation developed beyond experience level.

(3) Undetermined physical incapacitation.

*Primary

(b) (6) [redacted]

By direction

Copy to:
CMC (AAP)
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ (AIR 09E) (2)
COMNAVAIRLANT
CGFMFLANT
CO MARCOMBATCREWREADTRAGRU-20
CGSECONDMAW
NAVPRO BETHPAGE
CO NAVAERORECOVFAC
DIR AFIP

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NAVAL SAFETY CENTER
NAVAL AIR STATION
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23511

132/cs
9 October 1969

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6F

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NAVSAFECEN INVESTIGATION 11-70

1. INTRODUCTION

a. The Accident. A-6A, BUNO 151574, assigned to MARINE ALL WEATHER ATTACK TRAINING SQUADRON TWO ZERO TWO (VMAT(AW)-202) crashed 3 miles northeast of Kinston, North Carolina, at 0815(Q) on 26 August 1969. The pilot, 1ST LT Robert B. CASEY, USMC, (b) (6) ejected and received fatal injuries. The Instructor Pilot, 1ST LT (b) (6) USMCR, (b) (6) (b) (6) in the Bombardier/Navigator (B/N) position, ejected and received major injuries. Private property damage consisted of a large crater and dispersal of fuel over a large area in a farmer's field. There was no crop in the field at the time of the accident.

b. Synopsis of Flight. 1ST LT CASEY was undergoing pilot familiarization training when the accident occurred. This was his second flight in the A-6 aircraft. The pilot had been thoroughly briefed by his instructor prior to departure from MCAS Cherry Point, North Carolina, at 0730(Q). The pilot climbed the aircraft to 20,000 feet to conduct basic air work and tacan tracking. While performing tacan tracking, various basic instrument patterns were performed. Following this, the aircraft descended to 4000 feet for slow flight in a landing configuration. This configuration was maintained as the aircraft climbed to 6500 feet to perform stalls. The stalls were performed satisfactorily and the instructor had the pilot climb to 12,000 feet in a clean configuration for acrobatic maneuvers. These maneuvers consisted of high G turns, flaperon rolls, wingovers and barrel rolls. The pilot displayed substandard basic air work while performing the above maneuvers. While performing these maneuvers, the pilot climbed to 16,000 feet. Without advising the instructor of the next intended maneuver the pilot rolled the aircraft inverted at 380 knots. The instructor believed the pilot was beginning a flaperon roll but the maneuver was stopped with the aircraft inverted. The aircraft then entered a vertical dive with the engines at full power. The instructor pilot directed the pilot to reduce power, extend speed brakes and pull out, but the pilot did not respond. The pilot was observed to be sitting erect, with his hands on the throttle and control stick, looking straight ahead. The instructor pilot slapped the pilot on the shoulder with no

response. At 5000 feet the instructor noted that all instrument gauges were normal and ejected at 4000 feet. The speed of the aircraft when the instructor ejected was between .86 and .88 indicated mach number (IMN). His ejection seat functioned normally and he landed 115 feet from the crater. The pilot ejected at approximately 300 feet and was outside the safe escape envelope of the seat. He landed 50 feet from the crater with the parachute partially drawn from its pack. The aircraft impacted the ground in a vertical dive in excess of .88 IMN. An explosion occurred after impact but there was no fire. Witnesses were within 300 yards of the impact point and went immediately to the aid of both pilots.

2. INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS

a. History

(1) Pilot. 1ST LT CASEY, age 25, was designated a Naval Aviator on 10 June 1969. He had a total of 296 flight hours, 3 of which were in A-6 aircraft. This was his second flight in an A-6 with the initial flight having been flown the day before with the same instructor pilot, 1ST LT (b) (6) . 1ST LT CASEY had not flown for 73 days prior to the A-6 flights because of leave, travel and school attendance.

(2) Aircraft. A-6A, BUNO 151574, was accepted by the Navy in September 1964 and had accumulated 1552 flight hours. A 3rd calendar check was completed in July 1969 and the aircraft had subsequently flown 81 hours. The second progressive aircraft rework (PAR) was completed by Naval Air Rework Facility (NAVAIREWORKFAC) Norfolk, Virginia, in June 1968 and the aircraft had subsequently flown 447 hours.

(3) Engine.

	NUMBER 1	NUMBER 2
MODEL	J52-P-6A	J52-P-6A
SERIAL NUMBER	650183	650328
DATE ACCEPTED	JUL 1968	AUG 1968
OPERATING HRS	1080	1398
NUMBER OVHLS	2	2
HRS SINCE OVHL	742	423
DATE INSTALLED THIS ACFT	JUL 1969	JUL 1969
DATE CHECK COMPLETED	JUL 1969	JUL 1969
TYPE CHECK PERFORMED	CALENDAR	CALENDAR

The engines were not a factor in this accident.

(4) Weather. Weather was not considered a factor in this accident.

b. Field Investigation

(1) The aircraft crashed in a vertical dive in a farmer's field at a speed of .88 IMN, or higher. There was an explosion upon impact but no fire followed. The aircraft made a crater 53 feet in diameter that filled with water. Wing imprints were noted on each side of the crater.

(2) The instructor pilot ejected by the use of the face curtain at 4000 feet and was unconscious until just prior to landing. The pilot ejected at a low altitude using the secondary firing handle with insufficient time for parachute deployment. Both ejection seats functioned normally. The instructor pilot contacted the ground 115 feet from the aircraft crater and his seat landed 100 feet from the crater. The pilot contacted the ground 50 feet from the crater and his seat landed 16 feet from the crater.

(3) There were no previous flight discrepancies that would have caused an engine or flight control malfunction.

(4) Interviews with various witnesses disclosed the following:

(a) The aircraft was observed in a near vertical dive.

(b) There was no in-flight fire or explosion.

(c) One pilot did not eject until just prior to tree top level.

(5) There was evidence of fuel having been present in all fuel tanks at time of impact.

(6) The pilot was medically grounded on 19 August 1969 because of a foot injury sustained while playing football. An "up" chit was issued on 25 August 1969. While grounded he was taking medication consisting of Darvon for pain and Ananase for swelling. He had taken 10 of the 13 Darvon capsules and 12 of the 25 Ananase capsules. The remaining medication was in his living quarters. The pilot retired at 2200(Q)

the previous night after stating that he was very tired. Because of pain and discomfort he soaked his foot prior to retiring. He arose the next morning at 0500(Q) and ate a bowl of cereal with a glass of juice for breakfast.

(7) Several doctors were interviewed. Some stated that Darvon, if taken prior to the flight, might induce some complications, but none believed it would cause pilot incapacitation. It was further stated that reactions differ with individuals.

(8) Personal problems and habits were carefully investigated in the hope that some light could be shed on the pilot's lack of response to the instructor. The pilot was found to have no pressing personal problems. His only detected problem was financial. He was in debt in the amount of $5500.00 to the Naval Federal Credit Union in order to consolidate all his bills. There was no evidence of failure to successfully meet his financial obligations. His roommate, who had known him two years, said he was in good spirits and enthusiastic about flying.

(9) Interviews with the instructor pilot revealed the following:

(a) The description of the flight from start to ejection was complete in detail.

(b) It was noted that the pilot under training was not as alert or talkative as on the previous day's flight. During the previous flight the pilot was more excited and talkative about flying the aircraft.

(c) The pilot answered only questions directed to him by the instructor during the briefing and in flight. The instructor pilot referred to him as "daydreaming at times."

(d) The pilot was sitting erect, looking straight ahead and did not respond to any commands given him during the dive.

(e) The instructor considered the pilot's basic air work as the roughest he had seen and not at all similar to the previous days flight. On this flight the pilot was not only rough but had a very difficult time trying to maintain altitude while flying on instruments.

c. Other Investigation. An autopsy was performed on the pilot at the Naval Hospital, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, with negative results.

NAVSAFECEN INVESTIGATION 11-70

Tissue specimens were sent to the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP), in Washington, D. C., for pathological study. Due to improper shipping procedures utilized by the Naval Hospital all tissue specimens were rendered useless. The tissue specimens were sent by U. S. Airmail vice Airfreight and did not reach AFIP in a satisfactory condition due to time delay.

3. CONCLUSION. The cause of this accident was pilot factor in that, the pilot placed the aircraft in a maneuver from which he did not recover. Whether or not the pilot was incapacitated until just before his ejection could not be determined due to the tissue specimens being improperly shipped to AFIP. Nor could it be disproved that the pilot had fixation on the ground. In either case, the pilot did not respond to the instructor's directions to recover the aircraft.

4. ACTION COMPLETED. The Naval Safety Center accident investigator visited the Naval Hospital, Camp Lejeune and reviewed the mode of shipping specimens to AFIP with the Executive Officer, Pathologist and Assistant Pathologist. Proper procedures and mode of transportation were discussed and have been instituted to prevent future tissue specimen deterioration during shipment.

5. ACTION PENDING. The Life Sciences Department of the Naval Safety Center is preparing an article for the Bioenvironmental Newsletter to reemphasize to Flight Surgeons and Naval Hospital Pathologists the need for proper packing and shipping of specimens to the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology in accordance with BUMED Instruction 6510.6 and NAVMED P-5083.

Distribution:
List "A"
CNO (OP-05F)
CNO (OP-098)

R&DP-8 (11-67)

DEPARTMENTAL COMMENTS FOR "CLOSE-OUT" LETTER
ON ORIGINAL REVIEW

NOTE:
1. Negative report is required.
2. Positive comments will be in a format suitable for inclusion in the "close out" letter.
3. Attach additional sheets if more space is required.

M&M DPEARTMENT: None

Hoa 1237
INITIAL/CODE

AERO-MED DEPARTMENT: TO Dr H.

82: Suggests

1. Possible pilot hypoxia (b) (5) [redacted]

2. (b) (5) [redacted]

83 Comment – I doubt hypoxia occurred due to altitude/ pressurization and O_2 mask. Hyperventilation would be possible (see MOR remarks) J

INITIAL/CODE

AVSAFECEN 3750-9(11/67)

COMPLETION SHEET

Action to: Correction to:		Action Required	Completed Code/Date
3750-1			/
DIR			/
Misc Items for Action or Correction			
To Code	From Code/Date	Hard-coded 9-29-67 bg	
	/		/
	511 / 12/16/69	ORIGINAL REC'D PS	/
511	512 / 4-21-70	FINAL REVIEW AND CLOSE OUT COMPLETED. PLEASE FILE IN CLOSED FILE BTB	/
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NAVSAFECEN 3750-10 Rev. (3/69)

UNIT VMAT(AW)-202
MODEL A6A
BUNO 151574

AAR REVIEW ROUTING SHEET

ADVANCE ROUTING

PRI	DEPT	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INIT	INTER-DEPT ROUTING:
	M&M		1-2-70	[illegible]	
	LSD				

DEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVES INITIALS FOR RECEIPT OF REPORTS:
REMARKS:

ORIGINAL ROUTING

DEADLINE DATE OUT OF NAVSAFECEN 19 JAN 1970
EXTENSIONS

DEPT	DATE IN	DEPT DEADLINE	DATE OUT	INIT	INTER-DEPT ROUTING
AAD	5 Jan		7 Jan 70		1-5-69

NAVSAFECEN ENDORSEMENT ROUTING

PRI	DEPT	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INIT
1	R&DP			
2	M&M			
3	ADMIN			

2/4/70

ROUTING AFTER CLOSE-OUT

DEPT	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INIT	INTER-DEPT ROUTING
LSD				

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AIR-09E21:RLC

11 DEC 1969

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

SIXTH ENDORSEMENT on VMAT(AW)-202 accident serial 1-70A concerning A6A, BuNo 151574 of 26 August 1969, pilot CASEY

From: Commander, Naval Air Systems Command
To: Commander, Naval Safety Center

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report

1. Forwarded.

2. The comments contained in the third, fourth, and fifth endorsements regarding the recommendation for dual controls in the A-6 aircraft are concurred with. The economic considerations as well as the various other factors mentioned in these endorsements substantiate the conclusion that further action in this regard is unwarranted.

(b) (6)

[redacted]

By direction

Copy to:
COMNAVAIRLANT
CMC (CODE AAP)
CG FMFLANT
CG 2ND MAW
CG MCAS CHERPT
CO VMAT(AW)-202
CO NAVAIRRECOVFAC
NAVPRO BETHPAGE
DIR AFIP

PS
12-16-69

CNAL 002
Ser 7009
21 NOV 1969

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

FIFTH ENDORSEMENT on VMAT(AW)-202 accident serial 1-70A concerning A6A, BuNo 151574 of 26 August 1969, pilot CASEY

From: Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet
To: Commander Naval Safety Center
Via: Commander Naval Air Systems Command

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report

1. Forwarded, concurring in the conclusions and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board as modified by subsequent endorsers.

2. Commander Naval Air Systems Command is requested to comment on recommendation A of the basic report. The statements contained in the third and fourth endorsements concerning dual control configuration of the A6 aircraft are concurred in. Such configuration of the A6 is not considered to be economically/operationally justifiable.

(b) (6) [redacted]

By direction

Copy to:
COMNAVSAFECEN (2)
CMC (CODE AAP)
CG FMFLANT
CG 2ND MAW
CG MCAS, CHERPT
CO VMAT(AW)-TWO ZERO TWO
CO NAVAERORECOVFAC EL CENTRO
NAVPLANTREPO BETHPAGE, N. Y.
Director of the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, Washington, D. C. 20012

ORIGINAL

14:LD:rab
3750
10 Nov 1969

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT on VMAT(AW)-202 accident, serial 1-70A, concerning A-6A BuNo 151574 of 26 August 1969, pilot CASEY

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic
To: Commander, Naval Safety Center
Via: (1) Commander, Naval Air Forces, Atlantic Fleet
(2) Commander, Naval Air Systems Command

Subj: VMAT(AW)-202 Aircraft Accident Report, serial 1-70A

Encl: (23) Supplementary Report to MOR of VMAT(AW)-202 1-70A, A-6A 151574, occurring 26 August 1969, pilot CASEY

1. Readdressed and forwarded, concurring in the comments and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Report as modified by the third endorsement and subject to the following remarks:

a. The recommendation concerning dual control A-6 aircraft is valid in that had such an aircraft been available for this fatal flight the mishap most probably would have been avoided. However, a dual control A-6, unlike dual control models of the F-4 and A-4 which retain full weapons system capability, would lose its unique all-weather weapons systems capabilities and become a special purpose training aircraft. In comparing the A-6's proven record and reputation as a safe aircraft with this one accident, a cost effectiveness evaluation tends to place the dual control A-6 in a "nice to have" category.

b. The third endorser's comments on the handling of tissue samples are pertinent in that had the samples been sent via Air Freight vice Air Mail and had AFIP been forewarned as specified in BUMEDINST 6510.6, the delay cited in the MOR would not have occurred.

2. Supplementary Report to MOR of VMAT(AW)-202 1-70A, A-6A 151574, occurring 26 August 1969, pilot CASEY was received by this Headquarters on 24 October 1969, and this report, less forwarding endorsements, has been added to the Aircraft Accident Report as enclosure (23).

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH
OPNAV INST. 3750.6

ORIGINAL

14:LD:rab
10 Nov 1969

Subj: VMAT(AW)-202 Aircraft Accident Report, serial 1-70A

3. Commander, Naval Air Systems Command and Commander, Naval Air Forces, Atlantic Fleet are requested to comment on the Aircraft Accident Report's recommendation to configure some A-6's with dual controls for training purposes.

J. E. LO PRETE
Chief of Staff

Copy to:
NAVSAFCEN (2)
NAVAIRSYSCOM (AIR-09E)
COMNAVAIRLANT
CMC (CODE AAP)
CG, 2d MAW
CO, MCCRTG-20
CO, VMAT(AW)-202
NAVPLANTREPO
NAVAIRRECFAC-EL CENTRO
DIR AFIP

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH
OPNAV INST. 3750.6

ORIGINAL

42:WSF:ces
3750
9 October 1969

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on VMAT(AW)-202 Accident, Serial 1-70A concerning A6A BuNo 151574 of 26 August 1969, Pilot CASEY.

From: Commander, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, FMF, Atlantic
To: Commander, Naval Safety Center
Via: (1) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic
(2) COMNAVAIRLANT

Subj: VMAT(AW)-202 Aircraft Accident Report, Serial 1-70A.

1. Forwarded.

2. Concur that the procurement of a dual-controlled A-6 is desirable. However there are considerations that militate against this solution:

a. Modification of aircraft presently assigned to VMAT(AW)-202 would necessitate the degradation of their combat capabilities.

b. Sufficient aircraft would have to be modified to insure availability within the squadron at all times, of an adequate number of dual-controlled aircraft.

c. Modified aircraft would have, at best, a reduced capability for training BN's.

d. The time requirements to effect such modifications would preclude an immediate remedy to this program.

e. It is not the purpose of the foregoing to terminate efforts to procure a dual-control A-6. However, positive actions to lessen the probability of the recurrence of this type of mishap are within the capabilities of this and subordinate commands. Efforts to this end are being made by appropriate staff sections.

f. MCCRTG-20 has instituted a program whereby all assigned aviators who have not flown for an excessive period of time are given a series of warm up flights in a dual-controlled aircraft.

3. Concur with the Second Endorser that proper instructor training can and will be accomplished by existing instructor indoctrination procedures.

4. This command believes that existing directives governing pathology investigations are adequate. Diligent adherence to the procedures contained therein will prevent the recurrence of the problems cited in Enclosure (22).

ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL

42:WSF:ces

9 October 1969

Subj: VMAT(AW)-202 Aircraft Accident Report, Serial 1-70A.

5. It is noted that distribution was not indicated on the second endorsement. Second Endorser insure that proper distribution is accomplished.

R R Read

R. R. READ
Acting

DISTRIBUTION:
NAVSAFCEN (2)
NAVAIRSYSCOM (AIR-09E)
CMC (CODE AAP)
COMNAVAIRLANT
CG FMFLANT
MCCRTG-20
VMAT(AW)-202
NAVPLANTREPO
NAVAIRRECFAC-EL CENTRO
DIR AFIP

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAV INST. 3750.6 SERIES

ORIGINAL

3750:LRF:mh

ORIGINAL 1 OCT 1969

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on VMAT(AW)-202 AAR 1-70A, 151574 accident occuring 26 August 1969, Pilot CASEY

From: Commanding Officer, Marine Combat Crew Readiness Training Group-20
To: Commander, Naval Safety Center
Via: (1) Commanding General, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing
(2) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic
(3) COMNAVAIRLANT

Subj: VMAT(AW)-202 Aircraft Accident Report Serial 1-70A

1. Forwarded.

2. The following comments on Part IX of the basic report are submitted:

a. Recommendation A. Concur. The requirement for a dual control aircraft is inherent in the mission of a training squadron, and has been satisfied in the case of the F-4 and A-4. Newly designated Naval Aviators and Undergraduate Pilot Training aviators have graduated from a training command environment in which they have been flying at least once weekly if not daily. The process of PCS orders, leave, checking out and in, schools, and learning about the fleet aircraft they are assigned to fly involves a substantial period of time. Because of this, the below average to average replacement pilot could easily become apprehensive about his first flights in an aircraft where he is the only pilot with access to the aircraft controls. A6As with dual controls would not only alleviate much of his anxiety but also allow him to phase into the A6A safely. MCCRTG-20 has instituted a refresher program in the TA4F for pilots with long periods of non-flying; however this is a different aircraft with different flight characteristics and can be only a partial solution.

b. Recommendation B. Do not concur. Supervisory error by the instructor was not cited by the Board as a factor in this accident, nor should it have been. While any training program can be enhanced by an expanded instructor training program, such effort rapidly becomes counterproductive. Rather, additional attention is required and will be directed toward recognizing and coping with replacement pilot deficiencies in squadron level IUT syllabi.

c. Recommendation C. Concur.

C. H. LUDDEN

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6F

ORIGINAL

6:TRM:jwk
3750
22 September 1969

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on VMAT(AW)-202 AAR 1-70A, A6A, 151574 accident occurring 26 August 1969, Pilot CASEY

From: Commanding Officer, VMAT(AW)-202
To: Commander, Naval Safety Center
Via: (1) Commanding Officer, Marine Combat Crew Readiness Training Unit
(2) Commanding General, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing
(3) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic
(4) CONNAVAIRLANT

Subj: VMAT(AW)-202 Aircraft Accident Report Serial 1-70A

1. Forwarded.

2. The following comments on part IX of the basic report are submitted:

a. Recommendation A. Concur. Any training squadron of this size dealing with newly designated Naval and UPT Aviators should have at least four and preferably one third of its aircraft dual-control configured. In many cases, a new pilot reporting for transition into the A6A will not have flown for an average of two months. The experience level of a "nugget" fresh from the training command and the lay-off from flying for extended periods of time, must warrant a refresher flight/flights in a dual-controlled aircraft. This recommendation should also apply to second tour aviators as well.

b. Recommendation B. Concur. (b) (5) [redacted]

c. Recommendation C. Concur.

3. The maneuver tried by Lt CASEY and the reason for its unsuccessful completion will never be known, but it is strongly felt, by this officer, that dual-controls in some A6A's in training squadrons are mandatory. This is the first and hopefully the last such accident of this nature that will take place, but nothing prevents it from happening again. All of the instructors in this unit are combat veterans and have ample time in type to qualify them as instructors.

ORIGINAL

Technique of instruction can be improved through school and experience, but manipulation of controls is basic and Lt (b) (6) was qualified in this respect and could have saved this accident from happening if he had had access to controls on the right side of the aircraft. Lt CASEY's flying experience can best be described in the basic report. A recent graduate of the Naval Air Training Command, he only flew one hop prior to the accident which was graded as average.

T. R. MADDOCK

DISTRIBUTION:

NAVSAFCEN (2)	CG, MCAS, CHERPT
NAVAIRSYSCOM	CO, MCCRTG-20
COMNAVAIRLANT	CO, VMAT(AW)-202
CNO (CODE [illegible])	NAVPLANTREPO[redacted]
CG, FMFLANT	CO, NAVAIRRECFAC-ELCENTRO
CG, 2dMAW	DIR AFIP

ORIGINAL

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6F

ORIGINAL

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT [redacted] SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED [redacted] in accordance with

OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Rev. 3-63) Page 1 *Para. 66, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6, effective edition*

PART I GENERAL

SECTION A. IDENTIFICATION

1. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BOARD APPOINTED BY *	2. SERIAL NO. *	3. DTG (LOCAL) OF MISHAP *	4. MODEL AIRCRAFT *	5. BUREAU NUMBER
CO, VMAT(AW)-202	1-70A	260815QAUG	A6A	151574

6. *	9. LOCATION OF MISHAP *	10. DAMAGE
TO: Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center	5½ Nautical miles from Kinston, N. C.	ALFA

7. VIA: *	8. *	11. TIME OF DAY *	12. TIME IN FLIGHT *	13. FLIGHT CODE
CO VMAT(AW)-202		DAY	0+45	IA1
CO MCAFTC-20		14. CLEARED		
CG 2dMAW		FROM: MCAS, CHERPT, N.C. TO: MCAS, CHERPT, N.C.		
CG FMFLANT				
COMNAVAIRLANT		15. TYPE CLEARANCE *	16. AIRSPEED	17. A/C WEIGHT
		Local VFR	560 kts ?	38,000

18. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MISHAP: Replacement Pilot failed to pull out of a self induced dive from 16,000 feet

19. ELEVATION AT TIME OF MISHAP: a.s.l. 20' TERRAIN: Level

20. LIST MODEL, BUNO, REPORTING CUSTODIAN AND DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION OF ANY OTHER A/C INVOLVED (Complete OPNAV Form 3750-1 for each A/C)

SECTION B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

*	✓	FACTOR	✓	FACTOR	✓	FACTOR
	X	1. PILOT ERROR IN TECHNIQUE/JUDGMENT		9. SERVICING PERSONNEL		17. WEATHER
		2. PILOT DEVIATION FROM NATOPS PROCEDURES		10. LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER		18. DESIGN AIRCRAFT
		3. PILOT INCORRECT OPERATION OF A/C SYSTEM		11. OTHER PERSONNEL (Specify)		19. DESIGN CREW EQUIPMENT
	X	4. PILOT OTHER (Specify) UNKNOWN		12. ADMINISTRATIVE		20. DESIGN OTHER (Specify)
		5. CREW		13. FACILITIES-RUNWAY, OVERRUN, TAXIWAY, FLIGHT DECK		21. ROLLING/PITCHING DECK ROUGH SEAS
		6. MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL		14. FACILITIES-NAV AIDS, LANDING AIDS (GCA, CCA, ILS, MIRROR)		22. MATERIAL FAILURE/MALFUNCTION
		7. MAINTENANCE SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL		15. FACILITIES-CATAPULT, ARRESTING GEAR (Ship or field)		23. UNDETERMINED
		8. SUPERVISORY OTHER (Specify)		16. FACILITIES OTHER (Specify)		24. OTHER (Specify)

SECTION C. PERSONNEL DATA

1. NAME (Last, first, & middle initial) *	2. RANK/GRADE	3. SSN	4. SERVICE	5. DESIGNATOR	6. AGE	7. TOTAL FLT HRS	8. DUTY	9. STATION	10. INJURY
PILOT (at controls at time of mishap) CASEY, Robert B.	1/Lt	(b) (6)	NA	USMC	25	1,16	Student	Pilot Seat	ALF
CO-PILOT (Giving & submit separate page) (b) (6)	1/Lt		NA						

PILOT EXPERIENCE IN HOURS

ITEM			ITEM		
11. ALL MODELS		332.0	17. CV LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT	ALL	12 / 0
				IN MODEL	0 / 0
12. ALL MODELS IN LAST 12 MONTHS		175.8	18. FCLP LANDINGS LAST 6 MONTHS DAY/NIGHT	ALL	58 / 8
				IN MODEL	0 / 0
13. ALL MODELS IN LAST 3 MONTHS		20.4	19. INSTRUMENT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS ACTUAL/SIMULATED	ALL	0 / 1.2
				IN MODEL	0 / 0
14. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	A/C	3.4	20. NIGHT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS	ALL	1.3 /
	OFT/CPT	3.0 / 0		IN MODEL	0 /
15. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 12 MONTHS	A/C	3.4	21. TOTAL HOURS IN JETS (If jet mishap) HELOS (If helo mishap)		239.7
	OFT/CPT	3.0 / 0			
16. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 3 MONTHS	A/C	3.4	22. LAST PRIOR FLIGHT ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	DATE	25AUG59
	OFT/CPT	3.0 / 0		DURATION	2.7
23. DATE/GRADE LAST NATOPS STANDARDIZATION CHECK	N/A		24. TYPE INSTRUMENT CARD		Standard

OTHER PERS.*

25. NAME (Last, first, & middle initial)	26. RANK/GRADE	27. SSN	28. SERVICE OR AFFILIATION	29. DESIGNATOR	30. AGE	31. DUTY	32. STATION	33. INJURY

PART 1 GENERAL

SECTION A. IDENTIFICATION

1. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BOARD APPOINTED BY: VMAT(AW)-202	2. SERIAL NO.: 1-70A	3. DTG (LOCAL) OF MISHAP	4. MODEL AIRCRAFT	5. BUREAU NUMBER
6. TO: Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center		9. LOCATION OF MISHAP		10. DAMAGE
7. VIA:	8.	11. TIME OF DAY	12. TIME IN FLIGHT	13. FLIGHT CODE
		14. CLEARED FROM: TO:		
		15. TYPE CLEARANCE	16. AIRSPEED	17. A/C WEIGHT
18. DESCRIPTION OF MISHAP			19. ELEVATION AT TIME OF MISHAP: S.L. TERRAIN	
20. LIST MODEL, BUNO, REPORTING CUSTODIAN AND DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION OF ANY OTHER A/C INVOLVED (Complete OPNAV Form 3750-1 for each A/C)				

SECTION B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

✓	FACTOR	✓	FACTOR	✓	FACTOR
	1. PILOT ERROR IN TECHNIQUE/JUDGMENT		9. SERVICING PERSONNEL		17. WEATHER
	2. PILOT DEVIATION FROM NATOPS PROCEDURES		10. LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER		18. DESIGN AIRCRAFT
	3. PILOT INCORRECT OPERATION OF A/C SYSTEM		11. OTHER PERSONNEL (Specify)		19. DESIGN CREW EQUIPMENT
	4. PILOT OTHER (Specify)		12. ADMINISTRATIVE		20. DESIGN OTHER (Specify)
	5. CREW		13. FACILITIES-RUNWAY, OVERRUN, TAXIWAY, FLIGHT DECK		21. ROLLING/PITCHING DECK ROUGH SEAS
	6. MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL		14. FACILITIES-NAV AIDS, LANDING AIDS (GCA, CCA, ILS, MIRROR)		22. MATERIAL FAILURE/MALFUNCTION
	7. MAINTENANCE SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL		15. FACILITIES-CATAPULT, ARRESTING GEAR (Ship or field)		23. UNDETERMINED
	8. SUPERVISORY OTHER (Specify)		16. FACILITIES OTHER (Specify)		24. OTHER (Specify)

SECTION C. PERSONNEL DATA

1. NAME (Last, first, & middle initial)	2. GRADE	3. SERVICE NO.	4.	5. BRANCH OF SERVICE	6. AGE	7.	8.	9.	10.
PILOT (at controls at time of mishap): CASEY, Robert B.	1/Lt		NA						
CO-PILOT (Identify & submit separate): [redacted]	1/Lt	[redacted]	NA	USMCR	25	2	Inst.	B/N Seat	Bra

PILOT EXPERIENCE IN HOURS

ITEM			ITEM		
11. ALL MODELS		1094.8	17. CV LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT	ALL	12 / 0
				IN MODEL	0 / 0
12. ALL MODELS IN LAST 12 MONTHS		378.6	18. FCLP LANDINGS LAST 6 MONTHS DAY/NIGHT	ALL	0 / 0
				IN MODEL	0 / 0
13. ALL MODELS IN LAST 3 MONTHS		133.4	19. INSTRUMENT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS ACTUAL/SIMULATED	ALL	15.3 / 9.6
				IN MODEL	15.3 / 9.6
14. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	A/C	804.2	20. NIGHT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS	ALL	14.2 /
	OFT/CPT			IN MODEL	14.2 /
15. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 12 MONTHS	A/C	374.3	21. TOTAL HOURS IN JETS (if jet mishap) HELOS (if helo mishap)		1066.2
	OFT/CPT				
16. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 3 MONTHS	A/C	131.1	22. LAST PRIOR FLIGHT ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	DATE	25Aug69
	OFT/CPT			DURATION	2.4
23. DATE/GRADE LAST NATOPS STANDARDIZATION CHECK		13May69 (4.0)	24. TYPE INSTRUMENT CARD		Standard

OTHER PERS.

25. NAME (Last, first, & middle initial)	26.	27.	28. BRANCH OF SERVICE	29.	30.	31.	32.	33.

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT — SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with — OPNAV [illegible]

OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Rev. 3-63) Page 2 — Para. 66, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6, effective edition

PART II MAINTENANCE, MATERIAL, AND FACILITIES DATA

A. A/C HISTORY

1. DATE OF MANUFACTURE	2. FLIGHT HRS SINCE ACCEPTANCE	3. NO. OF PAR/OVERHAUL	4. MONTHS SINCE LAST PAR/OVERHAUL	5. FLT. HRS. SINCE LAST PAR/OVERHAUL	6. LAST PAR/OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	7. TYPE OF LAST CHECK PERFORMED	8. FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST CHECK	9. DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK
Aug61	3551.5	2	13	447.0	NARF NORVA	CALENDAR	80.8	40

B. ENGINE HISTORY

	1. ENGINE MODEL	2. ENGINE SERIAL NUMBER	3. FLIGHT HRS SINCE ACCEPTANCE	4. NUMBER OF OVERHAULS	5. WAS DIR. REQUESTED?	6. FLT. HRS. SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	7. LAST OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	8. TYPE OF LAST CHECK PERFORMED	9. FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST CHECK	10. DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK
(1)	J52 P6A	650 183	1079.6	2	No	741.8	NARF JAX	CALENDAR	80.8	42
(2)	J52 P6A	650 328	1397.6	2	No	423.3	NARF JAX	CALENDAR	80.8	47
(3)										
(4)										

C. COMPONENT HISTORY

	1. COMPONENT INVOLVED NOMENCLATURE	2. MANUFACTURERS PART NUMBER	3. TOTAL HRS. ON PART	4. NO. OF OVERHAULS	5. HOURS SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	6. OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	7. WAS DIR. REQUESTED?	8. SER. NO. [illegible]
(1)								
(2)								
(3)								
(4)								

D. INCIDENTS & GROUND ACCIDENTS

1. PARTS REPAIRED		3. DIRECT MANHOURS INVOLVED	2. PARTS REPLACED	
PART NUMBER	NOMENCLATURE		PART NUMBER	NOMENCLATURE

E. ENGINE FAILURES

JET ENGINE FLAMEOUT (Include intentional securing to prevent engine damage)

AT TIME OF FLAMEOUT	1. ALTITUDE	2. IAS	3. RPM	4. EGT	5. MANEUVER AT TIME OF FLAMEOUT	6. FUEL FLOW	7. ATTITUDE

8. G FORCES	9. RELIGHT ☐ ATTEMPTED ☐ ACCOMPLISHED	10. ALTITUDE	11. IAS	12. MAX EGT	13. FUEL CONTROL ☐ PRIMARY ☐ MANUAL	14. NO. RELIGHT ATTEMPTS

INTENTIONAL SECURE	15. ENGINE SYMPTOMS	16. CAUSE OF SYMPTOMS

RECIPROCATING ENGINE FAILURE

17. ALTITUDE	18. IAS	19. ATTITUDE	20. RPM	21. MAP	22. TORQUE/SHP	23. FUEL FLOW PRESSURE	24. OIL PRESSURE

INTENTIONAL SECURE	25. ENGINE SYMPTOMS	26. CAUSE OF SYMPTOMS

F. OTHER REPORT

IDENTIFY OTHER REPORTS CONCERNING THIS MISHAP

1. AMPLIFYING SERIAL NUMBER _____

2. DIR MESSAGE REQUEST DATE-TIME-GROUP _____ [illegible]

[illegible]
14111

3. Preliminary Msg - VMAT(AW)-202 R261722Z Aug

4. Supp Msg - VMAT(AW)-202 R270230Z Aug

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT — OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Rev. 3-63) Page 3

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with Para. 66, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6, effective edition

ARRESTING DATA

1. EQUIPMENT INVOLVED	2. PRESSURE SETTING	3. WIND OVER DECK	4. RELATIVE WIND	5. APPROACH/ENG SPEED
☐ CATAPULT ☐ ARRESTING GEAR				

6. SERIAL NUMBER	7. MODEL NUMBER	8. LOCATION OF SHIP	9. LAUNCHING BRIDLE AND BRIDLE ARRESTER

10. CATAPULT/ARRESTING GEAR BULLETINS OR NOMOGRAMS USED

11. This portion shall be completed whenever (1) an aircraft accident involves arresting gear barrier and/or barricade equipment, or (2) an aircraft accident involves malfunctioning of arresting gear, barrier and/or barricade equipment. Incidents or routine damage to cables, webbings and other expendable equipment need not be reported herein.

ENGAGED	12. DECK RUNOUT (FEET)	13. RAM TRAVEL (INCHES)	14. CONTROL VALVE SETTINGS — CONSTANT PRESSURE — DOME (P.S.I.)	RATIO	CONSTANT RUNOUT (WT. LBS.)	15. ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE (PSI)	16. COMMENTS (for cable failures specify landings and marks ...)
DECK PENDANT							
DECK PENDANT							
BARRIER/ BARRICADE							

H. DEPLOYMENT

FOR ACCIDENTS ABOARD CARRIERS (complete on pilot)

1. DATE DEPLOYED CONUS	3. DAY HOURS/LANDINGS SINCE DEPLOYMENT	4. DAY HOURS/LANDING LAST 30 DAYS
2. NO. DAYS OPERATING PERIOD		
5. INST. HOURS LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYMENT ACTUAL/SIMULATED	6. NIGHT HOURS/LANDINGS SINCE DEPLOYMENT	7. NIGHT HOURS/LANDINGS LAST 30 DAYS

I. WEATHER

WEATHER AT SCENE OF MISHAP

1. CEILING	2. VISIBILITY	3. RELATIVE WIND DIRECTION AND VELOCITY	4. TEMPERATURE RUNWAY / OUTSIDE AIR	5. DEW POINT	6. ALTIMETER SETTING
Clear	50H	Calm	68° F	63° F	2993

7. OTHER WEATHER CONDITIONS (winds aloft, icing level, sea state, density altitude, as appropriate)

PART III ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

PART	SECTION	ITEM	1. REMARKS	2. COPY DISTRIBUTION
			ICC CO NAVAIRRECFAC EL CENTRO	20C NAV INSAFE... DIRECT (AAR) 10C BUWEPS DIRECT (AAR) ICC COMNAVAIRLANT ICC CMC (Code AA) ICC CG FMFLANT ICC CG 2dMAW ICC MCCRTG-20 ICC CO VMAT(AW)-20 ICC NAVPLANTREP ICC DIR AFIP

COST DAMAGE TO:	3. GOVERNMENT PROPERTY	4. PRIVATE PROPERTY	5. DATE SUBMITTED TO CO
	None	Total Est. Undetermined At Present	SEP 1 4 1969

PART IV SIGNATURES

1. SENIOR MEMBER

C. G. LAWSON

Major USMC — ExecutiveO — UNIT BILLET

2. (b) (6) [redacted]

Major USMC / AviationSafO — UNIT BILLET

3. FLIGHT SURGEON MEMBER (b) (6) [redacted] (b) (6) [redacted]

LTCMDR USN — Flight Surgeon

4. MEMBER (b) (6) [redacted]

CAPT USMC [redacted] NATOPS Officer — UNIT BILLET

* When preparing Incident and Ground Accident reports, items indicated by an asterisk in [redacted] per right hand corner must be filled in. Other items considered appropriate should also be filled in.

(b) (6) [redacted]

CAPT USMC

Quality Assurance Officer

V. THE ACCIDENT

On 26 August 1969 at 0730 LT CASEY, a replacement pilot, was scheduled to fly his second familiarization flight in the A6A aircraft (FP-2) with LT (b) (6) an instructor pilot (Enclosure (1). The procedure for the first five (5) fam flights is to have a qualified instructor pilot in the right seat when checking out replacement pilots. Also for the first four fam flights, the instructor pilot signs for the aircraft, even though he has no method of exercising control over the aircraft other than verbal communications via the intercom. The crew commenced briefing at 0625 rather than 0600 as LT (b) (6) was late in arriving. The squadron briefing guide for FP-2 was used during the briefing (Enclosure 2).

After the brief, both of the aircrew members preflighted the aircraft, started and taxied to the long position for runway 05. The aircraft, KD-10, was configured with 2-300 gallon drop tanks on the outboard wing stations. All checks were normal during this phase. Take-off was accomplished at 0730 as scheduled. After take-off, the slats failed to retract normally and LT CASEY was very rough in altitude and speed control while recycling the flaps handle. The flight proceeded through the normal FP-2 syllabus, including basic instruments, slow flight and approach to stalls. The next phase of the flight was the practice of wing overs and rolls (both flaperon and barrel rolls).

The maneuver which led to the crash was commenced heading away from MCAS, Cherry Point at about 380 knots at 16,000 feet with 11,000 pounds of fuel in the internal tanks only. Thirty (30) miles northwest of Cherry Point, LT CASEY pulled up the nose to 15° above the horizon and rolled the aircraft inverted. He then pulled the nose through the horizon with very slight back pressure and continued down through the vertical. He left the power at 100% and made two adjustments of wing position but did not respond to the commands of the instructor pilot to "reduce power", "pop the boards" and "pull-pull".

LT (b) (6) observed the speed increasing between 0.7 and 0.8 Mach and ejected by the primary ejection handle at about 3,500 feet. LT CASEY ejected after LT (b) (6) had left the aircraft using the secondary handle. Both crew members ejected through the canopy. LT (b) (6) chute opened with a severe shock just prior to his impact with the ground. He suffered (b) (6) during the ejection and landing. His helmet remained on during the ejection and landing. LT CASEY's ejection was outside the envelope for the seat. His helmet was torn off (i.e. loose chin strap severed) on ejection and entry into the air stream. Although he had separated from the seat, his chute had not yet deployed when he impacted the ground. Enclosure (3) shows the relative location of the crash site and the aircrew positions.

The aircraft continued downward in a 60° to 80° dive angle and impacted the ground causing an explosion which scattered mud and small pieces of the aircraft over a ¼ mile radius forward of the point of impact. Enclosures (4), (5) and (6) show the crash site and the blast effects.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

VI DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT

A6A, 151574, KC 10 received Alfa damage when the aircraft impacted in a tobacco field, 5½ nautical miles, northeast of Kinston, N. C. within a triangle bounded by North Carolina State Route 55 and secondary roads 1804 and 1803 (Coordinates N35°18' W77°28'). The aircraft was tracking 205° True with an extreme nose down position of between 60° and 80° dive angle slightly right wing down at impact. No salvageable parts remained due to the high angle of impact which was followed by an explosion.

VII THE INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS

A. GENERAL

The initial notification of the aircraft accident came from a call by Mrs. Clee Hill to the Kinston Emergency Rescue Squad and then to MCAS, Cherry Point which was received at 0850 by the tower. The rescue personnel from Seymour Johnson AFB were then notified by Cherry Point Tower. Two of the witnesses (Mr. Clee Hill and Mr. Vance Garner) were the first persons on the scene having observed the impact from a spot which was measured to be 450 feet from the crash site. Upon arriving at the spot where LT (b) (6) had landed, Mr. Hill found him to be conscious and he stated that he was from Cherry Point.

A delay in further identification was reached as LT (b) (6) name was not phoned in. Some misleading information was forwarded as the parachute back pads had the previous squadron's number (VA-42) stenciled on them. Voice checks with squadron aircraft airborne were completed with the exception of two aircraft, one of which was KC 10. Official notification that the aircraft was an A6A belonging to VMAT(AW)-202 whose survivor was LT (b) (6) was made at about 1015, a delay of about two hours from the actual time of the crash. A phone call was placed by the assistant operations officer for MCAS, Cherry Point (Capt (b) (6)) to the hospital which verified this information at 1030 (Enclosure (7)). At the scene of the crash, Lenoir Co. Deputy Sheriff (Mr. Raymond E. EUBANKS) was the first official to arrive. He stopped traffic and placed a call for an ambulance. In a very short time, an abundance of help arrived from the Kinston Area agencies which included:

Kinston Rescue Squad
Edwards Funeral Home ambulance
Kinston Fire Department
Lenoir County Fire Department
Highway Patrol

The ambulance took LT (b) (6) to the Lenior Co. Hospital in Kinston at about 0900. The first military on the scene were the SAR helicopters from Seymour Johnson AFB and MCAS, Cherry Point which arrived at about 0950. Shortly thereafter (about 1005) military units arrived by ground transportation. These included the following:

USAF, (b) (6)
Safety Officer (b) (6) and team
Chaplain
Fire Department
EOD Department
Claims Representative (Capt (b) (6))
USMC, Cherry Point
Crash Crew personnel
Military Police
ISO Team
Station photographer

A VMCJ-2 photo-aircraft was dispatched to the scene and obtained photos along the path of the aircraft.

The accident board was formed and departed for the crash site at 1130 via helicopter. Upon arrival at 1200, and ascertaining that the necessary photo coverage was completed, the flight surgeon placed the remains of LT CASEY aboard the helicopter for transportation to Camp Lejune for an autopsy. While other board members were marking and diagraming wreckage parts, the Air Force Safety Officer (Major (b) (6)) and other personnel at the site were questioned as to steps already taken.

The squadron personnel relieved the MP's on guard duties and the Senior Member and the flight surgeon went to the Lenior Hospital to interview LT (b) (6) Local witness statements had already been collected by the military personnel arriving earlier. The results of these interviews was made known to the Commanding Officer by telephone at 1330 and the arrangements were completed for the guard detail for the night.

Cmdr (b) (6) from the Naval Safety Center arrived at the crash scene about 1800 and then proceeded to Cherry Point. He verbally released the wreckage for salvage/cover-up at about 0930 on 27 August 1969 and followed this up with a confirmation message (Enclosure (8)).

B. DETERMINATION OF OCCURANCES

The reconstruction of the final maneuver and the sequence of events was made by use of LT (b) (6) recollections, four witness statements, and analysis of the crater and escape system component placement.

Enclosure (9) shows the area of the crash site and the location of those witnesses considered creditable and having observed something of value for this investigation. The location of Mr. McCoy at the Dupont Plant and Mr. George Garner at his home (numbers 3 and 4 on Enclosure (9)) fix the flight path of the aircraft prior to impact. Mr. McCoy's statement (Enclosure (10)) of two "objects" which "looked alike" leaving the aircraft before he lost sight of the aircraft is not compatible with other witness statements or the results of the ejections. Mr. George Garner's statement (Enclosure (11)) can only be used to verify the flight path as his estimate of altitude is not compatible with crater analysis or other witness statements. The reconstruction of the occurances

just before the crash is made by the statements of Mr. Clee Hill and Mr. Vance Garner (Enclosures (12) and (13)). Their close proximity (number 2 on Enclosure (9)) enabled them to observe the aircraft in its final trajectory and the egress of both crew members. The most significant point from their observations is that the aircraft was not on fire or smoking nor was it making any violent pull out attempts. Their impression is one which substantiates an extremely high speed, constant power setting dive. Subsequent discussions with both witnesses still leaves a question as to the amount of time between the ejection of Lt. (b) (6) and Lt. CASEY. In answer to direct questions concerning his statement, Mr. Vance Garner stated that the first crew member (Lt. (b) (6) touched down when the second crew member (Lt. CASEY) left the aircraft. This cannot be substantiated as Lt. CASEY had already achieved separation from his seat which would require about 2,000 feet altitude for the parameters of the flight path. The finding of Lt. CASEY's helmet at 500 feet back along the flight path agrees with the higher altitude.

The statement of Lt. (b) (6) (Enclosure (14)) is the only source of information concerning the events of the flight prior to the sighting by witnesses on the ground. There is no aspect of his statements taken at various times which would lead the board to believe that the occurances had happened other than as he stated.

C. PERSONNEL FACTORS

1. Pilot Factors

a. First Lieutenant CASEY was a graduate of the Naval Air Training Command. He completed VT-24 on 10 June 1969 and received his wings on 13 June 1969. He was undergoing Phase One training with VMAT(AW)-202 and had completed his first flight in Fam stage the day prior to the accident. He had a total of 332 flight hours with 3.4 hours in the A6A before the final flight.

b. Lt. CASEY's previous flight experience and OFT/WST experience is shown in Enclosures (15) and (16). It is noteworthy that in his unsuccessful attempt to obtain a civilian license (Enclosure (15)), that Lt. CASEY received a down by the FAA check pilot.

c. First Lieutenant CASEY's previous flight history with the Naval Air Training Command revealed that he was in the lower area of the Average group of pilots with an overall grade of 48.00. Major (b) (6) of VT-24, his primary instructor, stated that Lt. CASEYwas an enjoyable and capable individual with no abnormal traits, disabilities or abilities. He performed in the aircraft aggressively, but averagely. After checking into VMAT(AW)-202 on 7 July 1969, Lt. CASEY attended A6A NAMO at NAS, Oceana between 21 July and 30 July 1969. He fired the rifle range from 11 August to 15 August 1969 and attended the squadron's first series of lectures on operations and characteristics of the A6A held from 5 August to 12 August 1969.

This lecture series is entitled Fam week (Enclosure (17)). The exams administered during "Fam week" consisted of Emergency Procedures, NATOPS open and closed book exams, and the course rules exam. Due to his performance on those exams, LT CASEY ranked sixth of twelve pilots in his class. His scores were satisfactory on the exams with a 3.76 on the Emergency Procedures and a 3.55 on the NATOPS closed book. For three one hour periods he received CFT training on normal operating and emergency procedures at the A6A simulator at Cherry Point. There were no outstandingly bad or good trends noted in the comments concerning his performance. One of the periods was extra having been secured on his own initiative. His only other completed training consisted of his Fam-1 flight with Lt. (b) (6) [redacted] flown on 25 August 1969, the day before the accident. The briefing guide is included as Enclosure (18) and the flight grade sheet as Enclosure (19). As indicated by the instructor, Lt. CASEY displayed no unusual or unsafe practices or procedures on the flight. The only exceptional remark was that his normal landings were above average after finally becoming accustomed to the A6A landing characteristics on his first several attempts.

d. Lt. CASEY's physiological and psychological qualifications prior to his final flight are difficult to determine. He had been grounded the week preceeding due to an ankle injury received while playing football. The flight surgeon had prescribed 10 Darvon pain pills and soakings to reduce the swelling. The medication if used as intended should have been used well before he returned to a flying status. An "up-chit" had been issued 25Aug69. There were three pills remaining when Lt. CASEY's gear was inventoried. The flight surgeon reports that in order for him to have an adverse reaction due to the medication, he would have had to taken all seven at one time. There is no record of his ever taking any of the pills. On the morning of the accident, he remarked to his roommate, prior to departing for his brief, that he was tired and looking forward to returning and getting back to bed. The brief was scheduled for 0600 and being tired at that particular time is not remarkable. He had socked his ankle the night before, but was not complaining of any pain. He was a robust and active man in what could be considered above average physical condition. There is no really significant data concerning his physiological and phychological condition prior to the flight.

e. The brief for the flight was conducted a half-hour late due to the instructor's tardiness. It was thorough and included all facets of the briefing guide for FP-2/IP-1 (Enclosure (2)). The briefing also covered overhead maneuvers which are not a part of this flight. This was included as an instructive discussion only in that no overheads are to be performed on that flight. It was expressly stated by the instructor than no overheads would be performed. The briefing was conducted within the NATOPS guide lines. There are no other significant remarks.

f. The pre-flight of the aircraft by Lt. CASEY as monitored by Lt. (b) (6) appeared complete concerning the particular items to be checked, but cursory in view of the relative speed with which it was completed. Normally, on FP-2, the preflight is a relatively long undertaking. There are no other significant remarks.

g. All remarks concerning the conduct of the flight are taken from Lt. (b) (6) statements.

(1) On take-off, the slats did not initially retract. Lt. CASEY immediately reduced power and was going to cycle the slats, but was stopped by the instructor and told to climb to above 3,000 feet before cycling them. They were at approximately 500-600 feet altitude at the time. This action was noted as being very rough.

(2) The instrument portion of the hop in which Tacan radial tracking and interception and S-1 and S-3 patterns were performed indicated to Lt. (b) (6) that Lt. CASEY was slow to recognize deviations and to take corrective actions. Lt. CASEY was rough on the controls and not very alert. His responses were slow and he seemed to be uncommunicative.

(3) The remainder of the flight consisted of practicing slow flight at 4,000 feet, practicing clean and dirty stalls at 6,000 feet and the performance of wingovers and flaperon rolls between 12,000 and 16,000 feet. The conduct of wingovers and flaperon rolls is introduced on FP-2 and are therefore permitted in later hops if briefed even though not included in the briefing guides. Lt. (b) (6) at this time refused Lt. CASEY's request to do overhead maneuvers. The reasons given by Lt. (b) (6) for this refusal were that the maneuver was unauthorized at this stage and that Lt. CASEY's performance thus far did not indicate that he was ready for such a maneuver. It is significant to note that even though barrel rolls are not scheduled for this flight, Lt. (b) (6) permitted Lt. CASEY to perform this maneuver. This maneuver has been in the FP-2 syllabus on prior briefing guides, but was taken out in the most recent printing (i.e. about 1 July 1969). Lt. (b) (6) directed Lt. CASEY to do one more maneuver and to head back to Cherry Point.

(4) Lt. CASEY's final maneuver was initiated at 16,000 feet when at approximately 380 kts. indicated he pulled the nose 15° up and half rolled onto his back. From this position the aircraft was neither pulled thru nor allowed to fall through, but was directed downwards with approximately one "g". The throttles were at or near military. Lt. (b) (6) asked Lt. CASEY what his intentions were. Lt CASEY made no response and appeared fixed and unmoving on the stick. His eyes were undiscernable due to the dark visors. As the dangerous situtation developed with high air speed, dive angle and power setting, Lt. (b) (6) made repeated commands for reduction of power, extension of the speed brakes and for pulling out of the dive. During the dive, he repeatedly struck Lt. CASEY on the upper arm but received no response other than possibly a shrugging of Lt. CASEY's shoulder. From none of his demands did Lt. (b) (6) receive any response. Lt. CASEY appeared fixed.

(5) Lt. (b) (6) ejected at or near the seat's envelope at approximately 3,500 feet, 580 kts. indicated, 60° to 80° nose down and the aircraft upright. He had partially pulled the face curtain down, taken another look at the instruments and pulled the face curtain the remaining distance. His delay very nearly cost him his life. His personnel chute opened just prior to his impacting the ground. Enclosure (20) provides pertinent information relative to the ejections.

(6) Lt. CASEY apparently ejected within one to two seconds after Lt. (b) (6) utilizing the secondary handle. He had just separated from his seat when he impacted the ground.

h. The flight had been conducted with the parameters set up by the squadron's briefing guides (except for the barrel rolls) and the NATOPS flight manual. Lt. (b) (6) had no other avenues open to maintain the safe conduct of the flight after the aircraft's nose was pointed down. It is impossible to hold the control stick and place "g's" on the aircraft while strapped into the B/N's seat. Lt. (b) (6) delay in ejecting was excessive and nearly fatal. Lt. CASEY's unresponsiveness extending from an unknown source precluded the initiation of any recovery from his maneuver.

2. INSTRUCTOR FACTORS

a. Lt. (b) (6) has accumulated 1094.8 total hours of which 804.2 are in the A6A as First Pilot with 131.1 hrs. A6A flight time in the last three months.

b. Lt. (b) (6) qualifications consist of his standard instrument rating which expires 27Feb70, his latest NATOPS Evaluation dated 13 May 1969 on which he scored 4.0, and his previous flight history. While overseas, Lt. (b) (6) was awarded two (2) DFC's and twenty-two (22) Air Medals. There are no other pertinent remarks.

c. He has an entry in his log book dated 13Feb68 involving an A6A for unintentionally jettisoning a drop tank resulting in damage to the wing flap (Echo). Another entry, involving a TAF-9J in the training command occurred on 4 May 1967 when he sheared the nose wheel on a hard landing damaging the nose strut assembly (Charlie).

d. Since joining VMAT(AW)-202, Lt. (b) (6) has demonstrated a great willingness to work by flying more than the normal number of training flights. He was given an Instructor Under Training (IUT) syllabus consisting of local course rules, NATOPS exams, briefs by other instructors on the conduct of training flights in VMAT(AW)-202, and a check flight by an instructor. Additional instructional flights were waived due to Lt. (b) (6) former experience with Cherry Point's local flying area and his high experience level in the aircraft. Lt. (b) (6) was not overburdened with collateral duties.

e. On the 26th of August, Lt. (b) (6) was twenty-five minutes late for his brief with Lt. CASEY. As stated by Lt. (b) (6) the briefing guide was covered from "top to bottom" prior to accepting and pre-flighting the aircraft. The scheduled take-off time of 0730 was met. Therefore; only one hour and five minutes was spent from start of the brief to take-off for this flight. The normal requirement at the FP-2 level is one hour and thirty minutes minimum for brief, pre-flight, start and taxi. Lt. (b) (6) stated that he had given Lt. CASEY a very thorough debrief the day before on their FP-1 flight. This fact, coupled with Lt. (b) (6) statement that Lt. CASEY's pre-flight had not been as detailed as desireable, lessens the importance of the relatively short time between briefing and take-off. Lt. CASEY's performance on the flight and Lt. (b) (6) comments regarding it (Enclosure (14)) indicate that Lt. CASEY was thought to be unsafe, at least for instrument flying. A decision to abort the rest of the mission could have been prudent, but it would have been without precedent in this squadron. The purpose of the flight was to allow the transitioning pilot to practice and to improve his experience level in the aircraft. The problem of correcting "Below Average" or "Unsatisfactory" performance or trends is one which resists standardization as each transition pilot exhibits a different degree of responsiveness. One area for possible improvement would be to provide the instructors with a better education in instructional techniques.

f. During the flight, Lt. CASEY had been permitted to perform barrel rolls. This maneuver is not authorized by the briefing guide as of 1 July 1969, although previous FP-2 briefing guides did include barrel rolls. Lt. (b) (6) had demonstrated the maneuver on FP-1 and had briefed Lt. CASEY in the proper conduct of the maneuver. It is not felt that the briefing or the performing of this maneuver is relevant to the accident.

3. SUPERVISORY FACTORS

a. Supervision is not considered a cause factor of this mishap, however; additional training of Lt. (b) (6) as an instructor may well have prevented it. Although Lt. (b) (6) completed a squadron level IUT syllabus, which is designed to familiarize the instructor with the course of instruction and what is required of him as an instructor, the squadron syllabus is not slanted toward training instructors in the techniques of airborne instruction. A more formal course is required to provide instructors with the experience level and background needed to cope with pilot induced emergencies, deviations from the norm, and to teach him to recognize unsafe trends and take whatever corrective action is necessary.

D. MATERIAL FAILURES AND MALFUNCTIONS

1. Examination of Chain 10's (A6A Bureau # 151574) yellow sheets of the six months preceeding the accident revealed the following significant items:

a. 16 May 1969; aircraft made hard landing (8 g's). Aircraft was thoroughly inspected in accordance with M.R.C.'s. No damage discovered.

b. 25 July 1969; airspeed limitation of flaps and slats was exceeded. Aircraft was flown at 320 kts. with flaps/slats partially extended. No damage to aircraft noted.

c. 30 July 1969; longitudinal and lateral trim were inoperative. problem corrected by replacing a defective circuit breaker.

d. 20 August 1969; aircraft made hard landing (9¾ g's). Aircraft was inspected in accordance with M.R.C.'s. No damage detected.

e. 21 August 1969; a fuel leak was discovered in port wing root area. Wing was caulked.

2. A recent history of the aircraft is as follows:

a. Aircraft inducted for calendar check on 23 June 1969. Calendar check completed on 17 July 1969. Aircraft flew sorties on 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30 and 31 July 1969 and on 1, 4, 5, 6, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21 and 25 August 1969.

b. A total of 73.4 flight hours since the check was completed.

c. The aircraft has no history of engine or flight control malfunction nor has it had any trends of material failures. The yellow sheet discrepancies listed above are not considered to be a factor in the accident.

3. The complete destruction of the aircraft prevented any further analysis of material failure or malfunction.

4. Both ejection seats functioned properly. The failure of the pilot's parachute to fully deploy was due to ejection outside the operating parameters of the seat.

E. FACILITIES

1. No facility was directly or indirectly involved with the accident, however; the SAR reaction by both MCAS, Cherry Point and Seymour Johnson AFB personnel were outstanding considering the distance from the respective bases.

2. The civilian rescue agencies likewise acted quickly with effective results. The rescue report is included as (Enclosure (21)).

F. NATOPS

1. There is no evidence that NATOPS was related to or contributed to this accident.

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VIII CONCLUSIONS

A. The cause of this accident is a combination of pilot judgement for entering an unbriefed maneuver and an unkown pilot factor concerning Lt. CASEY's lack of corrective action or even response once the maneuver progressed to a dangerous point.

B. This accident could have been prevented if the instructor pilot had a set of dual controls to take over flying the aircraft and affect a recovery.

IX RECOMMENDATIONS

A. That at least four (4) A6 aircraft be modified for each A6A training squadron to incorporate dual controls for use during early familiarization stage training. The minimum controls necessary for this modification would be a stick, a throttle with speed brake switch and a method for lowering the landing gear. These controls would permit a no flap, arrested landing to be made in the event of total pilot incapacitation.

B. (b) (5) [redacted]

C. That the procedures and orders for handling and shipping perishable tissue for laboratory analysis be reviewed and modified to ensure that the problems cited in Enclosure (22) do not recur.

ORIGINAL

LIST OF ENCLOSURES

1. VMAT(AW)-202 Flight Schedule for 26 August 1969
2. FP-2 Briefing Guide
3. Photo of Aircraft Impact (Date 27Aug) VMAT(AW)-202 AAR Serial 1-70A Pilot CASEY of 26 August 1969
4. Photo of Aircraft Impact and immediate Area, VMAT(AW)-202 AAR Serial 1-70A, Pilot CASEY of 26 August 1969
5. Photo of Impact and Blast Effect, VMAT(AW)-202 AAR Serial 1-70A, Pilot CASEY of 26 August 1969
6. Photo of Aircraft Impact (Date 26Aug) VMAT(AW)-202 AAR Serial 1-70A Pilot CASEY of 26 August 1969
7. Statement of Captain (b) (6) [redacted]
8. NAVSAFCEN Msg 041232ZSEP69
9. Map of Crash Site and Surrounding Area
10. Statement of Mr. M. W. MCCOY (Witness)
11. Statement of Mr. George GARNER (Wintess)
12. Statement of Mr. Clee Hill (Witness)
13. Statement of Mr. Vance GARNER (Witness)
14. Statement of Lt. (b) (6) [redacted] (Instructor Pilot)
15. Flight experience of Lt. R. B. CASEY
16. OFT/WST Experience of Lt. R. B. CASEY
17. VMAT(AW)-202 Familiarization Training Syllabus for Pilots
18. FP-1 Briefing guide
19. Grade Sheet for Lt. R. B. CASEY on FP-1
20. Statement of Captain (b) (6) [redacted] (Flight Equipment Officer)
21. OPNAV Form 3750-13 (Rescue Report)
22. Medical Officer's Report
23. Supplementary Report to Medical Officers Report

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VMAT(AW)-202 FLIGHT SCHEDULE
FOR 26 AUGUST 1969, TUESDAY

SDO: LT (b) (6)

ODO: 0600-1200 CAPT CORRIGAN
1200-1700 CAPT PABIN
1700-SEC CAPT TAYLOR

FLT	CREW	BRIEF	T/O	LAND	MISSION	SYS	ORD	TOT	REMARKS
1-1	CAPT (b) (6) CAPT	0530	0630	1500	VIP	D		OUT & IN	
2-1	CAPT MAJ (b) (6)	0600 MAJ (b) (6)	0730 LT (b) (6)	1130	TC-9 LT (b)	A LT (b) (6)		CAPT (b) (6)	
3-1*	LT (b) (6) CAPT	0600 CAPT (b)	0730 LT (b)	1130	TC-10 LT (b)	A LT (b) (6)		CAPT (b) (6)	
4-1	LT (b) (6) CAPT (b) (6)	0600	0730	1030	FP-3 IP-2	D			
5-1	LT (b) (6) LT (b) (6)	0600	0730	1030	FP-2 IP-1	D			
6-1	LT (b) (6) CAPT (b) (6)	0630	0800	1100	VNP-2	D			
7-1	LT (b) CAPT (b) (6)	0700	0830	1130	STO-2	A	6MK76	0900 0930	A.F. DARE COUNTY
8-1	CAPT MAJ (b) (6)	0700	0830	1130	ST-1 SO-2	A	6MK76	0900 0930	A.F. DARE COUNTY
9-1	LT (b) (6) CAPT (b) (6)	0730	0900	1100	VOP-3	D	6MK76 6/2.75	0930 1000	A.F. DARE COUNTY
10-1	MAJ (b) (6) LTC	1130 CAPT (b) (6)	1300	1700 LT (b) (6)	TC-10	A LT (b) (6)			
11-1	CAPT (b) (6) LT (b) (6)	1130	1300	1600	TC-18	A	6MK76	1300 1400	A.F. DARE COUNTY A/A
12-1	LT (b) (6) LT	1130	1300	1600	STO-2	A	6MK76	1300 1400	A.F. DARE COUNTY
13-1*	LT (b) (6) CAPT (b) (6)	1200	1330	1630	VIS DAC 3+4 VOP-4	D	6MK76 6/2.75	1400 1500	BT-9
13-2	LT (b) (6) CAPT (b) (6)	1200	1330	1630	VIS DAC OMD-4	D	6MK76 6/2.75	1400 1500	BT-9
14-1	LT (b) (6) CAPT (b) (6)	1230	1400	1700	VNP-3	D			
15-1	LT (b) (6) CAPT (b) (6)	1745	1915	2115	FNP-1	D			
16-1	LT (b) CAPT (b) (6)	1745	1915	2115	FNP-1	D			
17-1	LT (b) (6) CAPT (b) (6)	1745	1915	2115	FNP-2 ST-2	A			

* AIRCRAFT COMMANDER
** FLIGHT LEADER

NOTES: WST Schedule, 0730-1000, CAPT (b) (6) vice CAPT (b) (6)

FLIGHT DATA			A6	TC-12
SUNRISE	0636	HRS SCHED(PREVIOUS DAY)	38.0	16.0
SUNSET	1943	HRS FLOWN(PREVIOUS DAY)	30.4	4.5
DAILY SCHED	A6-41.0/TC-12.0	TOTAL MONTHLY HRS	420.8	107.8

(b) (6)

By direction

ENCLOSURE (1)

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BRIEFING GUIDE : A6-A
FP-2/INST-1

TP/IP
FLIGHT TIME 3.0
BRIEF TIME 1.5
FUEL LOAD 16,000

A. MISSION OBJECTIVE: A flight to continue practice of procedures learned during FAM-1 and to introduce instrument procedures. TP continues area familiarization and accomplishes basic air airwork, approach to stalls and single engine performance for 1.5 hours. Introduce basic instrument procedures and VDI. Instrument approaches to home field, followed by landing practice.

B. FLIGHT PROCEDURES:

1. Weather: VFR to remain clear of clouds

2. Communications:

   a. Brief airfield, TACC and enroute communication procedures.

   b. TP will handle all communications.

3. Pre-flight:

   a. Instructor pilot will sign as pilot in command.

   b. TP will perform the walk-around pre-flight inspection monitored by the IP.

4. Start, Post-start and Taxi:

   a. Brief pre-start and start procedures from the current pilots kneeboard card.

   b. Review all plane captains' signals.

   c. Review post-start procedures and line signals.

   d. Review taxi route. TP will handle all UHF communications.

   e. Tune and adjust VDI. Top of pitch trim marker on horison.

5. Take-off

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   a. Review paragraph 3-8 of FP-1 guide.

   b. Climb to FL 200. Check in with "Icepack" and "Base".

   c. Engage MACH hold on AFCS in climb, and upon level-off at FL 200, engage ALT HOLD. Make turns on auto pilot to demonstrate capabilities. Utilize STAB AUG for remainder of hop if AFCS is operative.

ENCLOSURE (2)

6. Instrument Practice

a. Make turns, dives, climbs and speed changes until a comfortable instrument scan is established using the VDI and VGI.

b. Stabilize at 300 KIAS and FL 200 for turn pattern. (Maintain ±5 Knots and ±200 feet).

(1) Turn pattern: Make one-half standard rate turn for 90° of heading change; reverse for 90° of turn. Hold 15° of bank for 30° of heading change, reverse to original heading. Hold 45° of bank for 90° of heading change, reverse and turn to original heading.

c. S-1 Pattern: Stabilize at 250 KIAS. This will require approximately 83% ± 2%. While maintaining heading, descend at 1000 fpm for 1000 feet (Do not use speed brakes), climb at 1000 fpm for 1000 feet and repeat. (Average, 5° of heading change, ± 200 feet in four minutes). Descent may be accomplished at approximately 80% while climb will be at approximately 87%. (The response to the VSI is power; the response to airspeed is attitude).

d. S-3 Pattern: Same as S-1 pattern except maintain one-half standard rate turn to right for first two minutes (180° heading change). Reverse turn to the left for next two minutes (Average ± 200 feet, ± 5 seconds and 10° of heading error after a four minute pattern.

e. Practice TACAN bearing changes, tracking and station passage on VSI.

f. Perform penetration check list and execute a penetration to 3000 feet ACL. (80% Speed Brakes out, 250 KIAS). Make half standard rate turns in descent and steady out on a given heading. Level off at 250 KIAS, 3000 feet, and on heading, slow below 250 KIAS and drop gear and flaps/slats. With speed brakes in and at 150 KIAS perform half standard rate turn for 180° of heading change. Upon completion of turn steady up, military power, gear up, 170 KIAS flaps/slats and climb to 15,000 feet. (Check isolation switch to flight, defog off, engine anti-ice off).

7. Aerobatics

a. Between 12,000 and 15,000 feet and at 400 KIAS perform high "G" turns. Do not fly into buffet.

b. Below 6000 feet slow to below 250 KIAS, drop gear and flaps and perform approach to stalls.

(1) Approach to stalls: Attain nose high attitude with power set at approximately 80%. Decelerate aircraft by increasing nose attitude. DO NOT TRIM INTO STALL. As the aircraft slows past 23 units AOA, directional control must be maintained by use of rudder alone as flaperon deflection will occur about 10 to 15 knots prior to stall (about 27 units AOA). After moderate buffet is experienced, apply positive forward stick and advance throttle to military power. Effect recovery at 20 units AOA.

(2) Stall speeds: 32,000 lbs gross weight, wings level, T/O flaps.

	IDLE	85%	MIL
T/O FLAPS	98kts	88kts	82kts

c. At 350 KIAS, run nose trim full nose down over-riding with stick pressure to maintain level flight. Reduce power and slow to below 250 KIAS. Lower flaps and slow to 20 units AOA. When stabilized, run trim to full nose up. Raise flaps, accelerate to 450 KIAS or .5 IMN. This will demonstrate that the aircraft is controlable, with a runnwy trim tab, between the extreme speeds used.

d. At 200 KIAS in straight and level flight, engage spin assist switch and perform mild turns. While maintaining 200 KIAS and without stick pressure, turn off spin assist. Note pitching movement when switch is activated and deactivated.

e. Simulated single engine performance (port engine at idle and wing tip speedbrakes out). Perform large power changes to demonstrate yaw characteristics. With port engine at idle and wing tip speedbrakes out, descend to and level off at 5000 feet, below 250 KIAS lower gear and flaps and establish level flight at 150 KIAS. Establish a 500 fpm descent for 1000 feet, stop descent and establish a rate of climb with military power (stbd engine only, speedbrakes out). Again set up a 500 fpm descent; this time with 15° to 20° bank. Note power required and remaining power available. Stop sink rate after 1000 feet and establish climb (Optimum climb will be with wings level). This will illustrate to the TP how the A6 will fly and respond in the landing pattern under actual single engine conditions. (Max fuel weight for practice should be 7000 pounds)

8. Return to Base

a. Proceed directly from aerobatic area to Base TACAN FIX completing at least one turn in the holding pattern. Conduct the published TACAN approach, make a low pass and missed approach. Reenter the VFR pattern for a minimum of 5 Touch-and-go landings.

b. TACAN/INSTRUMENT Approaches

(1) Slow down to 230 KIAS (maximum airspeed for holding) 3 minutes prior to entering holding pattern.

(2) Complete the penetration checklist prior to commencing penetration or radar descent (pitot heat on, defog on, engine anti-ice as required current altimeter setting (with altimeter error) to be set passing FL 180).

(3) Descend at 250 KIAS, 80%, wing-tip speedbrakes out, between 4-6000 fpm. (VSI will not indicate greater than 6000 fpm.) Passing 10,000 feet give altimeter check; B/N acknowledge.

(4) Leveling Technique: Begin level-off no later than 10% of rate of descent above level off altitude. Speed brakes in. Maintain 250 KIAS. Prior to the gate or when directed by the final controller, drop gear and flaps (250 KIAS to 220 KIAS) and slow to 150 KIAS. (Speed brakes in) Check three down, brakes pumped, flaps and slats (indicators and visual confirmation).

(5) Slow to donut airspeed (cross check with 108 KIAS + 2 kts for every 1000 pounds of fuel and external stores) prior to final and complete landing checklist.

(6) Final: Descent from the gate on GCA glide path will be wit speed brakes out and power as needed to maintain approximately 600 fpm on the VSI (depending on head or tail winds). Descend to minimums; B/N check for runway and indicate the runway in sight. If pilot cannot see runway at minimums, execute missed approach.

(7) Missed approach: Military power and speed brakes in. Estal lish rate of climb and raise gear. When gear indicates up and 170 KIAS is reached, flaps up. (Flaps and slats not to be raised in a turn. In most cas it will be normal to turn to published or instructed heading prior to raising flaps). Check isolation valve to flight position and fly at 250 KIAS at the assigned pattern altitude.

c. Review break procedure from FP-1.

9. Safety Brief:

a. Runaway trim

b. Hot/Hung start

c. Generator Failure

"SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES"



ENCLOSURE (3)

AIRCRAFT IMPACT (DATE 27AUG) VM.T(AW)-2 [illegible] TIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
L 1-70M PILOT CASEY OF 26 AUGUST 1969 WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

PHOTO OF AIRCRAFT IMPACT AND IMMEDIATE AREA, VMAT(AW)-202
AAR SERIAL 1-70, PILOT CASEY OF 26 AUGUST 1969.

ENCLOSURE (4)
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

PHOTO OF IMPACT AND BLAST EFFECT, VMAT(AW)-202 AAR
SERIAL 1-70A, PILOT CASEY OF 26 AUGUST 1969

ENCLOSURE (5)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES



ENCLOSURE (6)

OF AIRCRAFT IMPACT (LATE 26AUG) VMAT(AW)-202 SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
SERIAL 1-7CA PILOT CASEY OF 26 AUGUST 1969 WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

Statement of Captain [redacted] USMC, Assistant Airfield Operations Officer, concerning VMAT(AW)-202 Serial 1-70A, Pilot CASEY of 26 August 1969

On 26 August 1969 at 0851 (local), the Control Tower called down to my office on the squawk box that they had received a somewhat excited phone call from a Mrs. Cecil HILL on the Crash Phone (5040 Line) that an aircraft had crashed near her house near Kinston. Her information was sketchy and when called back for more information, it was discovered she had given the wrong number.

Thereafter, the tower initiated various information gathering actions to determine exactly where, who and what had crashed. When word was received that Seymour Johnson's SAR bird was on the scene and that it was a Cherry Point aircraft, Pedro was dispatched at 1325Z.

The tower called again to report that the co-pilot was alive and in the Lenoir County Hospital. I found out from VMAT(AW)-202 the pilot's names and called the hospital between 1000 and 1030 (local) and they let me talk to Lt. [redacted]. He said Lt. CASEY had lost control somehow and ended up 60° nose down at .7 Mach passing 4,000 feet, at which time Lt. [redacted] ejected.

[redacted]

ENCLOSURE (7)

[redacted]

1

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

L XO

CZCLNA438
RTTEZYUW RUCILSA4379 2471356-EEEE--RUEBNLA.
ZNY EEEEE
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FM NAVSAFECEN
TO RUEBNLA/MARALLWEAATRARON TWO ZERO TWO
BT
UNCLAS E F T O
3750 A-6A BUNO 151574 ACCIDENT
1. WRECKAGE RELEASED TO SENIOR MEMBER OF BOARD.
2. INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN OPNAVINST 3750.6F, PAGE 20,
PARA 32D APPLY.
BT
4379

NNNN

ENCLOSURE (7)

"SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH
OPNAVINST 5510.6 SERIES"

MAP OF CRASH SITE AND SURROUNDING AREA



"SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 5750.6 SERIES"

ENCLOSURE (9)

Statement of Mr. M. W. McCoy, Route #1, Box 303, Cove City, N. C. concerning VMAT(AW)-202 Serial 1-70A, Pilot Casey of 26 August 1969

When I first saw the aircraft, it was in a steep dive with its wings level. Afterwards, I saw two objects come out of the aircraft, both of which looked alike. The aircraft and the two objects were several thousand feet up about this time. As far as I can remember, I saw no parachutes. Soon afterwards, I heard an explosion and saw smoke. I was working at the Dupont Plant some two miles from the scene of the accident at the time.

THIS BOARD CONSIDERS MR. M. W. MCCOY's STATEMENT CREDIBLE ONLY IN REGARDS TO THE AIRCRAFT'S FLIGHT PATH

M. W. McCOY

(b) (6)

ENCLOSURE (10)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

Statement of Mr. George Garner, Route #6, Box 312, Kinston, N. C. concerning VMAT(AW)-202 Serial 1-70A, Pilot Casey of 26 August 1969

I was about a mile and a half northeast of the scene of the accident. The plane passed directly over our house about a thousand feet up. All I could hear was hissing sound from the wings or the engine, time unknown. About 30 seconds later an explosion occurred. There was no smoke visible while the airplane was in the air. It was flying straight-humming, kind of a whistling sound, the noise sounded like a dynamite explosion. The jet was not traveling fast like jets usually do.

THIS BOARD CONSIDERS MR. G. GARNER's STATEMENT CREDIBLE ONLY IN REGARDS TO THE AIRCRAFT'S FLIGHT PATH

GEORGE GARNER

[redacted]

(b) (6)

ENCLOSURE (11)

1

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

Statement of Mr. Clee Hill, Route 1 Dover, Hiway 55, concerning VMAT(AW)-202 Serial 1-70A, Pilot CASEY of 26 August 1969

I was working on farm equipment around 8:30 - quarter to nine, when I saw a plane coming from the north heading south coming down very fast at a high angle. I looked up and saw the plane after hearing a very loud noise. Then the plane lost more altitude and went into the ground about 500 yards from me. Before the plane failed I saw a man tumbling in the air upwards and then something white coming from him. He landed by chute about 300 yards from me. I rushed to his aid and the first words the man said were, "I have a buddy, find him.". I then rushed over to where the plane had made its impact and found the body of another laying about 50 feet from the hole. I went back to the injured and told him I'd found his buddy, but didn't say he was dead. Shortly after this man was taken to the hospital and then I just stood by and waited. Before they took the injured man away I asked him what had happened and he said they'd lost control of the plane. The plane was not smoking or burning before it crashed. The second man just didn't seem to get out in time. (As told to 1stSgt (b) (6) MPS)

THIS BOARD CONSIDERS MR. C. HILL
A CREDIBLE WITNESS

CLEE HILL

CERTIFIED A TRUE COPY

(b) (6)

ENCLOSURE (12)

1

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

Statement of Mr. Vance Garner, Route #6, Kinston, N.C., concerning 7441(AA)-402 Serial 1-70A, Pilot Cassy of 26 August 1969

(Working with Mr. C. Hill and also witnesses the explosion)

The last man out of the plane waited until the plane was almost to the ground before he jumped. The plane was nosing down straight. There was no smoke or fire until he hit the ground. I heard a noise as if the plane was trying to get more speed and that's when I looked up and saw the plane falling. I rushed to aid the injured man and he said they'd lost control of the plane.

THIS BOARD CONSIDERS MR. V. GARNER
A CREDIBLE WITNESS

VANCE GARNER

(b) (6)

ENCLOSURE (13)

1

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

Statement of (b) (6) [redacted], 1stLt (b) (6) [redacted] USMC, Concerning VMAT(AW)-202 Serial 1-70A, Pilot Casey of 26 August 1969. First Statement 3.5 hours after mishap. Lt (b) (6) [redacted] was under sedation.

We were doing some aerobatics which were to include only rolls and wing overs but no overhead maneuvers. When he pulled the nose up about 15° nose high, rolled inverted and pulled it through. The entry speed was about 380 knots at about 16,000 feet*. I thought at first he was going to roll out in a "Cuban 8" type recovery, then when the nose kept coming through I thought he might be going to start a "Split-S". As the speed increased and he made no attempt to recover, I told him to reduce power, "pop the boards", "pull-pull". He did not respond verbally or by physical action to my commands. He didn't have any back pressure on the stick as I felt no G-forces and he didn't pull back the throttle. I saw the speed increase to between 0.8 and 0.9 Mach and I ejected at about 3500 feet using the face curtain. The plane going almost straight down. Lt CASEY didn't seem to respond at all to my voice commands and the only motions I am aware of is that he adjusted the wing positions very slightly at two times early in the maneuver and that when I slapped him on the shoulder after seeing no reaction, he shrugged his shoulder.

The hop was a Fam 2 which followed a Fam 1 we had flown together the previous day. He appeared a little rough on the controls and not too alert in taking corrective action throughout the flight. On take-off, the slats initially didn't come up and he was quite rough while cycling the slats to get them up. We then went to 20,000 feet and practiced TACAN radial tracking and interception and did S-1 and S-3 instrument patterns. We then went down to 4,000 feet for slow flight and then up to 6,000 feet for stalls. We had briefed for flaperon rolls and wing overs only but Lt CASEY asked about overhead maneuvers. I told him not to do any and we then proceeded into a few rolls and wing overs. The altitudes used were between 12,000 and 15,000 feet. At the time of entry into the last maneuver the fuel reading was about 11,000 lbs and the throttle setting was almost 100%.

I do not remember the ejection. All I do remember is seeing the ground come up and trying to roll with it. I hit, awoke and noticed pain in both legs and was spitting up phlegm or blood. I didn't know which since my visor was down. Almost immediately some men came up and started helping me.

*Note: The originally stated altitude was 20,000 feet which was changed in discussion on 26 August 1969 with Dr. T. W. TYSON.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

ENCLOSURE (14)

Question and Answer Period with 1stLt (b) (6) on 2 September 1969

Major (b) (6) - "Do you have any additions or deletions to make to your original statement?"

(Here Lt. (b) (6) read over his original statement, then began the following narrative)

1stLt (b) (6) - "He started the maneuver first by pulling the aircraft nose up to about 15°, rolled inverted and let the nose fall through for a few seconds. I thought he was going to do a half Cuban 8. As the nose fell through 10° nose down, I asked Lt. CASEY what he was doing, but there was no reply. At 30° nose down, I told him to reduce power, level the wings and pull out...still no response, even though I hit him on the shoulder a few times trying to get his attention. I started to become concerned and started to command him to reduce power, pop the speed brakes and to pull G's. I kept telling him to pop the speed brakes, reduce power and to pull G's, but he would give no response. All the time he had 100% power and only one G on the aircraft. As the aircraft descended, I noticed two gradual wing movements about 45° rotational change for each. As we passed 3900 I commenced my ejection stopping momentarily to again look at the altimeter. After ejection, all I remember is looking down at the earth, which was coming up at me at a high rate of speed. I began to turn away, then I hit. I remember trying to get up on my hands and knees, but found this to be painful, so I rolled over on my back. I then noticed that my legs were at an unusual angle. Immediately, a man was beside me trying to comfort me."

Major (b) (6) - "Did you have your helmet on after you landed?"

1stLt (b) (6) - "Yes, I did for I remember spitting up blood and couldn't see it because my visor was down. Plus, the doctor who treated me stated I was lucky I had my helmet on, for without it, I would have surely busted my head."

(Here Lt. (b) (6) Changed the Subject)

1stLt ALBRIGHT - "You know Lt. CASEY was the roughest pilot I have ever flown with...I decided that I would not let him go IFR if the need arose. He was really unsafe."

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

ENCLOSURE (14)

Major (b) (6) - "Was he unsafe on Fam 1?"

1stLt (b) (6) - "No, the only trouble on Fam 1 were his landings, but he improved once he got the picture. It was Fam 2 that I felt that he was unsafe. He couldn't stay on a Tacan Radial for more than one second. Flying at 20,000', he would vary his altitude ± 1000'. When I told him to level off at 18,000' from 20,000', he put 4 G's on the aircraft to do it. On his slow flight, he couldn't keep altitude. We spent something like forty-five minutes just doing Tacan and S-1's and S-3's."

Major (b) (6) - "What kind of brief did you give Lt CASEY?"

1stLt (b) (6) - "Well, I covered the briefing guide from top to bottom, except for taxiing the aircraft. I had him the day before and gave him a real good debrief. During the brief I explained overhead maneuvers and that he should not do them unless he was below 9,000#. I also stated that he should not do any during this hop. When he preflighted the aircraft he seemed to do it in a shorter period of time then should have been done. On take-off, after he raised the gear and flaps, I noticed the slats were still down. So, I mentioned this to him. He then reduced power. I had a feeling that he would stall the aircraft, so I immediately told him to add power and stabilize at 3,000', then he should recycle the slats. After he did this, the slats came up. I then discussed what he should do in case of gear, flap or slat problems in no uncertain terms. Afterwards, he flew a real bad SID."

Major (b) (6) - "What was the time of your brief?"

1stLt - "It was 0625, 25 minutes late."

Major - "What maneuvers did you perform?"

1stLt - "After the Tacans and S patterns, I told him he could do anything he wanted. We did a lot of wing overs. The first were bad. We then did some barrel rolls. Lt CASEY then said "Are you sure I can't do overheads?" I said no, then we flew straight for awhile, then he pulled the nose up and rolled inverted and this commenced the beginning of the accident."

Major (b) (6) - "Did you dump any fuel?"

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

ENCLOSURE (14)

1stLt [redacted] (b) (6) - "No, we had 19,000# or so on take-off and just before starting our last maneuver we were down to 11,000#. I questioned myself why would he ask to do overheads at 11,000# when I briefed him not to do overheads unless he was 9,000# or below."

Major [redacted] (b) (6) - "Did Lt CASEY say anything during the hop?"

1stLt [redacted] - "No, he didn't say too much. I tried a few times to strike up a conversation with him, but he wouldn't respond. During the brief, I asked him if there were any questions. He stated no, that he would ask questions if the need arose while airborne."

Major [redacted] (b) (6) - "When was the last time you looked at the airspeed indicator?"

1stLt [redacted] - "7,000 feet."

Major [redacted] - "When did you first reach for the ejection handle?"

1stLt [redacted] - "About 4,000 feet."

Major [redacted] - "Could you tell if Lt CASEY was conscious after he rolled the aircraft inverted?"

1stLt [redacted] - "I don't know if he was or not. When I slapped him on the shoulder, he seemed to shrug them; however, it could have been caused by me slapping him. During the descent, I had the impression that he was watching the airspeed indicator although I couldn't see his eyes."

ENCLOSURE (14)

PILOT'S FLIGHT EXPERIENCE

Civilian	5 Oct 65	Cessna 150-29 hrs	Operational
	3 Mar 67	Cessna 172-7 hrs	Operational

Command Attached	Period Assigned	Model Aircraft	Flight Hours	C V Landings Day/Night	Operational/ Proficiency
Basic Trng Comm	8 Apr 68				
VT-1	↓	T-34	26		Operational
VT-9		T-2A	44		"
		T-2B	8		"
VT-7		T-2A	50		"
VT-4	4 Dec 68	T-2B	21	4/0	"
Adv Trng Comm	13 Jan 69				"
VT-24	↓	TF-9J	106	8/0	"
	10 Jun 69	AF-9J *	34		"
VMAT(AW)-202	2 Jul 69	A-6A	4		"
MCCRTG-20					
2nd MAW					

* Last flight prior to reporting to 2d Marine Aircraft Wing on 7 July 1969

ENCLOSURE (15)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

PILOT'S OFT/WST EXPERIENCE

Flight Simulators

Location	Date	Simulator	Mission	Time
NAAS Meridian	1 Jun 68 4 Aug 68	2 F-23	Basic and Radio Instruments	14.5 Hrs.
NAAS Chase Field	3 Feb 69 4 Apr 69	2 F-23	Operational and Emerg Procedures	8.0 Hrs.
NAAS Chase Field	18 Feb 69 26 Mar 69	2 F-23	Basic and Radio Instruments	24.0 Hrs.
MCAS Cherry Point	12 Aug 69 14 Aug 69	A-6A Simulator	Operational and Emerg Procedures	3.0 Hrs.

ENCLOSURE (16)

PILOT'S OFT/WST EXPERIENCE

Flight Simulators

Location	Date	Simulator	Mission	Time
NAAS Meridian	1 Jun 68 4 Aug 68	2 F-23	Basic and Radio Instruments	14.5 Hrs.
NAAS Chase Field	3 Feb 69 4 Apr 69	2 F-23	Operational and Emerg Procedures	8.0 Hrs.
NAAS Chase Field	18 Feb 69 26 Mar 69	2 F-23	Basic and Radio Instruments	24.0 Hrs.
MCAS Cherry Point	12 Aug 69 14 Aug 69	A-6A Simulator	Operational and Emerg Procedures	3.0 Hrs.

ENCLOSURE (16)

VMAT(AW)-202

A6A FAMILIARIZATION WEEK

FRIDAY	(PRECEDING FAM WEEK)	
0800-0850	C.O.'s INTRODUCTION	
0900-0945	ASO/NATOPS ORIENTATION	
0955-1025	ADMIN DETAILS AND GENERAL REMARKS	
1030-1100	COURSE MATERIAL HANDOUT AND NATOPS OPEN BOOK EXAM	
1100-1130	FLIGHT EQUIP. AND SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT BRIEF	
1300-1330	A6A AIRCREW MISSION TFLPB #1	
WEEK END	GET COCKPIT TIME	
DAY 1	SUBJECT	REFERENCE
0800-0900	TFLPB 2 AIRFRAME/ENG OPERATING CHARACTIERISTICS AND LIMITATIONS	* 1-90 1-101
0900-1100	TFLPB 3 NORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURES	* 3-2 to 3-29
1100-1130	TFLPB 4 DUEL RESPONSIBILITY EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	* 5-1 5-23
1300-1500	TFLPB 5 EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	POCKET CHECK LIST
1500-1600	TFLPB 6 A6A SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT EJECTION SEAT	* 1-60 1-66
DAY 2		
0800-1000	TFLPB 7 AERO DYNAMICS/AOA	* 1-42 1-43
1000-1100	TFLPB 8 NATOPS PERFORM CHARTS PILOT B/N	* 11-2 11-44
1200-**	OFT; PILOT/B/n 1 PILOT BLINDFOLD COCKPIT CHECK	* 11-132 11-180
DAY 3		
0800-0900	TFLPB 9 ADC/RADAR ALTIMETER	* 7-13 7-14
0900-0945	TFLPB 10 AFCS	* 1-42, 43
0945-1045	TFLPB 11 PROHIBITED MANEUVERS	* 1-93
1045-1130	TFLPB 12 INTRODUCTION TO VDI	* 8-45 8-49
1200-**	OFT EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 2	
DAY 4		
0800-0900	TFEPB 13 EMERGENCY PROCEDURES EXAM & REVIEW	***
0900-1130	TFLPB 14 COURSE RULES	
1200-**	OFT 3 EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	
DAY 5		
0800-0955	TFLPB 15 A/C SERVICING & PREFLIGHT	* 1-83 1-89
1000-1200	TFLPB 16 CNI LECTURE	* 7-1 7-12
1300-1330	TFEPB 17 COURSE RULES EXAM	
1330-1430	NATOPS OPEN BOOK EXAM AND REVIEW	
1430-1500	TFEPB 19 NATOPS CLOSED BOOK EXAM	*10-9 10-15
1500-1600	TFCPB 20 REVIEW & SEMINAR	

NOTE: * NAVAIR MANUAL 01-85ADA-1

** ON OFT DAYS UNSCHEDULED TIME WILL BE UTILIZED FOR COCKPIT ORIENTATION TIME & FLIGHT EQUIPMENT MODIFICATIONS.

*** ALL LECTURES AND READING ASSIGNMENTS.

"SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES"

ENCLOSURE (17)

IP/TP
Flight Time 3.0
Brief Time 2.0
Fuel Load 16,000 LBS

A. MISSION OBJECTIVE: A DEMONSTRATION FLIGHT BY THE IP: TP IN THE RIGHT SEAT. THE IP WILL DEMONSTRATE THE ENTIRE FLIGHT ENVELOPE OF THE AIRCRAFT TO INCLUDE HIGH ALTITUDE AND SINGLE ENGINE PERFORMANCE, AEROBATICS, STALLS AND THE VARIOUS A/C CONFIGURATIONS. AFTER 1.5 HRS,, THE FLIGHT WILL RETURN TO THE FUEL PITS, REFUEL, AND TP/IP WILL SWITCH SEATS. THE TP WILL PERFORM AN AREA CHECK OUT, AEROBATICS (EXCLUDING OVERHEAD MANUEVERS), STALLS, AND LANDINGS.

B. FLIGHT PROCEDURES:

1. Weather: VFR to remain clear of clouds
2. Comm:
   (a) Brief airfield, TACC, and enroute communications procedures.
   (b) IP will control communications to demonstrate to TP.

3. Preflight:
   (a) IP will sign as pilot in command.
   (b) IP will demonstrate walk-around pre-flight. (Note all pins to be pulled by plane captain. AOA cover to be pulled prior to start. IP/IB to pull canopy actuating cylinder pin, TP to insure C.A.C. pin and canopy jettison pin are both pulled.)
   (c) Review ejection procedures.

4. Start:
   (a) Review current pilot kneeboard check list.
   (b) Review start procedures:
      (1) One, two, and three finger signals, cross-feed, and disconnect signals.
      (2) IP will demonstrate start.

5. Post Start and Taxi:
   (a) Review post start procedures from current pilot check list (to include boost pump check)
   (b) Review line procedures and signals.
      (1) Wing spread (flags down, switch aft, handle stowed).
      (2) Controls (flap up).
      (3) S/B. flaps-slats, wing pressure on.
      (4) S/B in (test position and norm retract).
      (5) Wing pressure (lights out, pressure norm).
      (6) Controls (flaps down).
      (7) Auto pilot check (new and old auto pilot).
      (8) Trim 0, 0, and 6.
      (9) Pins (count).
      (10) Ladders up, A.O.A. cover off (B/N visual check)
      (11) Park brake in.
      (12) Taxi.....75', roll, brake check, idle power, nose wheel steering engaged.

ENCLOSURE (18)

(c) Review taxi routes and voice procedures. Demonstrate use of nose wheel steering and differential braking for making turns. Taxi on Cherry Pt. Ground Control 380.8 (#1).

6. Pre Take-off:
   (a) In long position IP will read the TO check list and reply with the appropriate response.
   WINGS.....Spread, locked, flags down, switch aft, handle stowed
   TRIM.....6 nose up, 0 flaperon, 0 rudder
   FLAPS.....TO position, stab shifted, slats down, S/B in.
   FUEL.....Quantity, totaliser difference, wing pressure lights on.
   CONTROLS..Free
   SEAT.....Armed, alternate firing handle guard down.
   HARNESS...Locked.
   FLAPERON..Pop-up engaged (throttle check); anti-skid on and anti-skid light out.

7. Brief V/R Departure and course rules.
   (a) On all runways, do not climb above 1,000 feet until clear of traffic pattern.
   (b) Left turn or climb straight ahead after take-off. Right turns within five miles requires permission from the tower.

8. Take-off
   (a) Compute take-off roll during briefing.
   (b) T. O. check list.....to include runway heading check with HSI. and magnetic compass.
   (c) Hold both brakes, advance both throttles to military power. Check RPM, EGT, fuel flow, oil, engine trim, Hydraulics, Flaperons down, controls free, cockpit temperature normal.
   (d) Use nose wheel steering to maintain directional control until rudder becomes effective (about 80 KIAS).
   (e) Fly A/C off at single engine (gear up/flaps & slats down) flying speed (for A/C weight) approx 140 KIAS at 47,000 lbs gross wt. When a positive rate of climb is established and there is insufficient runway remaining to land the aircraft, raise the gear. At 170 KIAS raise the flaps, (do not raise flaps until main gear is up and locked). Do not accelerate beyond 250 KIAS until flaps and slats indicate up. Do not retract flaps below 170 KIAS for weights up to 50,000 lbs and not below 185 KIAS for weights above 50,000 lbs. When the gear, flaps and slats indicate up, place the isolation valve to the flight position.
   (f) Accelerate to 340 KIAS and climb to 12,000 feet check in with "Icepack" and "Base".
   (g) Monitor and report "engine instruments normal, hydraulics normal, oil normal, fuel transfer normal, cabin pressure normal.
   (h) At pilots discretion ergage auto pilot/stab aug mode. Be alert for trim changes or abrupt manuevers.

9. Enroute: Climb and proceed to aerobatic area.

(a) Demonstrate:

(1) Auto pilot (Altitude and Mach. hold during climb, Altitude hold after level off)
(2) Speed brakes (wing tip only.....fuselage and wing tip)
(3) Turn radius
(4) Single engine flight caracteristecs (Secure PORT engine)
(5) Perform normal air start with prot engine. Note windmill RPM, EGT, and warning light indications of windmilling engine. (This is a demonstration mnnuever only. TP will not practice air starts)

(b) Point out.

(1) New Bern Airport
(2) MCAF New River
(3) Bogue field
(4) Morehead/Beaufort Airport
(5) UFH/ADF Homer
(6) Rocket Range #2
(7) BT-11
(8) BT-9
(9) Cat Fish Lake

(c) (1) Flaperon rolls (slow and rapid rates with and without using rudder, etc.) (350KIAS)
(2) Barrell rolls and Wing overs (400KIAS)
(3) Loops (500KIAS, 4g's) Begin manuever between 5,000and 12,000 feet, 220-200KIAS minimum at top.
(4) Half cuban eights (500KIAS)
(5) Demonstrate approaches to clean stalls at 10,000 feet and dirty stalls at 6,000.

Stalls: Attain nose high attitude with 80% power and S/B out; (clean or dirty). As A/C decelerates maintain altitude by incresing nose attitude but do not trim into stall. As the aircraft slows past 24 units angle of attack, directional control must be maintained by use of rudder alone as flaperon deflection will cause early stall and sharp roll off. Buffet onset will occur about 10 to 15 knots prior to stall (about 27 units AOA). After moderate buffet is experienced apply positive forward stick and advance the throttles to military power. Effect recovery at optimum AOA. Stall speeds 32,000 lbs. gross weight

	IDLE	85%	MIL
Clean	128KIAS	124KIAS	120KIAS
T.O.	98KIAS	88KIAS	82KIAS

(6) Demonstrate simulated landing pattern emphasizing power needed to achieve desired rate of descent and effect of angle of bank on AOA and VAI with constant power setting/ revovery. (5000 FT AGL minimum)

(7) At 350 KIAS run nose trim full nose down over-riding with stick pressure to maintain level flight. Reduce power and slow to 200 KIAS. Lower flaps and slow to 20 units AOA. When stabilized, run trim to full nose up. Raise flaps, accelerate to 450 KIAS or .75 IMN. This will demonstrate that the aircraft is controlable, with a runaway trim tab, between the extreme speeds used.

(8) At 200 KIAS in straight and level flight, engage spin assist switch and perform mild turns. While maintaining 200 KIAS and without stick pressure, turn off spin assist. Note pitching movement when switch is activated and deactivated.

(9) For air force T.P. demo 30° dives-entry, pattern, recovery.

10. RETURN TO CHERRY POINT

(A) Demo TACAN penetration and missed approach followed by a G.C.A. with a missed approach, cancel instruments and procede to the appropriate initial for VFR entry.

(B) Enter the initial at 1500 feet AGL, 250 KIAS, using left hand turn. Descend to reach the break at 1000 feet AGL. The break will be a smooth roll to 45-60 degrees angle of bank (not a snap roll), simultaneously retarding both throttles to 80% and speed brakes open. Pull 2.5 to 3.0 "G'S". At 250 KIAS or below lower gear and flaps adding power to maintain altitude. Abeam position will be 8,000 feet, on AOA at 1,000 feet AGL. Cross check angle of attack and airspeed at 180° position. Gouge is 108 KIAS plus 2 KIAS for every 1,000 pounds of fuel and external stores. (Optimum AOA for landing is 21 units)

Read off and reply landing check list:

Harness.....locked.
Armament.....off.
Flaperon.....armed, anti-skid on, light out.
Hook.....up, or as desired for landing.
Wheels.....three down, and locked, brakes pumped and firm.
Flaps.....slats down, stabilizer shift, flaps down, wing tip speed brakes out.
Fuel.....wing tanks depressurized (lights ON)
Auto-pilot...stab aug only or off.

(C) Turn off 180° about 1500 feet past the end of the runway. The 90° altitude should be 450 to 500 feet AGL on airspeed. Land on downwind side of runway (traffic Permitting). Intercept the glide slope at optimum AOA (21 units with TO flaps).

(D) Demonstrate one normal landing to touch-and-go, touch and go procedures, a full flap touch and go, a no flap touch and go, a single engine (port engine idle, speed brakes out) to a wave off at two hundred feet, and a normal full stop (utilize aero-dynamic braking. Do not skag A/C, use aero braking until below 80 KIAS). Configuration changes should be made prior to turning downwind or after established on downwind. Speeds in the landing pattern should not exceed 170 KIAS.

(d) After landing and when clear of runway, complete the post-landing check list.

Anti-skid.....off
Seats.....safe
Flaps/Slats.....up
Flaperon pop-up.....off
IFF.....off
Tacan.....off
Pitot heat.....off
Anti-ice.....off
Radar altimeter.....off
VDI/PHD.....std/by
Return to fuel pits
Prior to refueling ensure crew members are completely unstrapped.
Secure PHD and VDI

(e) Check the aircraft; do not secure either engine. When A/C has taken on 12,000 lbs of fuel, the TP and IP will switch seats. TP will perform all post start, taxi and take-off check lists. (insure pins are removed and ladders are stowed prior to taxi)

(f) TP will take off and preceed to the aerobatics area and perform general air work, climbs, glides, approach to stalls, and those maneuvers required to introduce aircraft handling characteristics (to include slow flight, flaperon rolls, and wingovers). Overhead maneuvers are prohibited on this hop. Minimum maneuver altitude is 5000 feet. Return to Cherry Point (VFR entry) for normal touch and go landings utilizing T/O flaps. In pits, have TP check gunsight - become familiar with sights.

(g) Call base prior to landing and have A/C status with downing gripes.

C. SAFETY BRIEF: (UTILIZE NATOPS FLIGHT MANUAL IN CONJUNCTION WITH NATOPS CHECK LIST)

(1) Aborted take-off ..... take-off continued on single engine.
(2) TP explains low altitude ejection procedure.
(3) Combined hydraulic system failure.
(4) Air start procedures.
(5) Cross wind landings: Cross wind components

FLIGHT GRADE SHEET MCCRTG-20

TRAINEE CADET [redacted] DATE 25 AUG

INSTRUCTOR/MONITOR (b) (6) [redacted] FLT TIME 2.6

GRADING CODE (U) (BA) (A) (AA)

FP-4/HIST 1

ITEM	GRADE	ITEM	GRADE
PREFLIGHT	A	FIELD ENTRY	A
START/CHECKS	A	BREAK	A
TAXI	A	NORMAL LANDINGS	AA
T.O./CLIMB	A	180°	A
S-1 PATTERN	A	90°	A
S-3 PATTERN	A	GROOVE	A
STALLS (DIRTY)	A	FINAL LANDING	A
PENETRATION CHECK LIST	A	TAXI/SHUTDOWN	A
TACAN: HOLDING	—	EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	A
PENETRATION	—	HEADWORK	A
APPROACH	—	BASIC AIRWORK	A
MISSED APPROACH	—	ATTITUDE	A
*OVERALL GRADE			

*Overall grade of (U) on any one item (U) repeat flight.

REMARKS: Explain (U) and (BA) marks.

Enclosure (19)

"SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES"

Statement of Captain [redacted] USMC (Survival Officer, VMAT(AW)-202) concerning VMAT(AW)-202 Serial 1-70A, Pilot Casey of 26 August 1969

Summary of ejection sequence and description of parachutes and related equipment after ejection.

Date of accident: 26 August 1969

Time of accident: 0815

Place of accident: Approx. 5½ nautical miles northeast of Kinston, N.C.

Speed at time of ejection: Approx. 550 kts.

Altitude of ejection: 1st-approx. 3500 ft.
2nd-undetermined (est. 2000-2500 ft.)

Aircraft attitude at time of ejection: 60° to vertical dive.

Ejection seats: Martin-Baker MK GRU-5

Results of ejection: Pilot - Fatal
IP - Extensive injuries [redacted]

INSTRUCTOR PILOT

1. Initial ejection occurred at approximately 3500 feet. Ejection was initiated using primary firing handle (face curtain). Time delay on drogue gun - 1.0 second with approx. .5 seconds for drogue deployment. After drogues deployed and decelerated the seat, (approx. .75 seconds) the Time Release Mechanism started to unwind. TRM delay - 1.75 seconds. Occupant was released from the seat and Personnel Parachute deployed rapidly. Full deployment of chute was very close to the ground. IP experienced heavy opening shock. Injuries sustained consisted of [redacted] A deep gash was noted in the toe area of the flight boot probably caused during initial exit from the cockpit and presumably causing [redacted]. The safety toe obviously saved his foot from extensive injury.

2. After the parachute landing the IP became entangled in the lines which had to be cut by rescuers. Upon further examination of the parachute it was noted that severe strain at the peak had caused three of the parachute lines to break. Also, many of the remaining lines had begun to tear out of their channels (at the peak) to a distance of approx. 6 inches, probably caused by the extreme initial load imparted to this area prior to separation of the squid lines. Parachute pack was torn down one side.

ENCLOSURE (20)

3. Seat pan assembly was intact and sustained no visible damage, but URC-33 Survival Beacon failed to operate when later tested in the shop. Beacon was not configured for auto-actuation.

4. SV-2 vest had been entered by Seymour Johnson AFB personnel to remove pencil flares.

5. The IP and his chute came to rest 130 feet and in direction of 080° from the edge of the crater caused by the aircraft. The IP's seat was located 100 feet and in a direction of 095° from the crater (Enclosure (3)).

PILOT

1. Sequence of events concerning the ejection by the pilot can only be surmised due to lack of credible witnesses. Conclusions are based primarily on evidence gathered after the accident and may or may not be accurate. It is estimated that the pilot initially ejected at approx. 2500-2000 feet, or within a second after the IP. Yellow marks on the back of the pilot's helmet caused by his helmet slamming back into the face curtain indicate that the ejection was initiated using the secondary firing handle with head bent forward. The helmet was found approximately 450 feet from the initial point of body impact indicating that the helmet had been torn off prior to the pilots contact with the ground. The chin strap was broken and was probably loose before the ejection. Assuming that the chin strap was loose, it can also be assumed that when the pilot entered the slipstream, the helmet filled with air and violently forced the pilot's head back into the headrest and face curtain handle and then separated. The force would have been sufficient to cause extensive injury to the neck.

2. Drogue gun, drogues and Time Release Mechanism operated normally. Personnel parachute was drawn completely from the pack and had started to blossom, as indicated by the separation of the squid lines. It is assumed that complete separation from the seat had occurred due to the indication of two strike marks in the ground very close to each other; one caused by the seat and the other caused by the pilot. The body of the pilot came to rest 25 feet forward of the point of initial impact, as did the seat from its initial point of impact. The parachute pack was found in close proximity to the seat indicating that the pack had remained with the seat after initial impact, and further indicating that separation had occurred. If the parachute had not been completely withdrawn from the pack, the pack would have remained with the pilot. With the exception of separation of the squid lines, no other obvious strain was observed on any other part of the parachute. It is my opinion that the personnel parachute had blossomed enough to cause separation, but not sufficiently to appreciably reduce the pilot's rate of descent.

3. All equipment inside of the seat pan was mangled. URC-33 failed to operate when later tested in the shop. Beacon was not configured for auto-actuation.

4. The ejection system functioned normally, but due to the high speed, and near vertical attitude of the aircraft, ejection was made outside the ejection envelope.

5. The pilot, his chute, seat and other survival equipment were located within 25 feet of the edge of the aircraft's crater and approximately along the flight path of the aircraft (Enclosure (3)).

(b) (6)

[redacted]

ENCLOSURE (20)

RESCUE REPORT
OPNAV FORM 3750-13 (3-63)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6E
INSTRUCTIONS: SEE REVERSE

OPNAV REPORT SYMBOL 3750.14

1. FROM	2. DATE OF MISHAP	2A. DATE OF RESCUE
Marine All Weather Attack Training Squadron 202	26Aug69	26 August 1969

3. LOCATION AND DUTIES OF RESCUE VEHICLE	4. RESCUE VEHICLE (Type/model)
Edwards Funeral Home and Ambulance Service, Kinston, N. C.	1964 Cadilac Ambulance

5. NUMBER OF PERSONNEL	5A. IN RESCUE VEHICLE OR ON RESCUE TEAM	5B. TO BE RESCUED	5C. RESCUED	6. RESCUE BACK UP MEANS
2	2	1	1	Kinston Fire Department

7. TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (Local Date Time Group)

7A. Alert Received	Method	
260840QAUG	Telephone Call	
7B. Vehicle Departed	Distance to Scene	
260841QAUG	8 Miles	
7C. Arrived on Scene	Search Required	
260850QAUG	None	
7D. Located Survivor	Method of Locating	
N/A	N/A	
7E. Began Retrieval	What Was Sighted First	
ARRIVAL	N/A	
7F. Ended Retrieval	Subsequently	
N/A	N/A	
7G. Survivor(s) Disembarked	Location (If different from Item 3)	
	SURVIVOR TAKEN DIRECTLY TO LENOIR MEMORIAL HOSPITAL	

8. WEATHER CONDITIONS AT RESCUE SITE

8A. WATER TEMPERATURE	AIR TEMPERATURE	WIND VELOCITY
N/A °F	68 °F	Calm

8B. SEA STATE/WAVE HEIGHT/FREQUENCY; TERRAIN DESCRIPTION

LEVEL TERRAIN

9. EQUIPMENTS ACTUALLY USED DURING RESCUE

(1) Stretcher

10. DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED (List all difficulties and effect on final outcome of rescue attempt, i.e., ALERTING PERIOD, SEARCH/LOCATING, RETRIEVING, POST-RETRIEVAL)

None

11. PERSONNEL REQUIRING RESCUE NAME-LAST FIRST INITIAL	GIVE REASON FOR RESCUE	FACTORS COMPLICATING RESCUE ATTEMPT Physical condition, ignorance of equipment, sea state, etc.
(b) (6) [redacted]	Ejection from A6A and subsequent injuries	Rescue team had to cut him free from survival equipment

12. REMARKS: (Training of rescue teams or crews, communication equipments/techniques, retrieval equipments/techniques, rescue vehicle)

Rescue was initiated by Edwards Funeral Home and Ambulance Service and The Kinston Fire Department

13. ATTACH ENCLOSURES: Narratives of search, location and retrieving—Survivor's statements

14. NAME AND TITLE OF SUBMITTING OFFICIAL	SIGNATURE
(b) (6) [redacted] Senior Member AAR	(b) (6) [redacted]
15. NAME AND TITLE OF FORWARDING OFFICIAL	SIGNATURE OF FORWARDING OFFICIAL
T. R. MADDOCK Commanding Officer, VMAT(AW)-202	TR Maddock

"SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES"

ENCLOSURE (21)

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT OR GROUND ACCIDENT
IDENTIFICATION, FLIGHT AND NARRATIVE
OPNAV FORM 3750/8A (REV. 6-68) S/N 0107-731-8101

REPORT SYMBOL 3750-7

See Section H of OPNAVINST 3750.6

I. IDENTIFICATION

1. FROM (Name and mailing address of activity)	2. MOR NUMBER	3. DAMAGE CODE
VMAT-AW 202 MCAS CPMC	1-70	A

4. TYPE OF MISHAP	5. NO. OF OCCUPANTS	6. DATE	7. MODEL A/C	8. BUNO
[X] ACCIDENT [ ] GROUND ACCIDENT [ ] INCIDENT	2	8/26/69	A6A	151574

9. MODEL OTHER A/C IF INVOLVED	10. BUNO	11. NO. OF OCCUPANTS	12. DAMAGE CODE
N/A			

13. INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED (Use Additional Sheets if Required) NAME (Last, First and Middle Initial)	14. RANK/RATE	15. BRANCH OF SERVICE	16. DUTY BILLET	17. INJURY CODE	18. DISPOSITION
PILOT AT CONTROLS AT TIME OF MISHAP A. CASEY, R.R.	1st LT.	USMC	Transition Pilot	A	F
CO-PILOT B. (b) (6)	1st.LT	USMCR	Maintenance Material Officer	B	G
C.			Instructor Pilot		
D.					

II. FLIGHT DATA (At Time of Emergency)

1. TERRAIN CLEARANCE	2. CABIN ALTITUDE	3. TIME AT CABIN ALTITUDE	4. AMBIENT ALTITUDE	5. TIME AT AMBIENT ALTITUDE
16,000 FEET	8,000 FEET	0 HOURS 30 MIN.	16,000 FEET	0 HOURS 30 MIN.

6. PLACE IN FORMATION
- [X] A - SINGLE AIRCRAFT
- [ ] L - LEAD
- [ ] W - WING
- Y - OTHER (SPECIFY)

8. HORIZON
- [ ] 1 - DISTINCT
- [ ] 2 - OBSCURED
- 9 - OTHER (SPECIFY) 5 miles clear with haze

7. CLOUD CONDITIONS
- [X] 0 - CLEAR
- [ ] 1 - OVERCAST
- [ ] 2 - UNDERCAST
- [ ] 3 - IN CLOUDS
- [ ] 4 - IN AND OUT OF CLOUDS
- 5 - OTHER (SPECIFY)

9. DURATION OF FLIGHT
HOURS 0 MIN. 30

III. NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF MISHAP (Continue on Reverse Side if necessary)

0630- Brief for Fam 2/IP7 (this is a syllabas hop)
Area Familiarization- Basic airwork, approach to stalls, clean and dirty- Single engine performance, High turns, dives, climbs and speed changes. (b) (6) the I/P, advised Lt. CASEY they would do no overhead procedures on this flight. The only aerobatics would be flaperon rolls and wingovers. There would also be instrument work. Lt. CASEY seemed normal during brief other than rather quiet.

0730- Takeoff
During takeoff slats did not come up. Rose to 3000 feet upon I/P's orders, recycled slats and they came up.

745-0815- Lt. CASEY and Lt. (b) (6) started with straight and level flight on instruments. CASEY was rough varying from one to two thousand feet on instruments. CASEY seemed to (b) (6) to have a fixation on his scan. Next they began to practice clean and dirty stalls at 4000 feet. Finally the two want to 16,000 feet to practice wingovers and flaperon rolls. CASEY asked about inverted flight and was again cautioned - No Overheads. Last manuver was at pilot's discretion. (b) (6) states the pilot came up to 15[illegible] at 380 indicated air speed nose up attitude-Rolled inverted- "I thought he was going to do a flaperon roll" - (b) (6) . At this time the plane continued to fall through and no G's were placed by pilot to pull out although he did roll the wings level still inverted. At this point the I/P-(b) (6) said "pull out!" "pop your boards!" "slow down !"and hit pilot on right shoulder. Pilot gave no indication he had heard other than to shrug his shoulder. (b) (6) says pilot was alert but not responding.

Plane now passing through 10,000 feet and pilot again rolled wings through slight arc. Still no responce to instructions. Instructor Pilot continued attempt to get CASEY to pull out without effect at 3,00 feet at 0.8 - 0.88 about 60° nose down- (b) (6) ejected. Plane continued on and according to observer CASEY ejected just prior to impact.

0815- CRASH (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT INCIDENT OR GROUND ACCIDENT
MEDICAL INFORMATION
OPNAV FORM 3750/88 (REV. 6-68) S/N 0107-731-8201

REPORT SYMBOL 3750-7
See Section H of OPNAVINST 3750.6

1. DEGREE OF INJURY
- [ ] 1 - NONE
- [X] 4 - FATAL
- [ ] 7 - MISSING, UNKNOWN
- [ ] 2 - MINOR
- [ ] 5 - MISSING, LAND
- [ ] 3 - MAJOR
- [ ] 6 - MISSING, WATER

2. DAYS HOSPITALIZED NA
3. DAYS IN QUARTERS
4. DAYS GROUNDED
5. UNCONSCIOUS _____ HOURS _____ MIN.

5a. DISPOSITION: F

5b. EXPOSURE: NA
- [ ] 1 - MILD
- [ ] 2 - MODERATE
- [ ] 3 - SEVERE

5c. SHOCK: NA
- [ ] 1 - MILD
- [ ] 2 - MODERATE
- [ ] 3 - SEVERE

6. INJURIES INCURRED DURING MISHAP
(Use Standard DOD Terminology for Body Part, Diagnosis and Cause of Injury.) (See DDHC, NAVMED P5082.)

LEAVE THESE COLUMNS BLANK

A. BODY PART: (b) (6)
DIAGNOSIS:
CAUSE:

B. BODY PART: (b) (6)
DIAGNOSIS:
CAUSE:

C. BODY PART: (b) (6)
DIAGNOSIS:
CAUSE:

D. BODY PART:
DIAGNOSIS:
CAUSE:

E. BODY PART:
DIAGNOSIS:
CAUSE:

P / D / C

7. AUTOPSY

LABORATORY TESTS	A. TISSUE TESTED	B. METHOD USED	C. LABORATORY DOING TEST	D. RESULT
CARBON MONOXIDE				
ALCOHOL	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
LACTIC ACID				
OTHER (SPECIFY)				

8. X-RAY RESULTS
- [X] CHECK IF PERFORMED. SUBMIT RESULTS ON SEPARATE SHEET.

9. DISEASES/DEFECTS PRESENT AT TIME OF MISHAP

DIAGNOSIS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY: ANNUAL PHYSICAL	SICK CALL	AUTOPSY	OTHER	WAIVERS (AS APPLICABLE): AUTHORITY	DATE
NONE						

10. AUTOPSY CONDUCTED BY:
- [X] M - MILITARY PATHOLOGIST
- [X] F - FLIGHT SURGEON
- [ ] C - CIVILIAN PATHOLOGIST
- [ ] T - OTHER
- [ ] PROTOCOL ATTACHED
- [ ] WILL BE FORWARDED

11. MATERIAL SUBMITTED TO AFIP:
- [ ] 1 - AUTOPSY REPORT
- [ ] 3 - PICTURES
- [X] 2 - FROZEN TISSUE
- [ ] 4 - FIXED TISSUE

12. LIST ADDITIONAL INJURIES RECEIVED AS A RESULT OF THE MISHAP, AND ADD ANY PERTINENT REMARKS

Massive injuries due to impact upon ground. Complete listing of injuries in autopsy report.
Note- Frozen tissue did not reach AFIP in proper condition to perform test due to delay in route via mail as sent from Camp LeJuene by path. reports.

NAME	SERIAL NO.	A/C	BUNO
CASEY, Robert B.	(b) (6)	A6A	151574

C-31418

Lt. Casey had been grounded for a sprained ankle for five days prior to this flight. Medication prescribed was Darvon Compound and Ananase. Patient took these as prescribed as far as in known. Of the ten Darvon issued three were found in his Apartment. No trace of Ananase tabs were found. It is impossible that these drugs have any bearing on the accident. Up chit issued August 25.

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACC[illegible]T, INCIDENT OR GROUND ACCIDENT
MEDICAL INFORMATION
OPNAV FORM 3750/9B (REV. 4-68) S/N 0107-731-8201

REPORT SYMBOL 3750-7
See Section H of OPNAVINST 3750.6

1. DEGREE OF INJURY
- [ ] 1 - NONE
- [ ] 2 - MINOR
- [X] 3 - MAJOR
- [ ] 4 - FATAL
- [ ] 5 - MISSING, LAND
- [ ] 6 - MISSING, WATER
- [ ] 7 - MISSING, UNKNOWN

2. DAYS HOSPITALIZED: 8 days to date
3. DAYS IN QUARTERS:
4. DAYS GROUNDED:
5. UNCONSCIOUS: _____ HOURS _____ MIN.

5a. DISPOSITION: G

5b. EXPOSURE: [X] 1 - MILD [ ] 2 - MODERATE [ ] 3 - SEVERE

5c. SHOCK: [ ] 1 - MILD [X] 2 - MODERATE [ ] 3 - SEVERE

6. INJURIES INCURRED DURING MISHAP
(Use Standard DOD Terminology for Body Part, Diagnosis and Cause of Injury.) (See DDDC, NAVMED P5082.)

LEAVE THESE COLUMNS BLANK

A. BODY PART: (b) (6)
DIAGNOSIS:
CAUSE:

B. BODY PART:
DIAGNOSIS:
CAUSE:

C. BODY PART:
DIAGNOSIS:
CAUSE:

D. BODY PART:
DIAGNOSIS:
CAUSE:

E. BODY PART:
DIAGNOSIS:
CAUSE:

P / D / C

7.

LABORATORY TESTS	A. TISSUE TESTED	B. METHOD USED	C. LABORATORY DOING TEST	D. RESULT
CARBON MONOXIDE				
ALCOHOL	NA	NA	NA	NA
LACTIC ACID				
OTHER (SPECIFY)				

8. X-RAY RESULTS
[X] CHECK IF PERFORMED. SUBMIT RESULTS ON SEPARATE SHEET.

9.

DISEASES/DEFECTS PRESENT AT TIME OF MISHAP — DIAGNOSIS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY: ANNUAL PHYSICAL	SICK CALL	AUTOPSY	OTHER	WAIVERS (AS APPLICABLE): AUTHORITY	DATE
NONE						

10. AUTOPSY CONDUCTED BY: NA
- [ ] M - MILITARY PATHOLOGIST
- [ ] C - CIVILIAN PATHOLOGIST
- [ ] PROTOCOL ATTACHED
- [ ] F - FLIGHT SURGEON
- [ ] Y - OTHER
- [ ] WILL BE FORWARDED

11. MATERIAL SUBMITTED TO AFIP: NA
- [ ] 1 - AUTOPSY REPORT
- [ ] 2 - FROZEN TISSUE
- [ ] 3 - PICTURES
- [ ] 4 - FIXED TISSUE

12. LIST ADDITIONAL INJURIES RECEIVED AS A RESULT OF THE MISHAP, AND ADD ANY PERTINENT REMARKS

Pilot interview 3½ hours after crash in civilian hospital. Pilot was under treatment with IV's of 5% D5W, Hence lab test as indicated were no performed.

NAME	SERIAL NO.	A/C	BUNO
(b) (6)	(b) (6)	A6A	151570

C-31418

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT OR GROUND ACCIDENT
PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS

OPNAV FORM 3750/9C (REV. 4-68) S/N 0107-731-0101

REPORT SYMBOL 3750-7
See Section H of OPNAVINST 3750.6

INSTRUCTIONS: Complete on all occupants of aircraft, all injured persons, and all persons possibly contributing to the cause of the mishap. Supervisory factors attributed to persons not in the aircraft and such factors as design or weather should be reported only for the person in primary control of the aircraft. Factors contributing to injury during midair collisions, crash landings, ditchings, etc., are to be considered part of survival phase. Use codes at right to show only those factors present or contributing in each phase.

PHASES OF MISHAP
A – Accident
E – Escape
S – Survival (includes parachute landings)
R – Rescue

FACTOR IDENTIFIER
D – Definitely contributed
S – Suspected factor
P – Condition present but did not contribute to accident or injury

FACTORS		A	E	S	R
1. SUPERVISORY FACTORS					
A. INADEQUATE BRIEFING	101				
B. ORDERED/LED ON FLIGHT BEYOND CAPABILITY	102				
C. POOR CREW COORDINATION	103				
D. OTHER (SPECIFY) Psychological	199	D			
2. PRE-FLIGHT FACTORS					
A. FAULTY FLIGHT PLAN	201				
B. FAULTY PRE-FLIGHT OF AIRCRAFT	202				
C. FAULTY PREPARATION OF PERSONAL EQUIPMENT	203				
D. HURRIED DEPARTURE	204				
E. DELAYED DEPARTURE	205				
F. INADEQUATE WEATHER ANALYSIS	206				
G. OTHER (SPECIFY)	299				
3. EXPERIENCE/TRAINING FACTORS					
A. INADEQUATE TRANSITION	301				
B. LIMITED TOTAL EXPERIENCE	302	S	S		
C. LIMITED RECENT EXPERIENCE	303	S	S		
D. FAILURE TO USE ACCEPTED PROCEDURES	304	D			
E. OTHER (SPECIFY)	399				
4. DESIGN FACTORS					
A. DESIGN OF INSTRUMENTS, CONTROLS	401	D			
B. LOCATION OF INSTRUMENTS, CONTROLS	402	D			
C. FAILURE OF INSTRUMENTS, CONTROLS	403				
D. COCKPIT LIGHTING	404				
E. RUNWAY LIGHTING	405				
F. LIGHTING OF OTHER AIRCRAFT	406				
G. PERSONAL EQUIPMENT INTERFERENCE	407				
H. WORKSPACE INCOMPATIBLE WITH MAN	408				
I. OTHER (SPECIFY)	499				
5. COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS					
A. MISINTERPRETED COMMUNICATIONS	501				
B. DISRUPTED COMMUNICATIONS	502				
C. LANGUAGE BARRIER	503				
D. NOISE INTERFERENCE	504				
E. OTHER (SPECIFY) No cognizance of communications	599	D			
6. PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL FACTORS					
A. FOOD POISONING	601				
B. MOTION SICKNESS	602				
C. OTHER ACUTE ILLNESS	603				
D. OTHER PRE-EXISTING DISEASE/DEFECT	604				
E. GET-HOMEITIS	605				
F. HANGOVER	606				
G. SLEEP DEPRIVATION	607				
H. FATIGUE, OTHER	608				
I. MISSED MEALS	609				
J. DRUGS PRESCRIBED BY MEDICAL OFFICER	610	P	P	P	
K. DRUGS, OTHER	611				
L. ALCOHOL	612				
M. VISUAL ILLUSIONS	613				
N. UNCONSCIOUSNESS	614				
O. DISORIENTATION/VERTIGO	615	S	S		
P. HYPOXIA	616				
Q. HYPERVENTILATION	617				
R. DYSBARISM	618				
S. CARBON MONOXIDE POISONING	619				
T. BOREDOM	620				
U. INATTENTION	621				
V. CHANNELIZED ATTENTION	622	S	S		
W. DISTRACTION	623				
X. PREOCCUPATION WITH PERSONAL PROBLEMS	624				
Y. EXCESSIVE MOTIVATION TO SUCCEED	625				
Z - OVERCONFIDENCE	626				
AA. LACK OF SELF-CONFIDENCE	627				
BB. LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN EQUIPMENT	628				
CC. APPREHENSION	629				
DD. PANIC	630	S			
EE. OTHER (SPECIFY)	699				
7. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS					
A. ACCELERATION FORCES, IN-FLIGHT	701	S			
B. ACCELERATION FORCES, IMPACT	702	D	D		
C. DECOMPRESSION	703				
D. VIBRATION	704				
E. GLARE	705				
F. SMOKE, FUMES, ETC.	706				
G. HEAT	707				
H. COLD	708				
I. WINDBLAST	709		S		
J. VISIBILITY RESTRICTION-WEATHER, HAZE, DARKNESS	710				
K. VISIBILITY RESTRICTION-ICING, WINDOWS FOGGED, ETC.	711				
L. VISIBILITY RESTRICTION-DUST, SMOKE, ETC. IN ACFT	712				
M. WEATHER, OTHER THAN VISIBILITY RESTRICTION	713				
N. OTHER (SPECIFY)	799				
8. OTHER FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED					
A. HABIT INTERFERENCE, USED WRONG CONTROL	801				
B. CONFUSION OF CONTROLS, OTHER	802				
C. MISREAD INSTRUMENT(S)	803				
D. MISINTERPRETED INSTRUMENT READING	804				

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

NAME	SERIAL NO.	A/C	BUNO
CASEY, Robert W.	(b) (6)	A6A	151574

FACTORS		A	E	S	R	FACTORS		A	E	S	R
8. OTHER FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED (Cont.)											
E. MISLEAD BY FAULTY INSTRUMENTS	805					K. DELAY IN TAKING NECESSARY ACTION	811				
F. VISUAL RESTRICTION BY EQUIPMENT STRUCTURES	806					L. VIOLATION OF FLIGHT DISCIPLINE	812				
G. TASK OVERSATURATION	807					M. NAVIGATIONAL ERROR	813				
H. INADEQUATE COORDINATION OR TIMING	808					N. INADVERTENT OPERATION, SELF-INDUCED	814				
I. MISJUDGED SPEED OR DISTANCE	809					O. INADVERTENT OPERATION, MECHANICALLY INDUCED	815				
J. SELECTED WRONG COURSE OF ACTION	810					P. OTHER (SPECIFY)	000				

REMARKS: *(Indicate item and describe circumstances in detail as necessary.)*

1-D Believe pilots death due to "Freezing on the cotrols for unknown reason." Factors indicated may have caused his death.

4AB Death directly a result of poor design of A6A for training A/C. No stick or controls on instructor pilots side.

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A [illegible]CCIDENT, INCIDENT OR GROUND ACCIDENT
PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS

OPNAV FORM 3750-9C (REV. 6-68) S/N 0107-731-8101

REPORT SYMBOL 3750-7

See Section II of OPNAVINST 3750.6

INSTRUCTIONS: Complete on all occupants of aircraft, all injured persons, and all persons possibly contributing to the cause of the mishap. Supervisory factors attributed to persons not in the aircraft and such factors as design or weather should be reported only for the person in primary control of the aircraft. Factors contributing to injury during mid-air collisions, crash landings, ditchings, etc., are to be considered part of survival phase. Use codes at right to show only those factors present or contributing in each phase.

PHASES OF MISHAP
A – Accident
E – Escape
S – Survival (includes parachute landings)
R – Rescue

FACTOR SIGNIFICANCE
D – Definitely contributed
S – Suspected factor
P – Condition present but did not contribute to accident or injury

FACTORS		A	E	S	R
1. SUPERVISORY FACTORS					
A. INADEQUATE BRIEFING	101				
B. ORDERED/LED ON FLIGHT BEYOND CAPABILITY	102				
C. POOR CREW COORDINATION	103				
D. OTHER (SPECIFY)	199				
2. PRE-FLIGHT FACTORS					
A. FAULTY FLIGHT PLAN	201				
B. FAULTY PRE-FLIGHT OF AIRCRAFT	202				
C. FAULTY PREPARATION OF PERSONAL EQUIPMENT	203				
D. HURRIED DEPARTURE	204				
E. DELAYED DEPARTURE	205				
F. INADEQUATE WEATHER ANALYSIS	206				
G. OTHER (SPECIFY)	299				
3. EXPERIENCE/TRAINING FACTORS					
A. INADEQUATE TRANSITION	301				
B. LIMITED TOTAL EXPERIENCE	302				
C. LIMITED RECENT EXPERIENCE	303				
D. FAILURE TO USE ACCEPTED PROCEDURES	304				
E. OTHER (SPECIFY)	399				
4. DESIGN FACTORS					
A. DESIGN OF INSTRUMENTS, CONTROLS	401		D		
B. LOCATION OF INSTRUMENTS, CONTROLS	402		D		
C. FAILURE OF INSTRUMENTS, CONTROLS	403				
D. COCKPIT LIGHTING	404				
E. RUNWAY LIGHTING	405				
F. LIGHTING OF OTHER AIRCRAFT	406				
G. PERSONAL EQUIPMENT INTERFERENCE	407				
H. WORKSPACE INCOMPATIBLE WITH MAN	408				
I. OTHER (SPECIFY)	499				
5. COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS					
A. MISINTERPRETED COMMUNICATIONS	501				
B. DISRUPTED COMMUNICATIONS	502				
C. LANGUAGE BARRIER	503				
D. NOISE INTERFERENCE	504				
E. OTHER (SPECIFY)	599				
6. PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL FACTORS					
A. FOOD POISONING	601				
B. MOTION SICKNESS	602				
C. OTHER ACUTE ILLNESS	603				
D. OTHER PRE-EXISTING DISEASE/DEFECT	604				
E. GET-HOMEITIS	605				
F. HANGOVER	606				

FACTORS		A	E	S	R
G. SLEEP DEPRIVATION	607				
H. FATIGUE, OTHER	608				
I. MISSED MEALS	609				
J. DRUGS PRESCRIBED BY MEDICAL OFFICER	610				
K. DRUGS, OTHER	611				
L. ALCOHOL	612				
M. VISUAL ILLUSIONS	613				
N. UNCONSCIOUSNESS	614				
O. DISORIENTATION/VERTIGO	615				
P. HYPOXIA	616				
Q. HYPERVENTILATION	617				
R. DYSBARISM	618				
S. CARBON MONOXIDE POISONING	619				
T. BOREDOM	620				
U. INATTENTION	621				
V. CHANNELIZED ATTENTION	622				
W. DISTRACTION	623				
X. PREOCCUPATION WITH PERSONAL PROBLEMS	624				
Y. EXCESSIVE MOTIVATION TO SUCCEED	625				
Z - OVERCONFIDENCE	626				
AA. LACK OF SELF-CONFIDENCE	627				
BB. LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN EQUIPMENT	628				
CC. APPREHENSION	629				
DD. PANIC	630				
EE. OTHER (SPECIFY)	699				
7. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS					
A. ACCELERATION FORCES, IN-FLIGHT	701	S	S		
B. ACCELERATION FORCES, IMPACT	702		D		
C. DECOMPRESSION	703				
D. VIBRATION	704				
E. GLARE	705				
F. SMOKE, FUMES, ETC.	706				
G. HEAT	707				
H. COLD	708				
I. WINDBLAST	709				
J. VISIBILITY RESTRICTION–WEATHER, HAZE, DARKNESS	710				
K. VISIBILITY RESTRICTION–ICING, WINDOWS FOGGED, ETC.	711				
L. VISIBILITY RESTRICTION–DUST, SMOKE, ETC. IN ACFT	712				
M. WEATHER, OTHER THAN VISIBILITY RESTRICTION	713				
N. OTHER (SPECIFY)	799				
8. OTHER FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED					
A. HABIT INTERFERENCE, USED WRONG CONTROL	801				
B. CONFUSION OF CONTROLS, OTHER	802				
C. MISREAD INSTRUMENT(S)	803				
D. MISINTERPRETED INSTRUMENT READING	804				

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

NAME	SERIAL NO.	A/C	BUNO
(b) (6)	(b) (6)	A6A	151574

FACTORS		A	E	S	R	FACTORS		A	E	S	R
B. OTHER FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED (Cont.)											
E. MISLEAD BY FAULTY INSTRUMENTS	005					K. DELAY IN TAKING NECESSARY ACTION	011				
F. VISUAL RESTRICTION BY EQUIPMENT STRUCTURES	006					L. VIOLATION OF FLIGHT DISCIPLINE	012				
G. TASK OVERSATURATION	007					M. NAVIGATIONAL ERROR	013				
H. INADEQUATE COORDINATION OR TIMING	008					N. INADVERTENT OPERATION, SELF-INDUCED	014				
I. MISJUDGED SPEED OR DISTANCE	009					O. INADVERTENT OPERATION, MECHANICALLY INDUCED	015				
J. SELECTED WRONG COURSE OF ACTION	010					P. OTHER (SPECIFY)	099				

REMARKS: *(Indicate item and describe circumstances in detail as necessary.)*

4A-B Mishap could have been prevented if instructor pilot had controls (dual) on his side of plane.

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C [illegible]IDENT, INCIDENT OR GROUND ACCIDENT
PERSONAL DATA
OPNAV FORM 3750/OD (REV. 4-68) S/N 0107-721-8401

I. CONTRIBUTING EFFECT

REPORT SYMBOL 3750-7
See Section II of OPNAVINST 3750.6

I. ROLE OF THIS INDIVIDUAL IN THE CAUSE OF THE MISHAP:

A. PRIMARY: [X] 1. DEFINITE [ ] 2. PROBABLE [ ] 3. POSSIBLE
B. CONTRIBUTING: [ ] 4. DEFINITE [ ] 5. PROBABLE [ ] 6. POSSIBLE [ ] 8. NONE [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

II. BACKGROUND (Complete for all pilots and others who possibly contributed to mishap)

A. DATE LAST LEAVE ENDED: June 28, 1969
B. DAYS DURATION LAST LEAVE: 10
C. TYPE OF LEAVE LAST TAKEN:
[X] 1. ORDINARY [ ] 2. EMERGENCY [ ] 3. REENLISTMENT [ ] 4. GRADUATION
[ ] 5. SICK OR CONVALESCENT [ ] 6. DELAY ENROUTE [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

D. DATE OF LAST PREVIOUS FLIGHT: 8/25/69

HOURS AND MINUTES FLOWN
E. IN LAST 24 HOURS: 2.7hrs F. IN LAST 48 HOURS: 2.7 hrs. MIN.

MISSIONS FLOWN
G. IN LAST 24 HOURS: 1 H. IN LAST 48 HOURS: 1

HOURS AND MINUTES WORKED
I. IN LAST 24 HOURS: 6 MIN. 0 J. IN LAST 48 HOURS: 6 MIN. 0

HOURS SLEPT
K. IN LAST 24 HOURS: 8 L. IN LAST 48 HOURS: 15

M. CONTINUOUS DUTY PRIOR TO MISHAP: HOURS 2 MIN. 15
N. HOURS CONTINUOUSLY AWAKE PRIOR TO MISHAP: 3hrs. 15 min.
O. DURATION OF LAST SLEEP PERIOD: HOURS 8 MIN.
P. TIME IN COCKPIT PRIOR TO FLIGHT: 0 HOURS 20 MIN.

III. PHYSIOLOGICAL, LOW PRESSURE CHAMBER AND VERTIGO TRAINING (For all personnel)

TYPE TRAINING ACCOMPLISHED	PLACE TRAINING ACCOMPLISHED	COMPLETED Month	COMPLETED Year	ROLE* IN MISHAP
Low pressure chamber and vertigo	Corpuschristi, Texas	JAN.	69	9
Ejection seat	Corpuschristi, Texas	JAN	69	9
Centrifuge training	Corpuschristi, Texas	JAN	69	9

*For role in mishap, use following code:
0 - NO IMPORTANCE
1 - TRAINING DEFINITELY HELPED
2 - TRAINING POSSIBLY HELPED
3 - LACK OF TRAINING DEFINITELY A FACTOR
4 - LACK OF TRAINING POSSIBLY A FACTOR
9 - UNKNOWN

IV. ANTHROPOMETRIC DATA

a. DATE OF BIRTH: DAY 3 MONTH MAY YEAR 1944
b. HEIGHT 71" INCHES
c. WEIGHT 197 POUNDS
d. SITTING HEIGHT 36.7 INCHES
e. TRUNK HEIGHT 26 INCHES
f. FUNCTIONAL REACH 31.6 INCHES
g. BUTTOCK-KNEE LENGTH 24.5 INCHES
h. LEG LENGTH 45.5 INCHES
i. SHOULDER WIDTH (BIDELTOID) 18.6 INCHES

V. GENERAL

1. NUMBER AND TYPE OF PRIOR MISHAPS (Complete for all pilots, navigators, and/or other persons in control of aircraft)
a. No. 0 b. DESCRIBE TYPE(S):

2. TOTAL YEARS OF FORMAL EDUCATION: 5 years past high school

3. CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF ACTIVITIES OF PREVIOUS 72 HOURS (For all pilots, navigators, and/or persons possibly contributing to mishap)

August 23 Saturday
0900 Wokeup
Remained home - washed and waxed car

August 24 Sunday
0900 Woke up
1100 Went to church
1230 O Club Breakfast
Scrambled eggs, cream beef of toast, toast, coffee, tomato juice
1345 Returned home
1830 Dinner at TONI'S
Italian food, PEPSI
2000 Returned home
2200 Went to bed

August 25 MONDAY
0500 Woke up-breakfast
Cereal, juice
0545 At work
0600 Breif for FP-1
1200 Returned home
1215 Lunch- Bolony and cheeze
1400 Nap
1900 Dinner- Hotdogs, cheeze, refried beans
2100 Went to bed

August 26 Tuesday
0500 Woke up
Breakfast- Cereal, juice
0545 Brief FP-2

NAME	SERIAL NO.	A/C	BUNO
CASEY, Robert B.	(b) (6)	A6A	151574

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C [illegible]IDENT, INCIDENT OR GROUND ACCIDENT
PERSONAL DATA
OPNAV FORM 3750/5D (REV. 4-68) S/N 0107-731-8401

I. CONTRIBUTING EFFECT

REPORT SYMBOL 3750-7
See Section H of OPNAVINST 3750.6

I. ROLE OF THIS INDIVIDUAL IN THE CAUSE OF THE MISHAP:

A. PRIMARY	B. CONTRIBUTING		
☐ 1. DEFINITE ☐ 2. PROBABLE ☐ 3. POSSIBLE	☐ 4. DEFINITE ☐ 5. PROBABLE ☐ 6. POSSIBLE	☒ 8. NONE	☐ 9. UNKNOWN

II. BACKGROUND *(Complete for all pilots and others who possibly contributed to mishap)*

A. DATE LAST LEAVE ENDED: May 2, 1969
B. DAYS DURATION LAST LEAVE: 2
C. TYPE OF LEAVE LAST TAKEN:
☒ 1. ORDINARY ☐ 2. EMERGENCY ☐ 3. REENLISTMENT ☐ 4. GRADUATION
☐ 5. SICK OR CONVALESCENT ☐ 6. DELAY ENROUTE ☐ 9. UNKNOWN
D. DATE OF LAST PREVIOUS FLIGHT:

HOURS AND MINUTES FLOWN		MISSIONS FLOWN	
E. IN LAST 24 HOURS: 5 MIN. 6	F. IN LAST 48 HOURS: 5 MIN. 6	G. IN LAST 24 HOURS: 2	H. IN LAST 48 HOURS: 2
HOURS AND MINUTES WORKED		**HOURS SLEPT**	
I. IN LAST 24 HOURS: 10 MIN. 45	J. IN LAST 48 HOURS: 10 MIN. 45	K. IN LAST 24 HOURS: 8.5	L. IN LAST 48 HOURS: 17
M. CONTINUOUS DUTY PRIOR TO MISHAP: HOURS 2 MIN. 15		N. HOURS CONTINUOUSLY AWAKE PRIOR TO MISHAP: 2.3	
O. DURATION OF LAST SLEEP PERIOD: HOURS 8.5 MIN.		P. TIME IN COCKPIT PRIOR TO FLIGHT: HOURS 20 MIN.	

III. PHYSIOLOGICAL, LOW PRESSURE CHAMBER AND VERTIGO TRAINING *(For all personnel)*

TYPE TRAINING ACCOMPLISHED	PLACE TRAINING ACCOMPLISHED	COMPLETED Month	COMPLETED Year	ROLE* IN MISHAP
Low pressure and vertigo	Corpuschristi, TEXAS	NOV.	66	1
Seat	Corpuschristi, TEXAS	NOV.	66	1

*For role in mishap, use following code:
0 – NO IMPORTANCE
1 – TRAINING DEFINITELY HELPED
2 – TRAINING POSSIBLY HELPED
3 – LACK OF TRAINING DEFINITELY A FACTOR
4 – LACK OF TRAINING POSSIBLY A FACTOR
9 – UNKNOWN

IV. ANTHROPOMETRIC DATA

a. DATE OF BIRTH: DAY 3 MONTH 9 YEAR 44		b. HEIGHT: 69 INCHES		c. WEIGHT: 162 POUNDS	
d. SITTING HEIGHT: 35.1 INCHES	e. TRUNK HEIGHT: 25.4 INCHES		f. FUNCTIONAL REACH: Not recorded INCHES		
g. BUTTOCK-KNEE LENGTH: 22.6 INCHES	h. LEG LENGTH: 41.5 INCHES		i. SHOULDER WIDTH (BIDELTOID): 18.3 INCHES		

V. GENERAL

1. NUMBER AND TYPE OF PRIOR MISHAPS *(Complete for all pilots, crewmen, and/or other persons in control of aircraft)*
a. No. 1 b. DESCRIBE TYPE(S): Charlie damage to TAF-9J (nose wheel and strut)
4 May 1967

2. TOTAL YEARS OF FORMAL EDUCATION: 3 years past high school

3. CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF ACTIVITIES OF PREVIOUS 72 HOURS *(For all pilots, crewmen, and/or persons possibly contributing to mishap)*

August 23 Saturday
1000 Awoke- ate breakfast
1830 Wedding of friend attended - with DC
2200 Left wedding

August 24 Sunday
1230 Awoke - Washington D.C.
2130 Arrived home from wedding - Cherry Pt. and went to sleep

August 25 Monday
0500 Awoke- roll and coffee for breakfast
0600 Breif
0700 Take off
1100 Landed-fair flight

August 25 Monday cont.
1130 Breif-FP-4
Prior to 1400 2 hot dogs for lunch
1400 Take off
1645 Landed
Went home- ate beefsteak sandwich, oysters, watermelon

August 26 Tuesday
Awoke ½ late - normal breif
0730 Take off- Lt. CASEY seemed odd

NAME	SERIAL NO.	A/C	BUNO
(b) (6)	(b) (6)	A6A	151574

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT OR GROUND ACCIDENT
PERSONAL, SURVIVAL AND ESCAPE EQUIPMENT
OPNAV Form 3750-9E (REV. 4-68) S/N 0107-731-8501

REPORT SYMBOL 3750-7
See Section H of OPNAVINST 3750.6

NOMENCLATURE AND MODEL DESIGNATION	REQUIRED	AVAILABLE	ISSUED	NEEDED	PROBLEMS Indicate by code from list on reverse side.
1. CLOTHING (SUITS, HEADGEAR, SHOES, GLOVES, VISOR, UNDERWEAR, ETC.)					
Boots flying MIL-B-21408	Y	Y	AE	-	
Coveralls Type GS1 FRP-1	Y	Y	AE	-	
Gloves Type GS1 FRP-1	Y	Y	AE	-	
Helmet Type APH-6A	Y	Y	AE	-	(23-06)-E
Dual Visor 92114PN570-464	Y	Y	AE	-	
2. OXYGEN MASK Type A13A	Y	Y	AE	-	
3. OXYGEN REGULATOR					
4. LIFE VEST Type MK-3C	Y	Y			
5. LIFE RAFT Type LR-1	Y	Y			
6. SURVIVAL RADIO(S) AN/URT-33 SER.NO. 11310	Y	Y			
7. SIGNALLING DEVICES					
Flaregun MK-79-MOD0	Y	Y			
Light Strobe 07878-SDU5E	Y	Y			
Day-Night Flare MK-13-MOD0	Y	Y			
8. SURVIVAL KIT (CONTAINER) Vest Type SV-2	Y	Y			
9. OTHER SURVIVAL GEAR					
Survival kit SEEK -2	Y	Y			
Compas Magnetic Type MC-1	Y	Y			
Knife Pocket Survival Type MC-1	Y	Y			
Knife Survival SFN42	Y	Y			
Whistle 8465-254-8803	Y	Y			
10. RESTRAINTS (LAP BELTS, SHOULDER HARNESS, LEG RESTRAINTS)					
Lap Belt Assy. 26512-128AB10083-1	Y	Y	AE	-	
Shoulder Belt Right 26512-128AB-10084-7	Y	Y	AE	-	
Shoulder Belt Left 26512-128AB10084-5	Y	Y			
11. PARACHUTE-TYPE MVEU 6227PA	Y	Y	AE	-	
12. PARACHUTE CANOPY RELEASE KOCH-015-10968-1	Y	Y	AE	AE	
13. PARACHUTE OPENING/DEPLOYMENT DEVICES MBEU-TRM W/DUPLEX DROGUE 921-PA					
14. SEAT TYPE Martin Baker MKGRV-5	Y	Y	AE	-	
15. OTHER (SPECIFY)					
Torso harness	Y	Y	AE	-	

16. EXPLAIN PROBLEMS (USE REVERSE SIDE IF NECESSARY)

Helmet torn from body of Lt. CASEY due to inadequately fastened chin strap.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

NAME	SERIAL NO.	A/C	BUNO
CASEY, Robert B.	(b) (6)	A6A	151574

01 - NOT AVAILABLE-SUPPLY PROBLEM
02 - NOT AVAILABLE-LEFT BEHIND
03 - DISCARDED
04 - LOST
05 - DAMAGED-MINOR
06 - DAMAGED-MAJOR
07 - BURNED-MINOR
08 - BURNED-MAJOR
09 - DESTROYED BY EXTREME FORCE/FIRE
10 - FAILED TO OPERATE (RADIO, ACTUATOR, ETC.)
11 - OPERATED PARTIALLY
12 - DIFFICULTY LOCATING
13 - BEYOND REACH
14 - CONNECTION/CLOSURE DIFFICULTY
15 - CONNECTION/CLOSURE FAILURE
16 - RELEASE/DISCONNECT DIFFICULTY
17 - RELEASE/DISCONNECT FAILURE
18 - INADVERTENT RELEASE/DISCONNECT
19 - INADVERTENT ACTUATION
20 - ACTUATION DIFFICULTY
21 - ACTUATION FAILURE
22 - ACTUATED BY OTHER PERSON
23 - RESTRAINT/ATTACHMENT INADEQUACY
24 - RESTRAINTS/ATTACHMENTS NOT USED PROPERLY FOR MAXIMUM PROTECTION
25 - IMPROPER USE (OTHER)
26 - UNFAMILIAR WITH USE
27 - COLD HAMPERED USE
28 - INJURY HAMPERED USE
29 - WATER HAMPERED USE
30 - OTHER EQUIPMENT INTERFERED
31 - DONNING/REMOVAL PROBLEM
32 - DISCOMFORT/BULKINESS
33 - POOR FIT
34 - LEAKED
35 - MATERIEL DEFICIENCY
36 - DESIGN DEFICIENCY
37 - HANGUP/ENTANGLEMENT (WITH A/C OR OTHER EQUIPMENT)
38 - ENTANGLEMENT (PARACHUTE SUSPENSION LINES ONLY)-MAJOR
39 - ENTANGLEMENT (PARACHUTE SUSPENSION LINES ONLY)-MINOR
40 - DRAGGING (PARACHUTE ONLY)
41 - NON-STANDARD CONFIGURATION
42 - AIDED IN LOCATION/RESCUE
43 - NOT EFFECTIVE IN LOCATION/RESCUE (USED IN AREA OF SAR VEHICLES)
44 - PREVENTED/MINIMIZED INJURY
45 - EQUIPMENT PROBLEM (LOSS, FAILURE, ETC.) A FACTOR IN PRODUCING INJURY
46 - EQUIPMENT PRODUCED INJURY (HIT BY EJECTION SEAT, ETC.)
47 - FAILURE/DELAY IN USING COMPROMISED SURVIVAL/RESCUE
48 - ALL CREW EQUIPMENT (CODE ONLY ONCE)
49 - MAINTENANCE/INSTALLATION ERROR
50 - PROBLEM EXPERIENCED BY OTHERS IN ACTUATION/RELEASE OF EQUIPMENT
51 - EQUIPMENT DAMAGE-SELF INDUCED
52 - EQUIPMENT FAILURE-SELF INDUCED
60 - OTHER (SPECIFY)

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT OR GROUND ACCIDENT
PERSONAL, SURVIVAL AND ESCAPE EQUIPMENT
OPNAV FORM 3750/8E (REV. 4-68) S/N 0107-731-8501

REPORT SYMBOL 3750-7
See Section H of OPNAVINST 3750.6

NOMENCLATURE AND MODEL DESIGNATION	REQUIRED	AVAILABLE	USED	NEEDED	PROBLEMS *Indicate by code from list on reverse side.*
1. CLOTHING (SUITS, HEADGEAR, SHOES, GLOVES, VISOR, UNDERWEAR, ETC.)					
Boots flying MIL-B-21408	Y	Y	AE	-	
Coveralls Type GS1 FRP-1	Y	Y	AE	-	
Gloves Type GS1 FRP-1	Y	Y	AE	-	
Helmet Type APH-6A	Y	Y	AE	-	
Dual Visor 92114PN570-464	Y	Y	AE	-	
2. OXYGEN MASK Type A13A	Y	Y	AE	-	
3. OXYGEN REGULATOR					
4. LIFE VEST Type MK-3C	Y	Y			
5. LIFE RAFT Type LR-1	Y	Y			
6. SURVIVAL RADIO(S) AN/URT-33-SER.NO.11310	Y	Y			
7. SIGNALLING DEVICES					
Flaregun MK-79-MODO	Y	Y			
Light Strobe 07878-SDU5E	Y	Y			
Day-Night Flare MK-13-MODO	Y	Y			
8. SURVIVAL KIT (CONTAINER) Vest Type SV-2	Y	Y			
9. OTHER SURVIVAL GEAR					
Survival kit SEEK-2	Y	Y			
Compas Magnetic Type MC-1	Y	Y			
Knife Pocket Survival Type MC-1	Y	Y			
Knife Survival SFN42	Y	Y			
Whistle 8465-254-8803	Y	Y			
10. RESTRAINTS (LAP BELTS, SHOULDER HARNESS, LEG RESTRAINTS)					
Lap Belt Assy. 26512-128AB10083-1	Y	Y	AE	-	
Shoulder Belt Rt. 26512-128AB-10084-7	Y	Y	AE	-	
Shoulder Belt Lt. 26512-128AB-10084-5	Y	Y			
11. PARACHUTE-TYPE MBEU 6227PA	Y	Y	AE	-	
12. PARACHUTE CANOPY RELEASE KOCH-015-10968-1	Y	Y	AE		
13. PARACHUTE OPENING/DEPLOYMENT DEVICE MBEU-TPM W/DUPLEX DROGUE 921-PA					
14. SEAT TYPE Martin Baker MKGRV-5	Y	Y	AE	-	
15. OTHER (SPECIFY)					
Torso harness	Y	Y	AE	-	

16. EXPLAIN PROBLEMS (USE REVERSE SIDE IF NECESSARY)

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

NAME	SERIAL NO.	A/C	BUNO
(b) (6)	(b) (6)	A6A	151579

01 - NOT AVAILABLE-SUPPLY PROBLEM
02 - NOT AVAILABLE-LEFT BEHIND
03 - DISCARDED
04 - LOST
05 - DAMAGED-MINOR
06 - DAMAGED-MAJOR
07 - BURNED-MINOR
08 - BURNED-MAJOR
09 - DESTROYED BY EXTREME FORCE/FIRE
10 - FAILED TO OPERATE (RADIO, ACTUATOR, ETC.)
11 - OPERATED PARTIALLY
12 - DIFFICULTY LOCATING
13 - BEYOND REACH
14 - CONNECTION/CLOSURE DIFFICULTY
15 - CONNECTION/CLOSURE FAILURE
16 - RELEASE/DISCONNECT DIFFICULTY
17 - RELEASE/DISCONNECT FAILURE
18 - INADVERTENT RELEASE/DISCONNECT
19 - INADVERTENT ACTUATION
20 - ACTUATION DIFFICULTY
21 - ACTUATION FAILURE
22 - ACTUATED BY OTHER PERSON
23 - RESTRAINT/ATTACHMENT INADEQUACY
24 - RESTRAINTS/ATTACHMENTS NOT USED PROPERLY FOR MAXIMUM PROTECTION
25 - IMPROPER USE (OTHER)
26 - UNFAMILIAR WITH USE
27 - COLD HAMPERED USE
28 - INJURY HAMPERED USE
29 - WATER HAMPERED USE
30 - OTHER EQUIPMENT INTERFERED
31 - DONNING/REMOVAL PROBLEM
32 - DISCOMFORT/BULKINESS
33 - POOR FIT
34 - LEAKED
35 - MATERIEL DEFICIENCY
36 - DESIGN DEFICIENCY
37 - HANGUP/ENTANGLEMENT (WITH A/C OR OTHER EQUIPMENT)
38 - ENTANGLEMENT (PARACHUTE SUSPENSION LINES ONLY)-MAJOR
39 - ENTANGLEMENT (PARACHUTE SUSPENSION LINES ONLY)-MINOR
40 - DRAGGING (PARACHUTE ONLY)
41 - NON-STANDARD CONFIGURATION
42 - AIDED IN LOCATION/RESCUE
43 - NOT EFFECTIVE IN LOCATION/RESCUE (USED IN AREA OF SAR VEHICLES)
44 - PREVENTED/MINIMIZED INJURY
45 - EQUIPMENT PROBLEM (LOSS, FAILURE, ETC.) A FACTOR IN PRODUCING INJURY
46 - EQUIPMENT PRODUCED INJURY (HIT BY EJECTION SEAT, ETC.)
47 - FAILURE/DELAY IN USING COMPROMISED SURVIVAL/RESCUE
48 - ALL CREW EQUIPMENT (CODE ONLY ONCE)
49 - MAINTENANCE/INSTALLATION ERROR
50 - PROBLEM ESPERIENCED BY OTHERS IN ACTUATION/RELEASE OF EQUIPMENT
51 - EQUIPMENT DAMAGE-SELF INDUCED
52 - EQUIPMENT FAILURE-SELF INDUCED
60 - OTHER (SPECIFY)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C [illegible]CIDENT, INCIDENT OR GROUND ACCIDENT
ESCAPE - EGRESS COMPLETE FOR ALL [illegible]VIDUALS
OPNAV FORM 3750/6P (Rev. 4-68) S/N 0107-731-8801

REPORT SYMBOL 3750-7
See Section II of OPNAVINST 3750.6

1. LOCATION IN AIRCRAFT

A.
- [X] 1. COCKPIT OR PILOT'S COMPARTMENT
- [ ] 2. NAVIGATOR'S/ENGINEER'S COMPARTMENT
- [ ] 3. PASSENGERS' COMPARTMENT (SINGLE DECK)
- [ ] 4. PASSENGERS' COMPARTMENT (UPPER DECK)
- [ ] 5. PASSENGERS' COMPARTMENT (LOWER DECK)
- [ ] 6. OTHER COMPARTMENT
- [ ] 9. COMPARTMENT UNKNOWN

B. LONGITUDINAL LOCATION
- [X] 1. FORWARD SECTION
- [ ] 2. CENTER SECTION
- [ ] 3. AFT SECTION
- [ ] 4. SECTION UNKNOWN

C. LATERAL LOCATION
- [ ] 2. CENTER
- [X] 4. LEFT SIDE
- [ ] 5. RIGHT SIDE
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

D. DIRECTION FACING
- [X] 1. FORWARD
- [ ] 2. AFT
- [ ] 3. SIDEWARD
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

E. USE OF SEAT
- [ ] 0. NOT IN SEAT
- [X] 1. IN SEAT
- [ ] 2. BUNK/LITTER
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

2. METHOD OF ESCAPE *(More than one may apply)*

A. EJECTION
- [X] 1. ACCOMPLISHED (FREE OF AIRCRAFT)
- [ ] 2. ATTEMPTED (NOT ACCOMPLISHED)
- [ ] 3. SEAT EJECTED ON IMPACT (TERRAIN)
- [ ] 4. INADVERTENT EJECTION
- [ ] 7. UNKNOWN IF ATTEMPT WAS MADE
- [ ] 8. SUSPECTED EJECTION
- [ ] 0. DEFINITELY NOT ATTEMPTED

B. BAILOUT
- [ ] 1. ACCOMPLISHED (FREE OF AIRCRAFT)
- [ ] 2. ATTEMPTED (NOT ACCOMPLISHED)
- [ ] 3. BAILED OUT AFTER EJECTION ATTEMPT FAILED
- [ ] 7. UNKNOWN IF ATTEMPT WAS MADE
- [ ] 8. SUSPECTED BAILOUT
- [ ] 0. DEFINITELY NOT ATTEMPTED

C. OTHER
- [ ] A. STANDARD EMERGENCY GROUND EGRESS
- [ ] 1. UNDERWATER EGRESS (NOT EJECTION)
- [ ] 3. DID NOT ESCAPE
- [ ] 4. EXIT UNASSISTED (OTHER THAN STANDARD EMERG. GROUND EGRESS)
- [ ] 5. CARRIED/ASSISTED OUT
- [ ] 6. BLOWN/THROWN OUT
- [ ] 7. JUMPED FROM A/C (AIRBORNE)
- [ ] 8. UNKNOWN IF ESCAPE ACCOMPLISHED
- [ ] 9. ESCAPED, METHOD UNKNOWN

3. INTENT FOR ESCAPE
- [X] 1. INTENTIONAL
- [ ] 2. UNINTENTIONAL, SELF INDUCED
- [ ] 3. UNINTENTIONAL, MECHANICAL
- [ ] 4. INTENT UNKNOWN

4. EXIT USED
- [ ] 1. NORMAL EXIT
- [X] 2. EJECTED THROUGH CANOPY
- [ ] 3. EMERGENCY EXIT
- [ ] 8. OTHER
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

5. COCKPIT/CABIN CONDITION AFTER IMPACT
- [ ] 0. NO DAMAGE (OTHER THAN CANOPY LOSS, ETC.)
- [ ] 1. MINOR DAMAGE (DEFINITELY HABITABLE)
- [ ] 2. REASONABLY INTACT (PROBABLY HABITABLE)
- [ ] 3. MAJOR DAMAGE (PROBABLY NOT HABITABLE)
- [X] 4. DESTROYED (DEFINITELY NOT HABITABLE)
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

6. ORDER OF ESCAPE *(1st, 2nd, etc.)* 2ND

7. REASON(S) FOR ESCAPE *(More than one may apply)*
- [ ] A. FIRE/EXPLOSION/SMOKE
- [X] B. LOSS OF CONTROL
- [ ] C. ENGINE FAILURE
- [ ] D. FUEL EXHAUSTION
- [ ] E. STRUCTURAL FAILURE
- [ ] F. MID-AIR COLLISION
- [ ] G. WATER IMPACT
- [ ] H. GROUND/STRUCTURE IMPACT
- [ ] J. LAUNCH FAILURE
- [ ] K. ARRESTMENT FAILURE
- [ ] Y. OTHER
- [ ] Z. UNKNOWN

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

NAME	SERIAL NO.	A/C	BUNO
CASEY, Robert B.	(b) (6)	A6A	151574

8. COMMUNICATIONS PRIOR TO ESCAPE

- [ ] 1. DISTRESS SIGNAL TRANSMITTED
- [ ] 2. POSITION FIX TRANSMITTED
- [ ] 3. EMERGENCY IFF (MANUAL)
- [ ] 4. EMERGENCY IFF (AUTOMATIC)
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN
- [X] 8. NONE

9. NUMBER OF PREVIOUS:

EJECTIONS 0 EMERGENCY BAILOUTS _____

OTHER PARACHUTE JUMPS (TRAINING, SKYDIVING, ETC.) _____

10. TERRAIN OF PARACHUTE LANDING OR CRASH SITE

(More than one may be applicable)

- [ ] A - OPEN SEA
- [ ] B - LARGE LAKE
- [ ] C - RIVER
- [ ] D - DEEP WATER, OTHER
- [ ] E - SHALLOW WATER
- [ ] F - DEEP SNOW
- [ ] G - THICK ICE
- [ ] H - MARSH/SWAMP/MUD
- [ ] U - HARD GROUND
- [X] J - SOFT GROUND
- [ ] K - BUILDING
- [ ] L - FLIGHT DECK
- [ ] M - DENSE WOODS
- [ ] N - IN TREES
- [ ] T - THROUGH TREES
- [ ] P - RAVINE/STEEP SLOPE
- [ ] Q - ROCKS
- [ ] R - IN/NEAR FIREBALL
- [ ] S - DESERT
- [ ] Y - UNKNOWN
- [ ] Z - OTHER _____

11. AIRCRAFT ATTITUDE AT TIME OF ESCAPE

(Either in flight or after crash, ditching, etc.)

- [ ] NOSE UP
- [X] NOSE DOWN 60°-80° DEGREES
- [ ] RIGHT BANK
- [ ] LEFT BANK _____ DEGREES
- [ ] A. NOSE DOWN SPIN
- [ ] B. FLAT SPIN
- [ ] C. OSCILLATING SPIN
- [ ] D. ROLLING
- [ ] E. TUMBLING
- [ ] F. DISINTEGRATION
- [ ] G. INVERTED
- [ ] H. MUSHING
- [ ] Z. UNKNOWN
- [ ] Y. OTHER (DESCRIBE) _____

12. EJECTION SEAT/PARACHUTE TRAINING

(Not required for passengers who had no opportunity to escape)

TYPE OF TRAINING	TOTAL HOURS IN TRAINING	DATE OF LAST TRAINING	ROLE*
LECTURES/DEMONSTRATIONS	1.5	JAN. 69	9
TRAINING FILMS			
UNARMED EJECTION SEAT	UNK.	JAN. 69	9
ARMED SEAT ON TOWER	1	JAN. 69	9
JUMP SCHOOL			
PARASAIL TRAINING			
OTHER (SPECIFY)			

*Use codes below to indicate role training played in this mishap.

0 - NO IMPORTANCE
1 - TRAINING DEFINITE HELP
2 - TRAINING POSSIBLE HELP
3 - LACK OF TRAINING FACTOR
4 - LACK OF TRAINING POSSIBLE FACTOR
9 - TRAINING ROLE UNKNOWN

13. EGRESS DIFFICULTIES *(Place X in appropriate column)*

B - Before; D - During; A - After UNKNOWN

		GROUND B	GROUND D	GROUND A	WATER B	WATER D	WATER A	AIR B	AIR D	AIR A
1. BUFFETING	01									
2. G FORCES	02									
3. WINDBLAST	03									
4. SEAT PINS NOT REMOVED	04									
5. DIFFICULTY LOCATING CANOPY JETTISON MECHANISM	05									
6. HAMPERED BY CLOTHING	06									
7. HAMPERED BY EQUIPMENT (INCLUDE BODY ARMOR)	07									
8. HAMPERED BY INJURIES	08									
9. DIFFICULTY RELEASING CANOPY/HATCH	09									
10. FAILURE TO RELEASE CANOPY/HATCH	10									
11. DIFFICULTY LOCATING/REACHING NORMAL EJECTION MECHANISM	11									
12. DIFFICULTY LOCATING/REACHING ALTERNATE EJECTION MECHANISM	12									
13. FACE CURTAIN FAILED TO ACTIVATE SEAT	13									
14. FACE CURTAIN PROBLEM (LOCATING, REACHING, ETC.)	14									
15. SEAT PAN FIRING HANDLE FAILED TO ACTIVATE SEAT	15									
16. SEAT PAN FIRING HANDLE PROBLEM (LOCATING, ETC.)	16									
17. CANOPY JETTISON PROBLEM	17									
18. CANOPY JETTISON FAILURE (AUTOMATIC MEANS)	18									

CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

13. EGRESS DIFFICULTIES *(Place X in appropriate column) (Continued)*
B - Before; D - During; A - After

		GROUND			WATER			AIR		
		B	D	A	B	D	A	B	D	A
19. COULD NOT OPEN CANOPY/HATCH	19									
20. DIFFICULTY RELEASING RESTRAINTS	20									
21. DIFFICULTY REACHING HATCH/EXIT-OBSTRUCTIONS	21									
22. DIFFICULTY REACHING HATCH/EXIT-INJURIES	22									
23. DIFFICULTY REACHING HATCH/EXIT-A/C ATTITUDE	23									
24. DIFFICULTY REACHING HATCH/EXIT-EQUIPMENT HANGUP	24									
25. PINNED DOWN IN A/C (OTHER THAN EQUIPMENT HANGUP)	25									
26. CONFUSION/PANIC/DISORIENTATION	26									
27. DARKNESS-NO VISUAL REFERENCE	27									
28. FIRE/SMOKE/FUEL	28									
29. ANTHROPOMETRIC PROBLEM	29									
30. PERSONAL EQUIPMENT FACTOR (OTHER THAN HANGUP)	30									
31. UPPER EXTREMITIES HIT COCKPIT STRUCTURES	31								X	
32. LOWER EXTREMITIES HIT COCKPIT STRUCTURES	32									
33. MAN STRUCK CANOPY/CANOPY BOW	33									
34. STRUCK EXTERNAL SURFACE OF AIRCRAFT	34									
35. FLAILING - UPPER EXTREMITIES	35									
36. FLAILING - LOWER EXTREMITIES	36									
37. DROGUE SLUG SWINGING AT MAN	37									
38. DROGUE SLUG STRUCK MAN	38									
39. MAN STRUCK BY OTHER EQUIPMENT	39									
40. MAN STRUCK BY SEAT	40									
41. SEAT SEPARATION DIFFICULTY	41									
42. SEAT/PARACHUTE ENTANGLEMENT	42									
43. MAN TANGLED IN CHUTE RISERS-MAJOR	43									
44. MAN TANGLED IN CHUTE RISERS-MINOR	44									
45. PARACHUTE LINE OVER	45									
46. MAN HELD ON TO SEAT	46									
47. TUMBLING/SPINNING	47									
48. PARACHUTE DID NOT OPEN	48								X	
49. PARACHUTE STREAMED	49									
50. INADVERTENT OPENING OF LAP BELT	50									
51. FAILURE OF LAP BELT TO OPEN	51									
52. INRUSHING WATER	52									
53. COLD	53									
54. UNCONSCIOUS/DAZED	54									
55. OTHER	98									

REMARKS OR CONTINUATION *(Index each remark with code from above)*

#31 Air D- Individuals head hit face curtain handle. I assume this is due to his leaning forward and ejecting with secondary handle.

NAME	SERIAL NO.	A/C	BUNO
CASEY, Robert B.	(b) (6)	A6A	151574

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT OR GROUND ACCIDENT
ESCAPE - EGRESS COMPLETE FOR ALL INDIVIDUALS
OPNAV FORM 3750/SF (Rev. 4-68) S/N 0107-[illegible]-6601

REPORT SYMBOL 3750-7
See Section II of OPNAVINST 3750.6

1. LOCATION IN AIRCRAFT

A
- [ ] 1. COCKPIT OR PILOT'S COMPARTMENT
- [X] 2. NAVIGATOR'S/ENGINEER'S COMPARTMENT
- [ ] 3. PASSENGERS' COMPARTMENT (SINGLE DECK)
- [ ] 4. PASSENGERS' COMPARTMENT (UPPER DECK)
- [ ] 5. PASSENGERS' COMPARTMENT (LOWER DECK)
- [ ] 8. OTHER COMPARTMENT
- [ ] 9. COMPARTMENT UNKNOWN

B. LONGITUDINAL LOCATION
- [X] 1. FORWARD SECTION
- [ ] 2. CENTER SECTION
- [ ] 3. AFT SECTION
- [ ] 4. SECTION UNKNOWN

C. LATERAL LOCATION
- [ ] 2. CENTER
- [ ] 4. LEFT SIDE
- [X] 5. RIGHT SIDE
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

D. DIRECTION FACING
- [X] 1. FORWARD
- [ ] 2. AFT
- [ ] 3. SIDEWARD
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

E. USE OF SEAT
- [ ] 0 NOT IN SEAT
- [X] 1. IN SEAT
- [ ] 2. BUNK/LITTER
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

2. METHOD OF ESCAPE *(More than one may apply)*

A. EJECTION
- [X] 1. ACCOMPLISHED (FREE OF AIRCRAFT)
- [ ] 2. ATTEMPTED (NOT ACCOMPLISHED)
- [ ] 3. SEAT EJECTED ON IMPACT (TERRAIN)
- [ ] 4. INADVERTENT EJECTION
- [ ] 7. UNKNOWN IF ATTEMPT WAS MADE
- [ ] 8. SUSPECTED EJECTION
- [ ] 0. DEFINITELY NOT ATTEMPTED

B. BAILOUT
- [ ] 1. ACCOMPLISHED (FREE OF AIRCRAFT)
- [ ] 2. ATTEMPTED (NOT ACCOMPLISHED)
- [ ] 3. BAILED OUT AFTER EJECTION ATTEMPT FAILED
- [ ] 7. UNKNOWN IF ATTEMPT WAS MADE
- [ ] 8. SUSPECTED BAILOUT
- [ ] 0. DEFINITELY NOT ATTEMPTED

C. OTHER
- [ ] A. STANDARD EMERGENCY GROUND EGRESS
- [ ] 1. UNDERWATER EGRESS (NOT EJECTION)
- [ ] 3. DID NOT ESCAPE
- [ ] 4. EXIT UNASSISTED (OTHER THAN STANDARD EMERG. GROUND EGRESS)
- [ ] 5. CARRIED/ASSISTED OUT
- [ ] 6. BLOWN/THROWN OUT
- [ ] 7. JUMPED FROM A/C (AIRBORNE)
- [ ] 8. UNKNOWN IF ESCAPE ACCOMPLISHED
- [ ] 9. ESCAPED, METHOD UNKNOWN

3. INTENT FOR ESCAPE
- [ ] 1. INTENTIONAL
- [ ] 2. UNINTENTIONAL, SELF INDUCED
- [ ] 3. UNINTENTIONAL, MECHANICAL
- [ ] 4. INTENT UNKNOWN

4. EXIT USED
- [ ] 1. NORMAL EXIT
- [X] 2. EJECTED THROUGH CANOPY
- [ ] 3. EMERGENCY EXIT
- [ ] 8. OTHER
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

5. COCKPIT/CABIN CONDITION AFTER IMPACT
- [ ] 0. NO DAMAGE (OTHER THAN CANOPY LOSS, ETC.)
- [ ] 1. MINOR DAMAGE (DEFINITELY HABITABLE)
- [ ] 2. REASONABLY INTACT (PROBABLY HABITABLE)
- [ ] 3. MAJOR DAMAGE (PROBABLY NOT HABITABLE)
- [X] 4. DESTROYED (DEFINITELY NOT HABITABLE)
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

6. ORDER OF ESCAPE *(1st, 2nd, etc.)* 1st

7. REASON(S) FOR ESCAPE *(More than one may apply)*
- [ ] A. FIRE/EXPLOSION/SMOKE
- [X] B. LOSS OF CONTROL
- [ ] C. ENGINE FAILURE
- [ ] D. FUEL EXHAUSTION
- [ ] E. STRUCTURAL FAILURE
- [ ] F. MID-AIR COLLISION
- [ ] G. WATER IMPACT
- [ ] H. GROUND/STRUCTURE IMPACT
- [ ] J. LAUNCH FAILURE
- [ ] K. ARRESTMENT FAILURE
- [ ] Y. OTHER
- [ ] Z. UNKNOWN

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

NAME	SERIAL NO.	A/C	BUNO
(b) (6)	(b) (6)	A6A	151574

8. COMMUNICATIONS PRIOR TO ESCAPE

- [ ] 1. DISTRESS SIGNAL TRANSMITTED
- [ ] 2. POSITION FIX TRANSMITTED
- [ ] 3. EMERGENCY IFF (MANUAL)
- [ ] 4. EMERGENCY IFF (AUTOMATIC)
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN
- [X] 8. NONE

9. NUMBER OF PREVIOUS:

EJECTIONS 0 EMERGENCY BAILOUTS _____

OTHER PARACHUTE JUMPS (TRAINING, SKYDIVING, ETC.) _____

10. TERRAIN OF PARACHUTE LANDING OR CRASH SITE

(More than one may be applicable)

- [ ] A - OPEN SEA
- [ ] B - LARGE LAKE
- [ ] C - RIVER
- [ ] D - DEEP WATER, OTHER
- [ ] E - SHALLOW WATER
- [ ] F - DEEP SNOW
- [ ] G - THICK ICE
- [ ] H - MARSH/SWAMP/MUD
- [ ] U - HARD GROUND
- [X] J - SOFT GROUND
- [ ] K - BUILDING
- [ ] L - FLIGHT DECK
- [ ] M - DENSE WOODS
- [ ] N - IN TREES
- [ ] T - THROUGH TREES
- [ ] P - RAVINE/STEEP SLOPE
- [ ] Q - ROCKS
- [ ] R - IN/NEAR FIREBALL
- [ ] S - DESERT
- [ ] Y - UNKNOWN
- [ ] Z - OTHER _____

11. AIRCRAFT ATTITUDE AT TIME OF ESCAPE

(Either in flight or after crash, ditching, etc.)

- [ ] NOSE UP
- [X] NOSE DOWN 60°-80° DEGREES
- [ ] RIGHT BANK
- [ ] LEFT BANK _____ DEGREES
- [ ] A. NOSE DOWN SPIN
- [ ] B. FLAT SPIN
- [ ] C. OSCILLATING SPIN
- [ ] D. ROLLING
- [ ] E. TUMBLING
- [ ] F. DISINTEGRATION
- [ ] G. INVERTED
- [ ] H. MUSHING
- [ ] Z. UNKNOWN
- [ ] Y. OTHER (DESCRIBE) _____

12. EJECTION SEAT/PARACHUTE TRAINING

(Not required for passengers who had no opportunity to escape)

TYPE OF TRAINING	TOTAL HOURS IN TRAINING	DATE OF LAST TRAINING	ROLE*
LECTURES/DEMONSTRATIONS	UNK	NOV. 66	1
TRAINING FILMS			
UNARMED EJECTION SEAT	UNK	NOV. 66	1
ARMED SEAT ON TOWER	UNK	NOV. 66	1
JUMP SCHOOL			
PARASAIL TRAINING			
OTHER (SPECIFY)			

*Use codes below to indicate role training played in this mishap.

0 - NO IMPORTANCE
1 - TRAINING DEFINITE HELP
2 - TRAINING POSSIBLE HELP
3 - LACK OF TRAINING FACTOR
4 - LACK OF TRAINING POSSIBLE FACTOR
9 - TRAINING ROLE UNKNOWN

13. EGRESS DIFFICULTIES *(Place X in appropriate column)*

B - Before, D - During, A - After N/A

		GROUND B	GROUND D	GROUND A	WATER B	WATER D	WATER A	AIR B	AIR D	AIR A
1. BUFFETING	01									
2. G FORCES	02									
3. WINDBLAST	03									
4. SEAT PINS NOT REMOVED	04									
5. DIFFICULTY LOCATING CANOPY JETTISON MECHANISM	05									
6. HAMPERED BY CLOTHING	06									
7. HAMPERED BY EQUIPMENT (INCLUDE BODY ARMOR)	07									
8. HAMPERED BY INJURIES	08									
9. DIFFICULTY RELEASING CANOPY/HATCH	09									
10. FAILURE TO RELEASE CANOPY/HATCH	10									
11. DIFFICULTY LOCATING/REACHING NORMAL EJECTION MECHANISM	11									
12. DIFFICULTY LOCATING/REACHING ALTERNATE EJECTION MECHANISM	12									
13. FACE CURTAIN FAILED TO ACTIVATE SEAT	13									
14. FACE CURTAIN PROBLEM (LOCATING, REACHING, ETC.)	14									
15. SEAT PAN FIRING HANDLE FAILED TO ACTIVATE SEAT	15									
16. SEAT PAN FIRING HANDLE PROBLEM (LOCATING, ETC.)	16									
17. CANOPY JETTISON PROBLEM	17									
18. CANOPY JETTISON FAILURE (AUTOMATIC MEANS)	18									

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(b) (6) [redacted]

(b) (6) [redacted]

13. EGRESS DIFFICULTIES *(Place X in appropriate column) (Continued)*
B - Before; D - During; A - After

		GROUND			WATER			AIR		
		B	D	A	B	D	A	B	D	A
19. COULD NOT OPEN CANOPY/HATCH	19									
20. DIFFICULTY RELEASING RESTRAINTS	20									
21. DIFFICULTY REACHING HATCH/EXIT-OBSTRUCTIONS	21									
22. DIFFICULTY REACHING HATCH/EXIT-INJURIES	22									
23. DIFFICULTY REACHING HATCH/EXIT-A/C ATTITUDE	23									
24. DIFFICULTY REACHING HATCH/EXIT-EQUIPMENT HANGUP	24									
25. PINNED DOWN IN A/C (OTHER THAN EQUIPMENT HANGUP)	25									
26. CONFUSION/PANIC/DISORIENTATION	26									
27. DARKNESS-NO VISUAL REFERENCE	27									
28. FIRE/SMOKE/FUEL	28									
29. ANTHROPOMETRIC PROBLEM	29									
30. PERSONAL EQUIPMENT FACTOR (OTHER THAN HANGUP)	30									
31. UPPER EXTREMITIES HIT COCKPIT STRUCTURES	31									
32. LOWER EXTREMITIES HIT COCKPIT STRUCTURES	32								X	
33. MAN STRUCK CANOPY/CANOPY BOW	33									
34. STRUCK EXTERNAL SURFACE OF AIRCRAFT	34									
35. FLAILING - UPPER EXTREMITIES	35									
36. FLAILING - LOWER EXTREMITIES	36									
37. DROGUE SLUG SWINGING AT MAN	37									
38. DROGUE SLUG STRUCK MAN	38									
39. MAN STRUCK BY OTHER EQUIPMENT	39									
40. MAN STRUCK BY SEAT	40									
41. SEAT SEPARATION DIFFICULTY	41									
42. SEAT/PARACHUTE ENTANGLEMENT	42									
43. MAN TANGLED IN CHUTE RISERS-MAJOR	43									
44. MAN TANGLED IN CHUTE RISERS-MINOR	44									
45. PARACHUTE LINE OVER	45									
46. MAN HELD ON TO SEAT	46									
47. TUMBLING/SPINNING	47									
48. PARACHUTE DID NOT OPEN	48									
49. PARACHUTE STREAMED	49									
50. INADVERTENT OPENING OF LAP BELT	50									
51. FAILURE OF LAP BELT TO OPEN	51									
52. INRUSHING WATER	52									
53. COLD	53									
54. UNCONSCIOUS/DAZED	54									
55. OTHER	98									

REMARKS OR CONTINUATION: *(Index each remark with code from above)*

#32 Air D - (b) (6) [redacted]

NAME	SERIAL NO.	A/C	BUNO
(b) (6) [redacted]	(b) (6) [redacted]	A6A	151571

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A C AC DENT, INCIDENT OR GROUND ACCIDENT EJECTION OR BAILOUT

OPNAV FORM 3750/8G (REV. 4-68) S/N 0107-727-6701

REPORT SYMBOL 3750-7

See Section II of OPNAVINST 3750.6

(Complete for all - flight escapes and ejections)

1. TIME FROM EMERGENCY UNTIL ESCAPE ATTEMPT WAS INITIATED

HOURS ____ MINUTES ____ SECONDS UNK

2. DELAY IN INITIATING ESCAPE DUE TO

- [ ] 1. ATTEMPTING TO OVERCOME PROBLEM
- [ ] 2. AVOIDING POPULATED AREA
- [ ] 3. AVOIDING UNSUITABLE TERRAIN
- [ ] 4. GAINING ALTITUDE
- [ ] 5. LOSING ALTITUDE
- [ ] 6. LOSING AIRSPEED
- [ ] 8. OTHER
- [X] 9. UNKNOWN

3. TERRAIN CLEARANCE AT TIME OF:

A. 1. ESCAPE (FEET) X 2. PARACHUTE OPENING (FEET) X

B. 1. AIRSPEED AT TIME OF ESCAPE ____ KIAS

2. GROUND/FORWARD SPEED (IF NOT AIRBORNE) ____ K

C. [X] 1. PARACHUTE DID NOT OPEN [ ] 2. PARACHUTE STREAMED

4. PROTECTIVE HELMET

	CHIN STRAP FASTENED			HELMET VISOR LOWERED		
	YES	NO	UNK	YES	NO	UNK
1. BEFORE EMERGENCY	[ ]	[ ]	[X]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
2. DURING EGRESS	[ ]	[ ]	[X]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
3. DURING CHUTE LANDING	[ ]	[ ]	[X]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
4. CHIN STRAP FASTENED SNUGLY				[ ]	[X]	[ ]
5. NAPE STRAP FASTENED SNUGLY				[ ]	[ ]	[X]

5. ZERO LANYARD

A. WHEN CONNECTED

- [ ] 0. AVAILABLE, NOT CONNECTED
- [ ] 1. PRIOR TO EMERGENCY
- [ ] 2. DURING EMERGENCY
- [ ] 3. TIME UNKNOWN
- [ ] 8. NA/NOT AVAILABLE
- [X] 9. UNKNOWN

B. SURVIVAL FACTOR

- [ ] 0. NOT A FACTOR IN SURVIVAL
- [ ] 1. FACTOR IN SURVIVAL
- [ ] 2. NOT A FACTOR IN NON-SURVIVAL
- [ ] 3. FACTOR IN NON-SURVIVAL
- [X] 9. UNKNOWN IF FACTOR

6. AUTOMATIC LAP BELT RELEASE

- [ ] 0. DID NOT OPEN OR RELEASE
- [ ] 1. RELEASED AUTOMATICALLY AS DESIGNED
- [ ] 2. OPENED MANUALLY
- [ ] 3. OPENED INADVERTENTLY
- [ ] 8. UNKNOWN HOW RELEASED
- [X] 9. UNKNOWN IF RELEASED

7. REMOVAL OF AIRCRAFT CANOPY NA

A. INTENT

- [ ] 1. INTENTIONAL
- [ ] 2. UNINTENTIONAL, SELF-INDUCED
- [ ] 3. UNINTENTIONAL, MECHANICAL
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

B. INITIATED BY

- [X] 1. THIS INDIVIDUAL
- [ ] 2. ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

7. REMOVAL OF AIRCRAFT CANOPY *(Continued)*

C. REMOVAL

- [X] 0. DEFINITELY NOT ATTEMPTED
- [ ] 1. ACCOMPLISHED
- [ ] 2. ATTEMPTED (UNSUCCESSFUL)
- [ ] 3. UNKNOWN IF ATTEMPTED

D. METHOD

- [ ] 1. ARM REST/LEG BRACE
- [ ] 2. FACE CURTAIN
- [ ] 3. SEAT PAN HANDLE
- [ ] 4. MANUALLY UNLOCKED
- [ ] 5. EXTERNAL FORCE
- [ ] 6. CANOPY JETTISON HANDLE
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN
- [ ] 8. OTHER (DESCRIBE)

8. EJECTION

A. INTENT

- [X] 1. INTENTIONAL
- [ ] 2. UNINTENTIONAL
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

B. INITIATED BY

- [X] 1. THIS PERSON
- [ ] 2. ANOTHER PERSON
- [ ] 3. EXTERNAL FORCE
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

C. METHOD

- [ ] 1. ARM REST/LEG BRACE
- [ ] 2. FACE CURTAIN
- [X] 3. SEAT PAN HANDLE
- [ ] 4. SEAT SEQUENCER
- [ ] 5. IMPACT
- [ ] 6. FIRE
- [ ] 7. MECHANICAL FAILURE
- [ ] 8. OTHER EXTERNAL FORCE
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

9. BODY POSITION AT EJECTION *(As compared to optimal)*

		A. HEAD	B. HIPS	C. FEET	D. ELBOWS
OPTIMAL	1			X	
FORWARD	2	X	X		
UPWARD	3				X
LATERAL	4	X	X		X
UNKNOWN	9				

10. POSITION OF EJECTION SEAT

- [ ] 1. FULL UP
- [ ] 2. FULL DOWN
- [ ] 3. INTERMEDIATE POSITION
- [X] 9. UNKNOWN

11. METHOD OF SEPARATING MAN FROM SEAT

- [ ] 0. DID NOT SEPARATE
- [ ] 1. SEAT SEPARATOR
- [ ] 2. SPONTANEOUS TUMBLING
- [ ] 3. PUSHED SELF AWAY
- [ ] 4. PERSONNEL PARACHUTE
- [ ] 8. OTHER
- [X] 9. UNKNOWN

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

NAME	SERIAL NO.	A/C	BUNO
CASEY, Robert B.	(b) (6)	A6A	151574

12. TYPE OF SEAT SEPARATION

- [ ] 0. NONE
- [ ] 1. ROTARY
- [X] 2. BLADDER
- [ ] 3. PARACHUTE
- [ ] 4. SNUBBING LANYARD

13. METHODS OF DEPLOYING PARACHUTE

- [ ] 0. NOT DEPLOYED
- [X] 1. AUTOMATIC TIMER
- [ ] 2. ANEROID
- [ ] 3. BALLISTIC DEVICE
- [ ] 4. ZERO LANYARD
- [ ] 5. STATIC LINE
- [ ] 6. MANUAL
- [ ] 8. OTHER
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

14. PARACHUTE OPENING SHOCK

- [ ] 0. NEGLIGIBLE
- [ ] 1. MODERATE
- [ ] 2. SEVERE
- [X] 9. UNKNOWN

15. OSCILLATIONS

	0-NEGLIGIBLE	1-MODERATE	2-SEVERE	9-UNKNOWN
A. DURING DESCENT				
B. DURING LANDING				

16. PARACHUTE DAMAGE *(Enter number off)*

1. SEVERED SHROUD LINES NA
2. MISSING PANELS
3. TORN PANELS-MAJOR
4. TORN PANELS-MINOR

17. CAUSE OF PARACHUTE DAMAGE NA

- [ ] 1. OPENING SHOCK
- [ ] 2. FOULED ON EJECTION SEAT
- [ ] 3. FOULED ON A/C
- [ ] 4. FIRE
- [ ] 5. ON LANDING
- [ ] 6. IN TREES
- [ ] 7. DRAGGING
- [ ] 8. OTHER (DESCRIBE)
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

18. FOUR LINE CUT DISREGARD, *(Air Force Item only)*

19. DIRECTION FACED AT CHUTE LANDING

- [X] 1. DIRECTLY FACING
- [ ] 2. FACING AWAY
- [ ] 3. QUARTERING, FACING
- [ ] 4. QUARTERING, BACK
- [ ] 5. DIRECTLY SIDEWAYS
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

20. LANDING CONDITIONS

A. TOTAL WEIGHT UNDER PARACHUTE: _____ LBS

B. SURFACE WINDS _____ KNOTS

C. DRAGGED BY CHUTE [ ] 1. YES [X] 0. NO

D. DISTANCE DRAGGED _____ YARDS

21. PARACHUTE LANDING POSITION TECHNIQUES

A.
- [ ] 0. COULD NOT SEE
- [ ] 1. LOOKING AHEAD
- [ ] 2. LOOKING DOWN
- [ ] 8. OTHER
- [X] 9. UNKNOWN

B.
- [ ] 1. FELL OBLIQUELY
- [ ] 2. FELL BACKWARD
- [ ] 3. FELL FORWARD
- [ ] 8. OTHER
- [X] 9. UNKNOWN

C.
- [ ] 1. MUSCLES TENSED
- [ ] 2. MUSCLES TOO TENSE
- [ ] 3. TOO RELAXED
- [ ] 8. OTHER
- [X] 9. UNKNOWN

D.
- [ ] 1. PROPER POSITION
- [ ] 2. KNEES LOCKED
- [ ] 3. ARMS IN POOR POSITION
- [ ] 8. OTHER
- [X] 9. UNKNOWN

22. DEPLOYED BEFORE LANDING

	1 - YES	0 - NO	9 - UNKNOWN
A. SURVIVAL KIT			
B. LIFE RAFT			
C. LIFE VEST			

23. CANOPY DEFLATION POCKETS

- [ ] 0. NOT EFFECTIVE IN COLLAPSING CHUTE
- [ ] 1. AIDED IN COLLAPSING CHUTE
- [ ] 7. NOT INSTALLED
- [ ] 8. UNKNOWN IF INSTALLED
- [X] 9. UNKNOWN IF EFFECTIVE

REMARKS As far as can be learned parachute did not deploy due to nearly immediate impact with ground after ejection.

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A C[illegible]DENT, INCIDENT OR GROUND ACCIDENT EJECTION OR BAILOUT

OPNAV FORM 3750/8G (REV. 4-68) S/N 0107-[illegible]

REPORT SYMBOL 3750-7

See Section II of OPNAVINST 3750.6

(Complete for all inflight escapes and ejections)

1. TIME FROM EMERGENCY UNTIL ESCAPE ATTEMPT WAS INITIATED

HOURS ____ MINUTES ____ SECONDS 5

2. DELAY IN INITIATING ESCAPE DUE TO:

- [ ] 1. ATTEMPTING TO OVERCOME PROBLEM
- [ ] 2. AVOIDING POPULATED AREA
- [ ] 3. AVOIDING UNSUITABLE TERRAIN
- [ ] 4. GAINING ALTITUDE
- [ ] 5. LOSING ALTITUDE
- [ ] 6. LOSING AIRSPEED
- [X] 8. OTHER
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

3. TERRAIN CLEARANCE AT TIME OF:

A. 1. ESCAPE (FEET) ____ 2. PARACHUTE OPENING (FEET) ____

B. 1. AIRSPEED AT TIME OF ESCAPE ____ KIAS

2. GROUND FORWARD SPEED (IF NOT AIRBORNE) ____ K

C. [ ] 1. PARACHUTE DID NOT OPEN [ ] 2. PARACHUTE STREAMED

4. PROTECTIVE HELMET:

	CHIN STRAP FASTENED			HELMET VISOR LOWERED		
	YES	NO	UNK	YES	NO	UNK
1. BEFORE EMERGENCY	X			X		
2. DURING EGRESS	X			X		
3. DURING CHUTE LANDING	X			X		
4. CHIN STRAP FASTENED SNUGLY				X		
5. NAPE STRAP FASTENED SNUGLY				X		

5. ZERO LANYARD:

A. WHEN CONNECTED
- [ ] 0. AVAILABLE, NOT CONNECTED
- [ ] 1. PRIOR TO EMERGENCY
- [ ] 2. DURING EMERGENCY
- [ ] 3. TIME UNKNOWN
- [ ] 8. NA/NOT AVAILABLE
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

B. SURVIVAL FACTOR
- [ ] 0. NOT A FACTOR IN SURVIVAL
- [ ] 1. FACTOR IN SURVIVAL
- [ ] 2. NOT A FACTOR IN NON-SURVIVAL
- [ ] 3. FACTOR IN NON-SURVIVAL
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN IF FACTOR

6. AUTOMATIC LAP BELT RELEASE

- [ ] 0. DID NOT OPEN OR RELEASE
- [ ] 1. RELEASED AUTOMATICALLY AS DESIGNED
- [ ] 2. OPENED MANUALLY
- [ ] 3. OPENED INADVERTENTLY
- [ ] 8. UNKNOWN HOW RELEASED
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN IF RELEASED

7. REMOVAL OF AIRCRAFT CANOPY NA

A. INTENT
- [ ] 1. INTENTIONAL
- [ ] 2. UNINTENTIONAL, SELF-INDUCED
- [ ] 3. UNINTENTIONAL, MECHANICAL
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

B. INITIATED BY
- [ ] 1. THIS INDIVIDUAL
- [ ] 2. ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

7. REMOVAL OF AIRCRAFT CANOPY *(Continued)*

C. REMOVAL
- [X] 0. DEFINITELY NOT ATTEMPTED
- [ ] 1. ACCOMPLISHED
- [ ] 2. ATTEMPTED (UNSUCCESSFUL)
- [ ] 3. UNKNOWN IF ATTEMPTED

D. METHOD
- [ ] 1. ARM REST/LEG BRACE
- [ ] 2. FACE CURTAIN
- [ ] 3. SEAT PAN HANDLE
- [ ] 4. MANUALLY UNLOCKED
- [ ] 5. EXTERNAL FORCE
- [ ] 6. CANOPY JETTISON HANDLE
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN
- [ ] 8. OTHER (DESCRIBE)

8. EJECTION

A. INTENT
- [X] 1. INTENTIONAL
- [ ] 2. UNINTENTIONAL
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

B. INITIATED BY
- [X] 1. THIS PERSON
- [ ] 2. ANOTHER PERSON
- [ ] 3. EXTERNAL FORCE
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

C. METHOD
- [ ] 1. ARM REST/LEG BRACE
- [X] 2. FACE CURTAIN
- [ ] 3. SEAT PAN HANDLE
- [ ] 4. SEAT SEQUENCER
- [ ] 5. IMPACT
- [ ] 6. FIRE
- [ ] 7. MECHANICAL FAILURE
- [ ] 8. OTHER EXTERNAL FORCE
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

9. BODY POSITION AT EJECTION *(As compared to optimal)*

		A. HEAD	B. HIPS	C. FEET	D. ELBOWS
OPTIMAL	1	X	X	X	X
FORWARD	2				
UPWARD	3				
LATERAL	4				
UNKNOWN	9				

10. POSITION OF EJECTION SEAT

- [ ] 1. FULL UP
- [ ] 2. FULL DOWN
- [X] 3. INTERMEDIATE POSITION
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

11. METHOD OF SEPARATING MAN FROM SEAT

- [ ] 0. DID NOT SEPARATE
- [X] 1. SEAT SEPARATOR
- [ ] 2. SPONTANEOUS TUMBLING
- [ ] 3. PUSHED SELF AWAY
- [ ] 4. PERSONNEL PARACHUTE
- [ ] 8. OTHER
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

NAME	SERIAL NO.	A/C	BUNO
(b) (6)	(b) (6)	A6A	151574

12. TYPE OF SEAT SEPARATION

- [ ] 0. NONE
- [ ] 1. ROTARY
- [X] 2. BLADDER
- [ ] 3. PARACHUTE
- [ ] 4. SNUBBING LANYARD

13. METHODS OF DEPLOYING PARACHUTE

- [ ] 0. NOT DEPLOYED
- [X] 1. AUTOMATIC TIMER
- [ ] 2. ANEROID
- [ ] 3. BALLISTIC DEVICE
- [ ] 4. ZERO LANYARD
- [ ] 5. STATIC LINE
- [ ] 6. MANUAL
- [ ] 8. OTHER
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

14. PARACHUTE OPENING SHOCK

- [ ] 0. NEGLIGIBLE
- [ ] 1. MODERATE
- [X] 2. SEVERE
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

15. OSCILLATIONS

	0-NEGLIGIBLE	1-MODERATE	2-SEVERE	9-UNKNOWN
A. DURING DESCENT	X			
B. DURING LANDING	X			

16. PARACHUTE DAMAGE *(Enter number of)* NA

1. SEVERED SHROUD LINES _____ 3. TORN PANELS-MAJOR _____
2. MISSING PANELS _____ 4. TORN PANELS-MINOR _____

17. CAUSE OF PARACHUTE DAMAGE NA

- [ ] 1. OPENING SHOCK
- [ ] 2. FOULED ON EJECTION SEAT
- [ ] 3. FOULED ON A/C
- [ ] 4. FIRE
- [ ] 5. ON LANDING
- [ ] 6. IN TREES
- [ ] 7. DRAGGING
- [ ] 8. OTHER (DESCRIBE)
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

18. POWERLINE CUT DISREGARD. *(Air Force Use only)*

19. DIRECTION FACED AT CHUTE LANDING

- [X] 1. DIRECTLY FACING
- [ ] 2. FACING AWAY
- [ ] 3. QUARTERING, FACING
- [ ] 4. QUARTERING, BACK
- [ ] 5. DIRECTLY SIDEWAYS
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

20. LANDING CONDITIONS

A. TOTAL WEIGHT UNDER PARACHUTE: _____ LBS
B. SURFACE WINDS _____ KNOTS
C. DRAGGED BY CHUTE [ ] 1. YES [X] 0. NO
D. DISTANCE DRAGGED _____ YARDS

21. PARACHUTE LANDING POSITION TECHNIQUES

A
- [ ] 0. COULD NOT SEE
- [X] 1. LOOKING AHEAD
- [ ] 2. LOOKING DOWN
- [ ] 8. OTHER
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

B
- [ ] 1. FELL OBLIQUELY
- [ ] 2. FELL BACKWARD
- [X] 3. FELL FORWARD
- [ ] 8. OTHER
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

C
- [X] 1. MUSCLES TENSED
- [ ] 2. MUSCLES TOO TENSE
- [ ] 3. TOO RELAXED
- [ ] 8. OTHER
- [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

D
- [ ] 1. PROPER POSITION
- [ ] 2. KNEES LOCKED
- [ ] 3. ARMS IN POOR POSITION
- [ ] 8. OTHER
- [X] 9. UNKNOWN

22. DEPLOYED BEFORE LANDING

	1 - YES	0 - NO	9 - UNKNOWN
A. SURVIVAL KIT	X		
B. LIFE RAFT	X		
C. LIFE VEST	X		

23. CANOPY DEFLATION POCKETS

- [ ] 0. NOT EFFECTIVE IN COLLAPSING CHUTE
- [ ] 1. AIDED IN COLLAPSING CHUTE
- [ ] 7. NOT INSTALLED
- [ ] 8. UNKNOWN IF INSTALLED
- [X] 9. UNKNOWN IF EFFECTIVE

REMARKS

(b) (6) [redacted]

(b) (6) [redacted]

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A C[illegible]DENT, INCIDENT OR GROUND ACCIDENT SURVIVAL AND RESCUE
OPNAV FORM 3750-1/1 (REV. 4-68) S/N 0107-721-8600

REPORT SYMBOL 3750-7
See Section H of OPNAVINST 3750.6

1. SURVIVAL TRAINING
**Use Code at right to indicate the role this person's training played in survival.*

0 - NOT A FACTOR
1 - DEFINITELY HELPED
2 - POSSIBLY HELPED
3 - LACK OF TRAINING DEFINITE FACTOR
4 - LACK OF TRAINING POSSIBLE FACTOR
9 - ROLE UNKNOWN

	TYPE TRAINING	COURSE AND SPONSOR	PLACE ACCOMPLISHED	COMPLETED Month	COMPLETED Year	*ROLE
A.	WATER SURVIVAL:					
	1. MAINTENANCE SWIM	1-5 36 hour water survival	Cherry Point, N.C.	JULY	69	0
	2. DILBERT DUNKER	course				
	3. PARACHUTE DRAG					
	4. IMMERSED COCKPIT					
	5. IMMERSED SEAT					
B.	JUNGLE SURVIVAL					
C.	ARCTIC SURVIVAL					
D.	DESERT SURVIVAL					
E.	MOUNTAIN SURVIVAL					
F.	SURVIVAL (GENERAL)					

2. CONDITIONS PREVAILING AT SURVIVAL/RESCUE SITE *(If widely variable, give range)*

A. WATER TEMPERATURE NA °F
B. AIR TEMPERATURE ____ °F
C. SURFACE WINDS ____ KNOTS
D. WAVE HEIGHT NA FEET
E. WAVE FREQUENCY NA PER MIN.

F. TERRAIN
[X] 1. OPEN GROUND
[ ] 2. WOODS/JUNGLE
[ ] 3. MOUNTAINS
[ ] 4. DESERT
[ ] 5. WATER
[ ] 6. ICE/SNOW
[ ] 7. SWAMP
[ ] 8. OTHER
[ ] 9. UNKNOWN

G. WEATHER
[X] 1. CLEAR
[ ] 2. OVERCAST
[ ] 3. FOG
[ ] 4. RAIN
[ ] 5. SNOW
[ ] 6. SLEET
[ ] 7. HAIL
[ ] 8. OTHER
[ ] 9. UNKNOWN

3. TIME LAPSE SEQUENCE FOR RESCUE EVENTS *(Give time lapse in hours and minutes from time of mishap)* NA Pronounced dead at 1145

For actual rescue vehicle and personnel and others who took an active part in the rescue sequence but did not actually recover this individual. See instructions for details.

	ACTUAL	OTHER ASSIST	OTHER ASSIST	LIGHT CONDITIONS Day	Night	Dawn	Dusk
A. RESCUE PERSONNEL NOTIFIED THAT MISHAP HAD OCCURRED							
B. RESCUE VEHICLE DEPARTED							
C. THIS INDIVIDUAL LOCATED BY RESCUE PERSONNEL							
D. THIS INDIVIDUAL PHYSICALLY REACHED BY RESCUE VEHICLE PERSONNEL							
E. THIS INDIVIDUAL ACTUALLY ABOARD RESCUE VEHICLE OR RESCUE ATTEMPT ABANDONED							
F. RESCUE COMPLETED (PERSON RETURNED TO STATION, HOSPITAL, ETC.)							

4. A. TIME THIS INDIVIDUAL SPENT IN WATER NA HRS. ____ MIN. B. TIME THIS INDIVIDUAL SPENT IN LIFE RAFT NA HRS. ____ MIN.

5. AT TIME OF RESCUE ALERT, DISTANCE IN MILES FROM MISHAP SITE TO:
A. ACTUAL RESCUE VEHICLE ____ B. NEAREST ASSIST RESCUE VEHICLE 6 miles

6. PERSONNEL/VEHICLES PARTICIPATING IN RESCUE

A. VEHICLE PERFORMING ACTUAL PICKUP OF THIS PERSON
1. TYPE/MODEL: H46 A/C 2. LOCATION WHEN ALERTED Cherry Point, N.C. 3. BY WHEN ALERTED SAR

B. DID RESCUE PERSONNEL LEAVE VEHICLE TO ASSIST IN RESCUE? [ ] 1. YES [ ] 2. NO [ ] 9. UNKNOWN
IF SO, HOW?
[ ] A. PARACHUTED [ ] C. DESCENDED LINE/LADDER/NET [X] E. NORMAL GROUND/WATER
[ ] B. JUMPED WITHOUT PARACHUTE [ ] D. LOWERED BY HOIST [ ] Y. OTHER

C. LIST OTHER VEHICLES PARTICIPATING IN RESCUE EFFORT: (OTHER ASSISTS IN ITEM 5) Cadillac 1954 Ambulance Civ. fun. hom
OTHERS WHO STOOD BY READY TO RENDER ASSISTANCE IF REQUIRED: Semour Johnson Crash rescue team

D. NUMBER SEARCH AND RESCUE HOURS 1 hour

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

NAME	SERIAL NO.	A/C	BUNO
CASEY, Robert B.	(b) (6)	A6A	151574

7. RESCUE EQUIPMENT USED *(Use numbers to show sequence)* NA

- [ ] A - SLING
- [ ] B - SEAT
- [ ] C - CARGO NET
- [ ] D - ROPE
- [ ] E - LIFE RING
- [ ] F - BASKET
- [ ] G - BOOM NET
- [ ] H - DAVIT
- [ ] J - RAFT
- [ ] K - WEBBING CUTTERS
- [ ] L - CHICAGO GRIP
- [ ] M - GRAPNEL
- [ ] N - BOARDING LADDER
- [ ] P - KNIFE/AXE/SAW
- [ ] Q - MAKESHIFT CARRIER/SUPPORT
- [ ] R - FIRST AID EQUIPMENT
- [ ] S - TREE PENETRATOR SEAT
- [ ] T - HELICOPTER PLATFORM
- [ ] U - STRETCHER
- [ ] V - CABLE CUTTERS
- [ ] W - HELICOPTER RESCUE BOOM
- [ ] X - BILLY PUGH NET
- [ ] Y - OTHER (DESCRIBE)

8. RESCUE ALERTING MEANS *(Use numbers to show sequence)*

- [1] A - WITNESSED
- [ ] B - RADAR SURVEILLANCE
- [ ] C - OVERDUE REPORT TO SAR
- [ ] D - AIRBORNE RAPID RELAY
- [ ] E - CRASH PHONE
- [2] F - OTHER TELEPHONE
- [ ] G - RADIO MAY DAY CALL
- [ ] H - RADIO SURVIVAL TYPE
- [ ] J - OTHER RADIO REPORT
- [ ] K - VISUAL SIGNALLING EQUIPMENT
- [ ] L - AUDIO SIGNALLING EQUIPMENT
- [ ] M - SURVIVOR REPORT
- [ ] N - LOSS OF RADIO CONTACT
- [ ] P - SMOKE/FIRE-CRASH SCENE
- [ ] Y - OTHER (DESCRIBE)

9. ALERTING/COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEMS NA

- [ ] A - POOR RADIO RECEPTION
- [ ] B - TELEPHONE LINE BUSY
- [ ] C - POOR RADIO DISCIPLINE
- [ ] D - AIRCRAFT RADIO/IFF EQUIPMENT INOPERATIVE
- [ ] E - POOR RADIO PROCEDURES
- [ ] Y - OTHER

10. DELAYS IN DEPARTURE OF RESCUE VEHICLES

- [ ] A - VEHICLE OPERATOR NOT AVAILABLE
- [ ] B - VEHICLE NOT READY
- [ ] C - VEHICLE CREW NOT AVAILABLE
- [ ] D - COMMUNICATIONS BREAKDOWN
- [ ] E - COMPLETING PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED DUTIES
- [ ] F - LACK OF INFORMATION ON CRASH SITE
- [ ] G - NATURE OF TERRAIN
- [ ] H - WEATHER
- [X] Y - OTHER Transportation difficulties and assembling of AAR board

11. RESCUE VEHICLE PROBLEMS ENROUTE NONE

- [ ] A - HEADWIND
- [ ] B - POOR VISIBILITY
- [ ] C - HIGH SEA STATE
- [ ] D - MECHANICAL PROBLEMS
- [ ] E - NATURE OF TERRAIN
- [ ] F - OTHER OBSTRUCTIONS (FENCES, ETC.)
- [ ] G - RESCUERS LOST
- [ ] H - WEATHER
- [ ] Y - OTHER

12. PROBLEMS IN LOCATING INDIVIDUAL (OR KEEPING IN SIGHT) NONE

- [ ] A - HEAVY SEAS
- [ ] B - TREES
- [ ] C - FOG/CLOUDS
- [ ] D - PRECIPITATION
- [ ] E - DARKNESS
- [ ] F - RADIO INTERFERENCE
- [ ] G - CONFUSION DUE TO OTHER LIGHTS
- [ ] H - MALFUNCTION OF DIRECTIONAL EQUIPMENT
- [ ] J - LACK OF CORRECT INFORMATION ON LOCATION OF SURVIVOR
- [ ] K - INABILITY TO VISUALLY DISTINGUISH SURVIVOR FROM TERRAIN
- [ ] L - LOSS OF RADIO/RADAR CONTACT
- [ ] M - SURVIVOR'S FAILURE TO USE SIGNALLING EQUIPMENT
- [ ] Y - OTHER

13. LOCATOR MEANS

Consult Instructions for listing of specific locator means and enter under appropriate categories. Use numbers to indicate sequence of observance.

GENERAL	PYROTECHNICS	ELECTRONIC SIGNAL DEVICES	BALLISTICS	AUDITORY	VISUAL
01-A					

CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

OPNAV FORM 3750/5H (REV. 4-68) (Continu...

14. SURVIVAL PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED BY THIS PERSON NA

- ☐ 01 - INADEQUATE FLOTATION GEAR
- ☐ 02 - INADEQUATE COLD WEATHER GEAR
- ☐ 03 - LACK OF SIGNALLING EQUIPMENT
- ☐ 04 - LACK OF OTHER EQUIPMENT
- ☐ 05 - ENTANGLEMENT (PARACHUTE)
- ☐ 06 - DRAGGING (PARACHUTE)
- ☐ 07 - PARACHUTE HARDWARE PROBLEM
- ☐ 08 - ENTRAPMENT IN AIRCRAFT
- ☐ 09 - PULLED DOWN BY SINKING PARACHUTE
- ☐ 10 - ENTANGLEMENT (OTHER THAN PARACHUTE)
- ☐ 11 - UNFAMILIAR WITH PROCEDURES/EQUIPMENT
- ☐ 12 - CONFUSED, DAZED, DISORIENTED
- ☐ 13 - INCAPACITATED BY INJURY
- ☐ 14 - POOR PHYSICAL CONDITION
- ☐ 15 - EXPOSURE (HEAT, COLD, SUNBURN, ETC.)
- ☐ 16 - FATIGUE
- ☐ 17 - WEATHER
- ☐ 18 - TOPOGRAPHY (SWAMPS, MOUNTAINS, DESERTS, ETC.)
- ☐ 19 - DARKNESS
- ☐ 20 - THROWN OUT OF RAFT
- ☐ 21 - HAMPERED BY HELO DOWNWASH
- ☐ 22 - PROBLEM BOARDING RESCUE VEHICLE
- ☐ 23 - THIRST
- ☐ 24 - HUNGER
- ☐ 25 - INSECTS, SNAKES, ANIMALS, ETC.
- ☐ 26 - SHARKS
- ☐ 98 - OTHER _____

15. PROBLEMS THAT COMPLICATED RESCUE OPERATIONS NA

- ☐ 01 - FAILURE OF RESCUE VEHICLE (MECHANICAL PROBLEMS)
- ☐ 02 - INADEQUACY/LACK OF RESCUE VEHICLE
- ☐ 03 - FAILURE OF RESCUE EQUIPMENT (HOIST, ETC.)
- ☐ 04 - INADEQUACY/LACK OF RESCUE EQUIPMENT
- ☐ 05 - INADEQUACY OF RESCUE PERSONNEL KNOWLEDGE/TRAINING
- ☐ 06 - INADEQUATE MEDICAL EQUIPMENT
- ☐ 07 - INADEQUATE MEDICAL FACILITIES
- ☐ 08 - VEHICLE OPERATOR FACTOR (POOR PROCEDURE)
- ☐ 09 - RESCUE CREWMAN ASSIST HESITANCY
- ☐ 10 - FIRE/EXPLOSION
- ☐ 11 - ENTRAPMENT IN AIRCRAFT
- ☐ 12 - PHYSICAL LIMITATIONS OF RESCUE PERSONNEL
- ☐ 13 - PHYSICAL LIMITATIONS OF PERSON BEING RESCUED
- ☐ 14 - CARELESSNESS OF RESCUE PERSONNEL
- ☐ 15 - PANIC/INAPPROPRIATE ACTIONS OF PERSON BEING RESCUED
- ☐ 16 - RESCUE VEHICLE ACCIDENT
- ☐ 17 - COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEMS
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- ☐ 19 - TOPOGRAPHY (ROUGH SEAS, MOUNTAINS, ETC.)
- ☐ 20 - INTERFERENCE FROM OTHER VEHICLES
- ☐ 21 - VICTIM PULLED AWAY BY EXTERNAL FORCES
- ☐ 22 - WEATHER
- ☐ 23 - DARKNESS
- ☐ 24 - WEIGHT/DRAG PROBLEM NOT DUE TO PARACHUTE
- ☐ 25 - HAMPERED BY PERSONNEL/SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT OF PERSON BEING RESCUED
- ☐ 26 - FLOATING DEBRIS
- ☐ 27 - PRIMARY RESCUER DELAYED AWAITING FUTILE ATTEMPTS BY OTHER RESCUERS
- ☐ 28 - HAMPERED BY HELICOPTER DOWNWASH
- ☐ 98 - OTHER _____

16. INDIVIDUAL'S PHYSICAL CONDITION

	DURING RESCUE	AFTER RESCUE
1. FULLY ABLE TO ASSIST	1 -	A -
2. PARTIALLY ABLE TO ASSIST	2 -	B -
3. IMMOBILE OR UNCONSCIOUS	3 -	C -
4. FATAL ON RECOVERY-DUE TO INJURIES	X	D -
5. FATAL ON RECOVERY-DROWNED		E -
6. RECOVERED ALIVE-DIED FROM INJURIES		F -
7. LOST DURING RESCUE ATTEMPT-PRESUMED DROWNED		G -
8. LOST DURING RESCUE ATTEMPT-APPARENTLY INJURED OR DROWNED		H -

17. CHECK CATEGORY OF FACTORS THAT HELPED RESCUE/RECOVERY (FROM RESCUER POINT OF VIEW)

- ☐ 1 - RESCUE PERSONNEL TRAINING
- ☐ 2 - TRAINING OF PERSON TO BE RESCUED
- ☐ 3 - KNOWLEDGE OF AIRCRAFT EMERGENCY ESCAPE MEANS
- ☐ 4 - KNOWLEDGE OF PERSONNEL EQUIPMENT RELEASES/ACTUATORS
- ☐ 5 - RESCUE PROCEDURES/PRE-ACCIDENT PLANS
- ☐ 6 - AVAILABILITY OF RESCUE EQUIPMENT
- ☐ 7 - SUITABILITY OF RESCUE EQUIPMENT
- ☐ 8 - SURVIVOR'S TECHNIQUES
- ☒ 9 - COORDINATION OF RESCUE EFFORTS

NAME	SERIAL NO.	A/C	BUNO
CASEY, Robert B.	(b) (6)	A6A	151574

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C [illegible]DENT, INCIDENT OR GROUND ACCIDENT SURVIVAL AND RESCUE

OPNAV FORM 3750/5H (REV. 6-68) S/N 0107-751-6800

REPORT SYMBOL 3750-7

See Section H of OPNAVINST 3750.6

1. SURVIVAL TRAINING

"Use Code at right to indicate the role this person's training played in survival.

0 - NOT A FACTOR
1 - DEFINITELY HELPED
2 - POSSIBLY HELPED
3 - LACK OF TRAINING DEFINITE FACTOR
4 - LACK OF TRAINING POSSIBLE FACTOR
9 - ROLE UNKNOWN

	TYPE TRAINING	COURSE AND SPONSOR	PLACE ACCOMPLISHED	COMPLETED Month	COMPLETED Year	*ROLE
A.	WATER SURVIVAL:					
	1. MAINTENANCE SWIM	1-5 Water survival	Pensacola, Fla	MAR.	66	1
	2. DILBERT DUNKER	Pensacola, Fla.				
	3. PARACHUTE DRAG					
	4. IMMERSED COCKPIT					
	5. IMMERSED SEAT					
B.	JUNGLE SURVIVAL					
C.	ARCTIC SURVIVAL					
D.	DESERT SURVIVAL					
E.	MOUNTAIN SURVIVAL					
F.	SURVIVAL (GENERAL)					

2. CONDITIONS PREVAILING AT SURVIVAL/RESCUE SITE *(If widely variable, give range)*

A. WATER TEMPERATURE NA °F
B. AIR TEMPERATURE 69 °F
C. SURFACE WINDS Calm KNOTS
D. WAVE HEIGHT NA FEET
E. WAVE FREQUENCY NA PER MIN.

F. TERRAIN
[X] 1. OPEN GROUND
[ ] 2. WOODS/JUNGLE
[ ] 3. MOUNTAINS
[ ] 4. DESERT
[ ] 5. WATER
[ ] 6. ICE/SNOW
[ ] 7. SWAMP
[ ] 8. OTHER
[ ] 9. UNKNOWN

G. WEATHER
[X] 1. CLEAR
[ ] 2. OVERCAST
[ ] 3. FOG
[ ] 4. RAIN
[ ] 5. SNOW
[ ] 6. SLEET
[ ] 7. HAIL
[ ] 8. OTHER
[ ] 9. UNKNOWN

3. TIME LAPSE SEQUENCE FOR RESCUE EVENTS *(Give time lapse in hours and minutes from time of mishap)*

For actual rescue vehicle and personnel and others who took an active part in the rescue sequence but did not actually recover this individual. See Instructions for details.

	ACTUAL	OTHER ASSIST	OTHER ASSIST	LIGHT CONDITIONS Day	Night	Dawn	Dusk
A. RESCUE PERSONNEL NOTIFIED THAT MISHAP HAD OCCURRED	0840			X			
B. RESCUE VEHICLE DEPARTED	0840			X			
C. THIS INDIVIDUAL LOCATED BY RESCUE PERSONNEL	0850			X			
D. THIS INDIVIDUAL PHYSICALLY REACHED BY RESCUE VEHICLE PERSONNEL	0850			X			
E. THIS INDIVIDUAL ACTUALLY ABOARD RESCUE VEHICLE OR RESCUE ATTEMPT ABANDONED	0900			X			
F. RESCUE COMPLETED (PERSON RETURNED TO STATION, HOSPITAL, ETC.)	0915			X			

4. A. TIME THIS INDIVIDUAL SPENT IN WATER NA HRS. NA MIN. B. TIME THIS INDIVIDUAL SPENT IN LIFE RAFT NA HRS. NA MIN.

5. AT TIME OF RESCUE ALERT, DISTANCE IN MILES FROM MISHAP SITE TO:

A. ACTUAL RESCUE VEHICLE 1964 Cadilac B. NEAREST ASSIST RESCUE VEHICLE

6. PERSONNEL/VEHICLES PARTICIPATING IN RESCUE

A. VEHICLE PERFORMING ACTUAL PICKUP OF THIS PERSON

1. TYPE/MODEL 1964/Cadilac 2. LOCATION WHEN ALERTED Edwards Funeral 3. DUTY WHEN ALERTED Home On duty driver

B. DID RESCUE PERSONNEL LEAVE VEHICLE TO ASSIST IN RESCUE? [X] 1. YES [ ] 2. NO [ ] 9. UNKNOWN

IF SO, HOW?

[ ] A. PARACHUTED [ ] C. DESCENDED LINE/LADDER/NET [ ] E. NORMAL GROUND/WATER
[ ] B. JUMPED WITHOUT PARACHUTE [ ] D. LOWERED BY HOIST [X] Y. OTHER Out of auto

A-10

C. LIST OTHER VEHICLES PARTICIPATING IN RESCUE EFFORT: (OTHER ASSISTS IN ITEM 3)

OTHERS WHO STOOD BY READY TO RENDER ASSISTANCE IF REQUIRED: Semour Johnson Crash Team

D. NUMBER SEARCH AND RESCUE HOURS Total 1

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

NAME	SERIAL NO.	A/C	BUNO
(b) (6)	(b) (6)	A6A	151574

7. RESCUE EQUIPMENT USED *(Use numbers to show sequence)*

- [ ] A - SLING
- [ ] B - SEAT
- [ ] C - CARGO NET
- [ ] D - ROPE
- [ ] E - LIFE RING
- [ ] F - BASKET
- [ ] G - BOOM NET
- [ ] H - DAVIT
- [ ] J - RAFT
- [ ] K - WEBBING CUTTERS
- [ ] L - CHICAGO GRIP
- [ ] M - GRAPNEL
- [ ] N - BOARDING LADDER
- [ ] P - KNIFE/AXE/SAW
- [ ] Q - MAKESHIFT CARRIER/SUPPORT
- [ ] R - FIRST AID EQUIPMENT
- [ ] S - TREE PENETRATOR SEAT
- [ ] T - HELICOPTER PLATFORM
- [ ] U - STRETCHER
- [ ] V - CABLE CUTTERS
- [ ] W - HELICOPTER RESCUE BOOM
- [ ] X - BILLY PUGH NET
- [X] Y - OTHER (DESCRIBE) litter

8. RESCUE ALERTING MEANS *(Use numbers to show sequence)*

- [X] A - WITNESSED
- [ ] B - RADAR SURVEILLANCE
- [ ] C - OVERDUE REPORT TO SAR
- [ ] D - AIRBORNE RAPID RELAY
- [ ] E - CRASH PHONE
- [X] F - OTHER TELEPHONE
- [ ] G - RADIO MAY-DAY CALL
- [ ] H - RADIO SURVIVAL TYPE
- [ ] J - OTHER RADIO REPORT
- [ ] K - VISUAL SIGNALLING EQUIPMENT
- [ ] L - AUDIO SIGNALLING EQUIPMENT
- [ ] M - SURVIVOR REPORT
- [ ] N - LOSS OF RADIO CONTACT
- [ ] P - SMOKE/FIRE-CRASH SCENE
- [ ] Y - OTHER (DESCRIBE)

9. ALERTING/COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEMS NONE

- [ ] A - POOR RADIO RECEPTION
- [ ] B - TELEPHONE LINE BUSY
- [ ] C - POOR RADIO DISCIPLINE
- [ ] D - AIRCRAFT RADIO/IFF EQUIPMENT INOPERATIVE
- [ ] E - POOR RADIO PROCEDURES
- [ ] Y - OTHER

10. DELAYS IN DEPARTURE OF RESCUE VEHICLES NONE

- [ ] A - VEHICLE OPERATOR NOT AVAILABLE
- [ ] B - VEHICLE NOT READY
- [ ] C - VEHICLE CREW NOT AVAILABLE
- [ ] D - COMMUNICATIONS BREAKDOWN
- [ ] E - COMPLETING PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED DUTIES
- [ ] F - LACK OF INFORMATION ON CRASH SITE
- [ ] G - NATURE OF TERRAIN
- [ ] H - WEATHER
- [ ] Y - OTHER

11. RESCUE VEHICLE PROBLEMS ENROUTE NONE

- [ ] A - HEADWIND
- [ ] B - POOR VISIBILITY
- [ ] C - HIGH SEA STATE
- [ ] D - MECHANICAL PROBLEMS
- [ ] E - NATURE OF TERRAIN
- [ ] F - OTHER OBSTRUCTIONS (FENCES, ETC.)
- [ ] G - RESCUERS LOST
- [ ] H - WEATHER
- [ ] Y - OTHER

12. PROBLEMS IN LOCATING INDIVIDUAL (OR KEEPING IN SIGHT) NONE

- [ ] A - HEAVY SEAS
- [ ] B - TREES
- [ ] C - FOG/CLOUDS
- [ ] D - PRECIPITATION
- [ ] E - DARKNESS
- [ ] F - RADIO INTERFERENCE
- [ ] G - CONFUSION DUE TO OTHER LIGHTS
- [ ] H - MALFUNCTION OF DIRECTIONAL EQUIPMENT
- [ ] J - LACK OF CORRECT INFORMATION ON LOCATION OF SURVIVOR
- [ ] K - INABILITY TO VISUALLY DISTINGUISH SURVIVOR FROM TERRAIN
- [ ] L - LOSS OF RADIO/RADAR CONTACT
- [ ] M - SURVIVOR'S FAILURE TO USE SIGNALLING EQUIPMENT
- [ ] Y - OTHER

13. LOCATOR MEANS

Consult instructions for listing of specific locator means and enter under appropriate categories. Use numbers to indicate sequence of observance.

GENERAL	PYROTECHNICS	ELECTRONIC SIGNAL DEVICES	BALLISTICS	AUDITORY	VISUAL
01-A					

CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

(b) (6) (b) (6)

14. SURVIVAL PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED BY THIS PERSON NA

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16. INDIVIDUAL'S PHYSICAL CONDITION

	DURING RESCUE	AFTER RESCUE
1. FULLY ABLE TO ASSIST	1 -	A -
2. PARTIALLY ABLE TO ASSIST	2 - X	B - X
3. IMMOBILE OR UNCONSCIOUS	3 -	C -
4. FATAL ON RECOVERY-DUE TO INJURIES		D -
5. FATAL ON RECOVERY-DROWNED		E -
6. RECOVERED ALIVE-DIED FROM INJURIES		F -
7. LOST DURING RESCUE ATTEMPT-PRESUMED DROWNED		G -
8. LOST DURING RESCUE ATTEMPT-APPARENTLY INJURED OR DROWNED		H -

17. CHECK CATEGORY OF FACTORS THAT HELPED RESCUE/RECOVERY (FROM RESCUER POINT OF VIEW)

- ☐ 1 - RESCUE PERSONNEL TRAINING
- ☐ 2 - TRAINING OF PERSON TO BE RESCUED
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- ☐ 7 - SUITABILITY OF RESCUE EQUIPMENT
- ☐ 8 - SURVIVOR'S TECHNIQUES
- ☒ 9 - COORDINATION OF RESCUE EFFORTS

NAME	SERIAL NO.	A/C	BUNO
(b) (6)	(b) (6)	A6A	151574

The primary cause of the accident is unknown. All that can be done is to speculate. Upon consulting with Lt. Casey's flight instructor the following came out. Lt. Casey got only average marks in flying. He was decribed as friendly and personable. Futhermore his instructor stated he was very aggressive in the air. He seemed to have no fear in the plane. Perhaps this attitude contributed to Lt. Casey's getting into the situation leading to this accident. Another possibility is that the following sequence occ@red. Lt. Casey began to hypervenilate as he entered the last manuver and lost consciousness regaining it only in time to attempt ejection. Regrettably we got no worthwhile result on tissue analysis since the specemens spoiled before analysis. All ejection gear worked well. Lt. Casey did possibly receive some injuries upon ejection due to loss of his helmet since it was not securely fastened. Finally ther is ample evidence that Lt. Casey seemed "odd" prior to and during the flight.

Reccmendation

1. Since the A6A is used as a pilot training aircraft it should have a set of controls for the Instructor Pilot to use. This must be considered the actual cause of the crash, Lt. (b) (6) injuries and Lt. Casey's death!

2. Again all I/P should be cautioned not to fly with trainees they beleive are not in complete control of themselves'.

3. In view of the fact that Lt. (b) (6) boot was lacerated to the steel cap and (b) (6) some thought should be given to design of the right side of the cockpit to obleviate this problem.

Finally the investigation was hampered due to the loss of tissue specimens since they were sent from Lejeune by the pathologist via ordinary mail. E.G. Left Lejuene Thursday August 28 on afternoon mail run to commercial airport, then to Washington post office, then to AFIP. Breakdown occured with tissue remaining in transit until Tuesday September 2. This should have been prevented by some type of direct airlift to AFIP or registered mail special delivery.

FLIGHT SURGEON PARTICIPATED FULLY IN INVESTIGATION	NO. OF HOURS SPENT	DATE OF REPORT
[X] YES [ ] NO	50	9/7/69
FLIGHT SURGEON PARTICIPATED FULLY IN BOARD PROCEEDINGS	NO. OF HOURS SPENT	NO. REPORTS PREPARED
[X] YES [ ] NO	20	1
FLIGHT SURGEON'S NAME AND GRADE	DUTY STATION	SIGNATURE
(b) (6) LCDR MC USN	VMAT(AW) 202 CPNC	(b) (6)

Standard Form 503
Revised August 1954
Bureau of the Budget
Circular A-32 (Rev.)

CLINICAL RECORD	AUTOPSY PROTOCOL				
DATE AND HOUR DIED A.M. P.M. 0900 hours 26 AUG 1969	DATE AND HOUR AUTOPSY PERFORMED A.M. P.M. 0900 hours 27 AUG 1969	CHECK ONE			
		FULL AUTOPSY	HEAD ONLY	TRUNK ONLY	
[redacted], LCDR MC USN	ASSISTANT	X			

CLINICAL DIAGNOSES (Including operations)

PATHOLOGICAL DIAGNOSES

FINAL PATHOLOGICAL DIAGNOSES:

CAUSE OF DEATH: MULTIPLE EXTREME DECELERATIVE INJURIES SECONDARY TO AIRCRAFT-GROUND IMPACT

RESPIRATORY SYSTEM: [redacted]

CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEM:

SPLEEN:

LIVER AND BILIARY TRACT:

GENITOURINARY TRACT:

MUSCULOSKELETAL SYSTEM:

APPROVED—SIGNATURE

[redacted] LCDR MC USN

MILITARY ORGANIZATION (When required)	AGE	SEX	RACE	IDENTIFICATION NO.	AUTOPSY NO.
Navhosp, CLNC	25	Male	Cauc	[redacted]	A69-56

PATIENT'S IDENTIFICATION (For typed or written entries give: Name—last, first, middle; grade; date; hospital or medical facility)

CASEY, ROBERT BRIAN
1ST LT USMC

REGISTER NO.	WARD NO.
	CPSC

AUTOPSY PROTOCOL
Standard Form 503
503-104

(b) (6)

[redacted]

CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM:

GENERAL:

[redacted]

SPECIAL EXAMS:

Spe photographs and radiographic report. Specimens for toxicological studies have been sent to the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology and the results will be reported later.

CONSENT:

The autopsy findings of extreme mutilating injuries are consistent with the injury of aircraft-ground impact. There is no evidence of pre-existing disease.

(b) (6)

[redacted]

A6956 CASEY, ROBERT BRIAN PAGE 1

CLINICAL SUMMARY: This 25-year old caucasian male was killed in an aircraft accident, with the aircraft being from VMAT-AW-202 at Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina. The aircraft (A6A) is said to have been in a dive immediately before the accident and the co-pilot successfully ejected from the aircraft, but the pilot, Lt. Casey, was not able to successfully eject from the aircraft. Lt. Casey is said to have been on Darvon and Ananase for several days prior to the accident.

(b) (6)

[redacted]

(b) (6)

[redacted]

(b) (6)

[redacted]

(b) (6)

[redacted]

MARINE ALL WEATHER ATTACK TRAINING SQUADRON 202
Marine Combat Crew Readiness Training Group 20
2d Marine Aircraft Wing, FMF, Atlantic
Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, N. C. 28533

8:JP:grp
3750
14 October 1969

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commander, Naval Safety Center
Via: (1) CO, MCCRTG-20
(2) CG, 2dMAW
(3) COMNAVAIRLANT

Subj: Supplementary Report to MOR of VMAT(AW)-202 Serial 1-70A, A6A, 151584, occuring 26 August 1969, Pilot CASEY

Ref: (a) 3750.6F

Encl: (1) Report of Post-mortem Biochemical findings on Aircraft Accident Fatality of 1stLt Robert B. CASEY 010 30 90

1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosure (1) is hereby submitted.

C. G. Lawson

C. G. LAWSON
ACTING

Copies to:
(2) Commander, Naval Safety Center

ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE OF PATHOLOGY
WASHINGTON D. C. 20305

8/26/69

REPORT OF POST-MORTEM BIOCHEMICAL FINDINGS ON AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT FATALITY

IDENTIFICATION

CASEY, ROBERT B 21/69 (b) (6)
(b) (6)
NAVAL HOSP CP LEJEUNE NC 28542
2 SEP 69 A-69-55 A FROZEN T
RUSH

TO Chief, Laboratory Service
Naval Hospital
Camp Lejeune, N. C. 28542

cc NAVSAFECEN, Norfolk, Va. 23511
CNO OP-05F, Wash., D. C. 20360

1. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT DATA: AIRCRAFT TYPE: A6A AIRCRAFT SERIAL NUMBER:

(b) (6)

3. EXAMINATION AND REPORT BY: (b) (6) USAF

4. DATE OF REPORT: 16 September 1969

5. FOR THE DIRECTOR:
ROBERT M. DRAKE
Captain, MC, USN

6. SIGNATURE

AFIP FORM 64 (1 OCT 66)

XR c AT 1500 A-69-56

PATIENT'S LAST NAME — FIRST NAME — MIDDLE NAME

569-56

Cauly DOA

REGISTER NO.	WARD NO.
	Pathology

AGE: B SEX: M

(Check one) ☑ BEDSIDE, WHEELCHAIR, OR STRETCHER ☐ BED PATIENT ☐ AMBULATORY

[redacted]

DATE OF REQUEST: 8/26/69

(Above space for mechanical imprinting, if used)

PERTINENT CLINICAL HISTORY, OPERATIONS, PHYSICAL FINDINGS, AND PROVISIONAL DIAGNOSIS

Documentation of injuries aircraft accident

FILM NO. 10013

DATE OF REPORT: 26 AUG 1969

RADIOGRAPHIC REPORT

8-26-69

[redacted]

SIGNATURE: (Specify location of laboratory if not part of requesting facility)

NAME OF HOSPITAL OR OTHER MEDICAL FACILITY

-OVER-

Standard Form 519-A (Rev. Aug. 1954)— Promulgated by Bureau of the Budget Circular A—32 (Rev.)

RADIOGRAPHIC REPORT

519-205

[redacted]

[redacted] CDR MC USN

[redacted]

Complete spine series – Negative.

[redacted]

ORIGINAL

MESSAGE DRAFT
SND 446 I (Rev. 7-68)

CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 26 SEPTEMBER 1969

FROM	DRAFTED BY	DEPT.	RELEASED
NAVAL SAFETY CENTER	CDR (b) (6)	A. I.	LTCOL (b) (6)

ACTION		PRECEDENCE		INFO
MARAIRWEAATRARON TWO ZERO TWO			Mail	
			Night Message	
	X	X	Routine	
			Priority	
			Op Immed.	
			Emer.	
			Flash	

TEXT

UNCLAS E F T O

3750 A-6A BUNO 151574 ACCIDENT

1. WRECKAGE RELEASED TO SENIOR MEMBER OF BOARD.

2. INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN OPNAVINST 3750.6F, PAGE 20, PARA 32D APPLY.

REFERENCE MESSAGE

TOR 12397
648
4379

TRANSMIT BY RADIO—	CLASS OF REF.	CWO	TOR COMM. OFFICE	DATE/TIME GROUP
				041232Z SEP

A6A/151574 2MAT(AW)202 1-70A 8/26/69

NNNN
UZFRLS#67CZCSLA370
RTTUZYUW RUEBNLA2519 2390230-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU
R 270230Z AUG 69
FM MARALLWEAATRARON TWO ZERO TWO
TO RUENAAA/CNO
RUCILSA/NAVSAFCEN
INFO RUEBBHB/NAVAIRSYSCOM
RULYSJJ/FIFTH NAVAL DIST
RUCILMA/COMNAVAIRLANT
RUEBHOA/CMC (CODE AAP)
RUEBBHA/CHNAMAT
RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
RUWJMUA/COMNAVAIRPAC
RUEDMKA/CINCLANTFLT
ZEN/MCCRTG TWO ZERO
RUCILSA/FLTREADREPLANT
RUMLMHA/MAG ONE ONE
RUEBFJA/JAG
RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW
ZEN/CG SECOND MAW
RUEDJQA/NAVPLANTREPO (GRUMMAN CORP BETHPAGE, N.Y.)
RUEBAVA/CG FMFLANT



Suff INCIDENT

PAGE TWO RUEBNLA2519 UNCLAS FOUO
RUEBFDA/DIR AFIP
RUEBFA/BUPERS
ZEN/MAG ONE FOUR
RUCLSKA/RCVW FOUR
RUWJAPA/RCVW ONE TWO
RUMLMSA/MAG ONE TWO
BT
UNCLAS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
NAVY SUPPLEMENTARY MESSAGE REPORT OF AN AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
A. OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES
1. 26 AUG 0815 Q DAY
2. ADDITIONAL INFO: UTM COORDINATES TQ 095760;(LAT N 35 18 LONG W 77 28)
3. A6A 151574
4. VMAT(AW)-202 1-70A
5-6. REMAIN THE SAME
7. EJECTION ALTITUDE 3,500FEET AT.8 TO .9 MACH
8-9. REMAIN THE SAME
10. ACROBATICS
11. REPLACEMENT PILOT INITIATED FLAPERON ROLL AT 20,000 FEET, BUT AFTER 1/2 ROLL PULLED THROUGH TO APPARENT SPLIT-S. IP/COPILOT COMMANDED PULL OUT TO COMMENCE RECOVERY, BUT NO RESPONSIVE ACTION TAKEN BY

PAGE THREE RUEBNLA2519 UNCLAS FOUO
REPLACEMENT PILOT. IP EJECTED AT 3,500 FEET.
12-16. REMAIN THE SAME
17. (b) (6) MAJOR, SENIOR MEMBER AAB, VMAT(AW)-202 ASST ASO
PHONE OFFICE (AUTOVON) 555 1600 EXT 2032 HOME 919 466 7500
BT
#2519

90826103

A6A/151574 VMAT(AW)-202 1-70A 8/26/69 2702 3Pn

MESSAGE DRAFT
SND 4462 (Rev. 7-68)

CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED

DATE: 26 AUGUST 1969

FROM	DRAFTED BY	RELEASED
NAVAL SAFETY CENTER	CDR (b) (6) A. I.	CDR (b) (6)

ACTION

MARINE ALL WEATHER ATTACK SQUADRON
TWO ZERO TWO
CG MCAS CHERPT

V PRECEDENCE V		
	Mail	
	Night Message	
	Routine	X
X	Priority	
	Op Immed.	
	Emer.	
	Flash	

INFO

CNO
CMC
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
NAVAIRSYSCOMREPLANT
NAVPRO BETHPAGE
CG FMFLANT
COMNAVAIRLANT
CG SECOND MAW
COMSIX

TEXT

UNCLAS E F T O

37ØØ A-6A BUNO 151574 ACCIDENT

1. CDR (b) (6) USN, (b) (6) CLEARED TOP SECRET, WILL ARR ACDT SITE VIA GSA AUTO 18ØØ LOCAL 26 AUG 1969 TO CONDUCT NAVSAFECEN INVESTIGATION OF SUBJ ACDT.

2. INST CONTAINED IN OPNAV 375Ø.6I, PG 14, PARA 24B, AND PG 2Ø, PARA 32A (PRESERVATION OF WRECKAGE) APPLY.

REFERENCE MESSAGE

TOD 17476
4357
626

TRANSMIT BY RADIO —	CLASS OF REF.	CWO	TOR COMM. OFFICE	DATE/TIME GROUP
				2617397 AUG

A6A/151574 VMAT(AW)-202 1-76A 8/26/69

ZNY EEEEE
P 261722Z AUG 69
FM MARALLWEAATRARC[illegible]O ZERO TWO
TO RUENAAA/CNO
RUCILSA/NAVSAFCEN
INFO RUCILWA/NAVAIRSYSCOM
RULYSJJ/FIFTH NAVAL DIST
RUCILMA/COMNAVAIRLANT
RUEEHOA/CMC CODE AAP
RUEEBHA/CHNAMAT
RUHPFMA/CG FMFPAC
RUWLMUA/COMNAVAIRPAC
RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT
ZEN/MCCRTG TWO ZERO
RUCILSA/FLTREADREPLANT
RUMLMHA/MAG ONE ONE
RUEADWD/JAG
RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW
ZEN/CG SECOND MAW
RUELDQA/NAVPLANTREPO
RUEENVA/CG FMFLANT
RUEEPDA/DI
AF1P
RUEEJFA/BIPERS
YZEN/MAG ONE FOUR
RUCLSKA/RCVW FOUR
RUWJAPA/RCVW ONE TWO
RUMLMSA/MAG ONE TWO
BT

AAR STRIKE

05	01	011	012	013	014	015	02	02A	023	05	951
1	1		1	1			1			1	

TOR: _____ CHANNEL NUMBER 951A

INIT: Cm DATE _____

05	10	11	12	13	20	30	40	50	60	70	80
	A	1	1	1				1	1	1	1

(NORTHROP CORP BETHPAGE, N.Y.)
(#647..., :940 73500-&3, N.Y.)

P.R. COOK INVESTIGATING

29 Aug 69 22 032

A'
B'

UNCLAS E F T O FOR OFFICAL USE ONLY
NAVY PRELIMINARY MESSAGE REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
A. OPNAVINST 3750.6F
1. 26 AUG 0815 Q DAY
2. 098/22 GSB TACAN CHAN 112
3. A6A 151574
4. VMAT(AW)-202 1-70A
5. ALFA AIRCRAFT IMPACTED WITH GROUND IN NEAR STRAIGHT DOWN ATTITUDE
. CASEY, ROBERT B. 1/LT (b) (6) USMC, PILOT ACTIVE, ALFA
246 HRS TOTAL 3.4 IN MODEL 3.4 LAST 90 DAYS. MARTIN BAKER GRU-5
EJECTION ATTEMPT WAS UNSUCCESSFUL. REASON UNKNOWN. SUSPECT OUTSIDE
SEAT ENVELOPE.
7. (b) (6) 1/LT (b) (6) USMCR, CO-PILOT ACTIVE, BRAVO.

PAGE THREE RUEBNLA2446 UNCLAS E F T O FOUO
MARTIN BAKER GRU-5 EJECTION AT 4000 FEET .7 MACH AIRCRAFT NOSE DOWN
EJECTION SUCCESSFUL.
8. N/A
9. LOCAL FAM, 1.GO VFR
00. UNK
11. REPLACEMENT PILOT LOST CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT, DID NOT AFFECT
PULLOUT WHEN TOLD TO BY IP/CO-PILOT. IP EJECTED AT 4000 FEET
12. CLEAR 7 MILES VISIBILITY
13. NONE
14. NONE
15. NONE
16. WRECKAGE IS ACCESSABLE BY ROAD
17. CAPT CWM R. SAPPENFIELD VMAT(AW)-202 ASST ASO PHONE OFSICE
(AUTOVON) 555 1600 EXT 3429 HOME 919 447 7412
BT
#2446 A6A/151574 VMAT(AW)-202 1-70A

90826103
Aug 261722Z
8/26/69